

**A SENTENCE COMPLETION MEASURE OF KOHUT AND
WOLF'S NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY TYPES**

by

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B.A., University of British Columbia, 1987

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**Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

in the Department
of
Psychology

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
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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

The present study reconstructed a Sentence Completion test and scoring manual (Estrin, 1994) originally designed to measure Kohut and Wolf's (1978) *mirror-hungry*, *ideal-hungry*, and *twinsip-hungry* subclinical narcissistic personalities in a student sample. In order to extend the test's range, 140 student and 20 psychotherapy client participants were recruited. Operational definitions were revised and subscales constructed according to theory-driven rules, resulting in a 24-item test with 3 subscales representing the behavioral expression of the narcissistic need (*m1*, *i1*, *t1*), and 3 representing narcissistic vulnerability (*m2*, *i2*, *t2*). Inter-rater reliability was satisfactory for all subscales except *i1*. Student participants demonstrated greater ideal-hunger and grandiose narcissism. Females scored higher than males on narcissistic vulnerability. An analysis of scoring patterns determined that, as expected, mirror-hunger was most prevalent, and twinsip-hunger the least. A principal components analysis resulted in 4 oblique factors, suggesting both vulnerable and grandiose mirror-hungry narcissism, and the attraction and disappointment dynamics underlying twinsip-hunger. Aggregated content validity findings were consistent with theoretical models for mirror- and twinsip-hunger, but not ideal-hunger. All subscales except *i1* demonstrated convergence with self-rating measures of the personality constructs, but predicted associations between subscales and corresponding other-rating scales completed by therapists of clinical participants were not supported. Convergent validity was not demonstrated for the *i1* subscale, whereas *i2* was related to defensiveness. Twinsip-hungry scales were related to dependency and reassurance-seeking (for *t1*), and risk-avoidance (for *t2*). The combination of the *m1* and *m2*

subscales conformed to Kohut & Wolf's (1978) description of the mirror-hungry type as being both attention- and recognition-seeking, and defensive. As predicted, the *m1* (attention-seeking) subscale was related to overt narcissism, whereas the *m2* (vulnerability) subscale was associated with both overt and covert characteristics. Product term multiple regression analyses were inconclusive in attempting to demonstrate: a) that the low *m1*/high *m2* scoring profile was related to covert narcissism, and b) that narcissistic vulnerability (as manifested by the high *m1*/high *m2* scoring profile) was associated with overt narcissism. However, cumulative evidence suggested a relationship between overt narcissism and narcissistic vulnerability. Overall findings supported the validity of the mirror-hungry scale as a measure of exhibitionistic-vulnerable subclinical narcissism.

DEDICATION

For Yael and Orly, with love.

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INTRODUCTION

Narcissistic trends are frequent in our culture. More often than not people are incapable of true friendship and love; they are egocentric, that is, concerned with their security, health, recognition; they feel insecure and tend to overrate their personal significance; they lack judgment of their own value because they have relegated it to others. These typical narcissistic features are by no means restricted to persons who are incapacitated by neuroses. (Horney, 1939, p. 98)

Long before he abandoned mainstream psychoanalysis, Heinz Kohut encountered patients who did not respond to analytic interpretation, nor could their disturbances be explained within the classical drive model (Kohut, 1971, 1977, 1978). The core characteristic of these patients (revealed, as Kohut notes, through the *process* of therapy, rather than specific symptoms), consisted of a reactivation of archaic narcissistic needs in the analytic relationship. Kohut's recognition of these "narcissistic transferences" not only made therapeutic progress possible, but led to the development of a theoretical framework that describes psychic development not in terms of drive and conflict, but as the interplay between a continually evolving self and one's experience of significant others who provide (or fail to provide) the narcissistic supplies necessary to that self's integrity (Kohut, 1977, 1978, 1984, Silverstein, 1999).

Kohut (1977, 1978, 1984) described three narcissistic needs as essential to the development of a coherent self: to receive confirming and admiring responses (mirroring), to experience those who exemplify the qualities to which we aspire (ideals), and to have a sense of belonging through likeness in our relationships (twinship). It was maintained that if these needs were not met in a phase-appropriate manner, even a relatively healthy personality

might be influenced by the perpetual search for gratification of that need. Kohut & Wolf (1978) presented a tentative typology of subclinical, externally-dependent narcissistic types, wherein the mirror-hungry, ideal-hungry, and twinship-hungry personalities form a nonpathological subgroup within a greater classification of narcissistic self-disorders (Wolf, 1988, 1994). In recent years, assessment instruments have been constructed from various derivations of Kohut's mirroring and idealization concepts (Robbins & Patton, 1985, Lapan & Patton, 1986, and Slyter, 1989), but the three "normal" narcissistic personalities described by Kohut & Wolf (1978) have yet to be empirically validated. The present study outlines the reconstruction and validation of a sentence completion test and scoring manual (Estrin, 1994) designed to identify the three subclinical narcissistic need-states in a student and clinical sample.

Dissertation Overview

The *Literature Review* is divided into two sections. The *theoretical review* outlines important contributions to the concept of narcissism, prior to and including Kohut's self psychology model, with an emphasis on the distinction between normal and maladaptive narcissistic presentation. The review concludes with a discussion of Kohut and Wolf's (1978) three narcissistic personality types, and their operationalization in the present study. The *empirical review* provides a history of the assessment of pathological and subclinical narcissism within the broader forum of grandiose-type narcissism research, followed by a review of those measures based solely on self-psychology-derived narcissism constructs. The empirical review concludes with a summary of the Master's thesis research antecedent to the present

study, followed by a brief outline of current research objectives. The *Research Objectives* section describes objectives and hypotheses, set in the context of the previous (Master's) study, and other prior research. Research Objectives also reports some results completed prior to the statistical analysis, including: a) revisions to the operational definitions, b) revisions to the item pool using theory-based selection methodology, and c) reconstruction of the previous scoring manual. *Methods* describes the student and clinical sub-samples, recruitment issues specific to the two samples, test administration, and scoring procedures. *Results* presents findings pertaining to inter-rater reliability, content validity findings, and the relationship of the Sentence Completion test scales to: a) self- and other-rating narcissism measures, b) a measure of subclinical narcissism, and c) a selection of personality scales. Two additional analyses present findings pertaining to the measurement of covert narcissism, and the relationship between overt narcissism and narcissistic vulnerability. The *Discussion* section explores the implications of these findings, their limitations, and future directions for research.

Literature Review

The Concept of Narcissism

In the voluminous literature on narcissism, there are probably only two facts upon which everyone agrees: first, that the concept of narcissism is one of the most important contributions of psychoanalysis; second, that it is one of the most confusing. (Pulver, 1970, p. 90)

According to the Greek myth, the young and beautiful Narcissus was punished for his callous rejection of all suitors, condemned to fall in love with his own reflection. Trapped as he was in his unrequited torment, Narcissus took his own life (Graves, 1960). The term “narcissism” eventually came to represent instances of self-absorption (fatal or otherwise). In 1898, Havelock Ellis employed “narcissus-like” to describe a situation where one treated one’s own body as a sexual object. However, it was Paul Näcke who, in 1899, first employed “narcissism” to refer to a general state of self-admiration (Freud, 1914; Morrison, 1986). In his landmark 1914 paper, Freud extended the term to include non-sexual behavior, defining it in the general instance as when libidinal energy is invested in the ego, rather than other people (Freud, 1914, Pulver, 1970).

Despite (or perhaps because of) its theoretical and clinical importance, narcissism has for the last century remained a fluid concept. Early psychoanalytic literature defined it as a sexual perversion, a stage of development, a type of object relationship, or states of self-esteem (Pulver, 1970, pp. 109-110), whereas current psychoanalytic definitions favor Kernberg’s (1995) metapsychological “libidinal investment of the self,” and clinical “regulation of self-esteem” definitions (p. 7). Kohut’s self psychology accommodates both

definitions, but diverges with respect to Kernberg's adherence to the stage model of libidinal development (wherein narcissistic libido is transformed into object love), and instead views narcissism as following its own normal developmental trajectory into adulthood (Kohut, 1966, 1984). Most importantly, Kohut's theories focus less on pathological extremes and more on what is assumed to be the ubiquity of relatively mild narcissistic disturbances (Kohut, 1966, 1984).

Freud

Any discussion of narcissism must begin with Freud's description of the primary, normal, and secondary forms, as well as his discussion of the ego ideal and the relationship between narcissism and self-worth. Freud (1914) postulated a *primary narcissism* that constitutes the natural starting point for the infant's psychic life. In this pre-differentiated state, the libido is wholly invested in the ego, and the infant experiences him/herself as one with what is perceived as a perfect, all-powerful caregiver, both factors engendering feelings of grandiosity and omnipotence (Freud, 1914, Cooper, 1974). Maturation is seen to follow a process of separation/individuation that directs the libido from the ego to external objects. In adulthood, primary narcissism is therefore (optimally) abandoned for mature object love, the highest form being when one is in love, wherein "the subject seems to give up his own personality in favor of an object-cathexis" (Freud, 1914, p. 20). Freud (1914) noted however, that even within the parameters of object love, one may still make a *narcissistic object-choice*. That is, one may love a person because he/she is what he himself is, was, would like to be, or resembles someone who was once part of himself (p. 33).

Freud (1914) described three manifestations of adult narcissism: normal, secondary (transient), and overtly pathological. Apart from the assertion that mature object love shall replace the infant's ego-directed libido, Freud did acknowledge that adults display what he deemed a *normal narcissism*. Differing from primary narcissism in degree only, normal narcissism here represents the "libidinal complement to the egoism of self-preservation, a measure of which may be attributed to every living creature" (1914, p. 18). Freud also noted that in situations where disease or other stresses cause a person to focus inwardly, *secondary narcissism* may temporarily emerge as a regressive redirection of libido from the object world to the self. Lastly, Freud (1914) labeled the schizophrenic's complete withdrawal from the world of objects a *pathological* form of narcissism.

Freud also alluded to a relationship between narcissistic libido and the regulation of self-regard (or self-esteem).¹ To explain this, one must first understand that Freud (1914) maintained that vestiges of primary narcissism survive into adulthood in the form of *self-regard* and the *ego ideal*. As the omnipotence and perfection of infancy is gradually disrupted by cultural pressures and internal critical judgments, the self-love enjoyed by the ego in childhood is preserved as the ego ideal—the repository for all that is perfect and worthy, the guide for the ego's aspirations, and the means by which the superego calculates punishments for deviations from that ideal (Freud, 1914, Morrison, 1986). The ego ideal also serves a role

¹ Freud was not the first to describe such a relationship, simply the first to be acknowledged for it. In his *History of Emotions*, Ribot (1896) outlines the consequences of positive and negative self-regard, as well as the continuum from positive self-regard to megalomania – a discussion that was virtually ignored by mainstream psychology until Freud's 1914 paper (Nemiah, 1998).

in the regulation of self-regard, as not only is self-regard in part the residue of primary narcissism, but also the result of fulfillment of the ego ideal's standards and the ego's goals. Self-regard is therefore described as partly dependent upon the extent to which current experience and accomplishments match up to the remnants of primitive grandiosity contained within the ego ideal (Freud, 1914, Cooper, 1974).

Freud provided the basis for all contemporary narcissism theories. To summarize, his contributions include the concept of primary narcissism in the infant, a definition of normal, secondary and pathological narcissism, the recognition of a narcissistic object-choice, and the relationship between primary narcissism, the ego ideal, and self-regard. It is important to note that Freud's 1914 essay was written before his structural theory was developed and, apart from mention of a narcissistic libidinal character type in 1931, the ideas presented here were never developed further. It is generally accepted that not until Hartmann (1950) shifted the libidinal focus from the ego to the self did the renewed psychoanalytic study of narcissism occur (Morrison, 1986). However, predating Hartmann, Horney's (1939) (infrequently acknowledged) refutation of Freud's idea that healthy self-esteem and pathological narcissism occur on the same continuum (Cooper, 1998), constitutes a major contribution to modern theories of narcissism, particularly those of Kernberg and Kohut.

Horney

Horney (1939) accepted the psychoanalytic notion that egocentricity detracts from interest in others and impairs one's capacity to love. However, she rejected Freud's (1914)

assertion that because normal and pathological narcissism both originate in self-directed libido, they differ by degree only. While Freud maintained that the narcissistic person loves others less because he loves himself too much, Horney (1939) contended that normal and pathological narcissism differ *qualitatively* because they represent fundamentally different attitudes toward the self.

Horney (1939) described the pathological narcissist as someone who loves and admires him/herself (and expects love and admiration from others) for qualities or achievements that exist for the most part in fantasy. Normal narcissism (or true self-esteem) is expressed when a person values (or expects others to value) a quality in him/herself that he/she actually possesses. Normal self-esteem and pathological self-inflation are therefore mutually exclusive because the latter represents not self-love, but alienation from the self. Horney (1939) therefore viewed all unhealthy forms of narcissism as neurotic attempts to cope with the self and others through self-inflation, stating that the person who engages in self-aggrandizement “clings to illusions about himself because he has lost himself” (p. 89).

Horney (1939) also described several narcissistic character trends—varying in severity depending on the degree of alienation from the self—that ensure the pathological narcissist’s continued alienation: an inability to enjoy work (because constant anticipation of applause chokes creativity), a sense of entitlement, and relationships impaired by defensiveness, vindictiveness, distrust, and a tendency to disregard those who do not provide narcissistic supplies (p. 95). Each of these trends was seen to accompany a self-destructive cycle in which self-inflation leads to social humiliation, and further self-inflation (Horney, 1939).

Horney (1939) believed that pathological narcissism was the result of emotional deprivation in infancy. Driven by a fear of abandonment, the child who experiences little or no emotional sustenance abandons the “real me” in order to receive parental approval. The child’s sense of self and self-esteem therefore become externally dependent, leading in mild cases to impaired self-esteem, and in severe cases to a complete suppression of the spontaneous self (1939, p. 91). Given such a scenario, few options exist for the child. The narcissistic route—coping through fantasy-based self-aggrandizement—offers several spurious advantages: 1) the atrophied authentic self is replaced by a sense of self rooted in fantasy, which supports diminished self-esteem, 2) fantasy provides consolation for a lack of love and appreciation, and 3) self-aggrandizement provides a means to create gratifying “relationships” based on received admiration rather than love. The disadvantage, of course, is that any failure in this artificial support system causes the illusion to give way to the underlying insecurity (Horney, 1939, p. 92)

Horney made several primary contributions to the psychoanalytic discussion of narcissism. Foreshadowing the modern theories of Kohut and Kernberg, her reinterpretation of the distinction between normal and pathological narcissism addressed the disturbed object relations and impoverished self-esteem that are fundamental to narcissistic pathology, stating: “to the extent that [one] is narcissistic [one] is incapable of loving either himself or anyone else” (Horney, 1939, p. 100). Horney also provided new etiological and dynamic explanations for narcissistic pathology, and articulated the relationship between healthy narcissism and self-esteem in a manner that had not been previously addressed. Lastly, Horney predated modern cultural critics (i.e., Lasch, 1979) as she argued for the

prevalence of sub-pathological narcissism, claiming that Western culture engenders unhealthy narcissistic trends by valuing appearance over substance and promoting the acquisition of possessions or prestige as an antidote to inner emptiness (Horney, 1939, p. 93).

The Ego Psychologists: Hartmann, Jacobson, and Reich

While Freud certainly initiated the discussion of narcissism, it was Heinz Hartmann (1950) and Edith Jacobson (1954) who outlined a clear functional definition of the concept. Hartmann (1950) addressed what appeared to be a fundamental ambiguity in Freud's original definition—the libidinal cathexis of the ego. The problem, according to Hartmann (1950), was that Freud variously defined narcissism as the libidinal cathexis of the *ego* (a psychic structure), the *self* (the whole person, both physical and psychic), and *self-representation* (the ego representation of one's physical and mental self) (p. 84). Hartmann attempted to clarify the issue by stating that the opposite of object cathexis is not (as Freud maintained) ego cathexis (that is, cathexis of an entire psychic subsystem), but rather, cathexis of one's self (Hartmann, 1950, Taggart-White, 1979).

Jacobson (1954) extended Hartmann's thesis, describing narcissism as the libidinal investment not of the ego, but of the self-representation. Jacobson's seemingly simple distinction had profound implications, as it refined an idea originally suggested by Freud (1914), who implied that the function of the narcissistic object-choice is to regulate self-esteem by maintaining a positive self-representation (an implication that was not extended further). By distinguishing between self-representation and ego, Jacobson (1954) was able to

state clearly that the function of narcissistic activity is to regulate the affective tone of the self-representation (Stolorow, 1975).

Building upon the work of Jacobson, Annie Reich (1960) outlined how for both normal and pathological narcissism, narcissistic behavior patterns serve to maintain the self-representation, and in some instances, represent compensatory attempts to repair a self-representation damaged by early trauma (Stolorow, 1975). Like Horney, Reich (1960) also promoted the idea of an endemic “normal” narcissism (often displayed in the tactics used to regulate self-esteem), and emphasized that narcissistic behaviors do not equate with pathology. Reich (1960) noted that it is not unusual to see “a partial regression to earlier ego and libidinal states mixed with later, more highly developed structures...even a marked narcissistic orientation need not be completely...characterized by a withdrawal of the entire cathexis from objects” (p. 44).

According to Reich (1960) pathological narcissism is characterized by frequent oscillation between feelings of grandiosity and worthlessness—evidence of a profound vulnerability to “narcissistic injury” (manifested as uncontrollable feelings of helplessness, anxiety, and rage), and maladaptive attempts to protect the self from such injury. Foreshadowing both Kohut and Kernberg, Reich (1960) described how this cycle may be observed in two different narcissistic strategies. For example, some attempt may be made to stabilize the self-representation through identification, merger, or idealization, a strategy inevitably disrupted by contempt for the self and object, or perhaps envious rage (Reich, 1960, Morrison, 1986). In the other, more common maladaptive strategy, Reich (1960) described a “bottomless need for grandiosity as a form of compensatory striving,” often

accompanied by a superego disturbance that causes self-consciousness and overdependence on outside approval. (pp. 46-47). For Reich (1960) the ability to live up *sufficiently* to the demands of one's ego ideal constitutes healthy self-esteem regulation, whereas grandiose narcissistic pathology reflects an absence of accurate reality testing, the result of an overly demanding (i.e., infantile) ego ideal (p. 46).

Hartmann and Jacobson effected a conceptual shift in the discussion of narcissism by distinguishing between the ego and self, redefining narcissism as the libidinal cathexis of the self or self-representation, and described how the function of narcissistic "activity" was to regulate affect around self-representation (Hartmann, 1950, Jacobson, 1954, Stolorow, 1975). Reich introduced a dynamic description of narcissistic pathology in which a) narcissism is characterized by an oscillation between vulnerability and grandiosity, and b) self esteem may be regulated through self-aggrandizement or identification with an idealized other (in this regard, Reich represents an important precursor to Kohut). In summary, the ego psychologists initiated the next stage in the study of the relationship between narcissism, self-esteem, self- and object representations, and the ego ideal, providing a conceptual bridge between Freud's initial formulation and modern psychoanalytic theories of Kohut and Kernberg.

Kernberg

Kernberg's theory of narcissism, a fusion of psychoanalysis, ego psychology, and object relations, represents one of two dominant contemporary models. To provide some context for this discussion, it should be noted that Kernberg's views are built upon several

assumptions. First, when referring to libidinal investment, Kernberg (1970, 1974, 1995) *de-emphasizes* the concept of *ego* in favor of *self* (an amalgam of self-representations). Second, Kernberg asserts that investment in the self (narcissistic investment) and investment in other people and their representations (object investment) are seen to occur simultaneously and interact – from the very beginnings of psychic development. Kernberg therefore rejects Freud's concept of primary narcissism, asserting that even at the earliest, undifferentiated stages of consciousness, one is aware of an external object (albeit fused with oneself) (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Kernberg, 1995). Kernberg's (1974, 1995) third fundamental assumption is that healthy narcissism and a resultant involvement in object love are the outgrowth of healthy inner object representations acquired in infancy, whereas pathological narcissism results from unhealthy inner object-relatedness. Consequently, Kernberg (1995) maintains that grandiose adult narcissism is a pathological condition that does *not* constitute a return to infantile narcissism (Kohut's position). As such, Kernberg's model views grandiose adult narcissism and infantile narcissism as qualitatively different.

Kernberg (1995) defines normal narcissism as normal self-esteem regulation, and pathological narcissism as pathological self-esteem regulation. Normal narcissism is seen as taking two forms: mature and immature. Mature narcissism is the more stable and resistant to injury, (i.e., reactions to failure experiences tend to be limited to transient self criticism). Immature narcissism is most commonly associated with neurotic states, (i.e., one responds to injury with mood swings) (Kernberg, 1995). The development of overtly pathological narcissism, however, appears to be the result of a specific reaction to negative developmental conditions.

Kernberg (1970, 1974, 1995) suggests that pathological narcissism emerges between the ages of five and ten as a reaction to the chronic and unbearable frustration of the need to be loved. It is believed that the child reacts with intense (oral) rage manifested as envy of those who withhold love, along with the wish to destroy those who are envied. Kernberg (1970) describes how the early experience of chronic, primitive rage and frustration may lead to a pathological adaptation wherein the ideal self (which compensates for frustration and defends against rage and envy), ideal object (the fantasized image of a loving parent), and actual self (with an emphasis on those aspects of the self for which the parents *do* give approval) condense into a grandiose self. This defensive maneuver is accompanied by a devaluation of significant objects and their representations, thereby sealing the infant off from normal dependency on others. The result is “a hungry, enraged, empty self, full of impotent anger at being frustrated, and fearful of a world which seems as revengeful and hateful as the patient himself” (Kernberg, 1970, p. 219). Therefore, to develop pathological narcissism, one must over-invest in a *pathological grandiose self* that emerges as a defensive barrier against a world devoid of emotional sustenance. This fusion of ideal self, ideal object and actual self is extremely effective at inducing self admiration, depreciation of others, and eradication of dependency needs (and is virtually identical to the DSM narcissistic personality disorder) (Kernberg, 1995).

While Kernberg’s description of the narcissistic type is emphatically pathological, he notes that such persons may appear to function extremely well, displaying adequate impulse control, ego boundaries, and reality testing. However, even the “least severe” example of narcissistic symptomatology, is characterized by “a chronic sense of emptiness or

boredom...an inordinate need for approval and success...[and a] remarkable incapacity for empathy and emotional investment in others....” (Kernberg, 1998, p. 37). Furthermore, such person’s interpersonal behavior reveals a profoundly distorted sense of self and others, and despite excellent surface functioning, their capacity for regression can surprise the analyst: “their interactions reflect very intense, primitive, internalized object relationships of a frightening kind and an incapacity to depend on internalized good objects” (Kernberg, 1970, p. 214). Kernberg therefore appears to suggest that even mild manifestations of the grandiose self reflect a profoundly pathological state.

Although Kernberg goes so far as to describe normal narcissism, his primary focus is the pathological form and its variants. His theory of a pathological self that develops to defend against a loveless world (imbued with projected rage and profound feelings of worthlessness) stands in stark contrast to Kohut’s model. While both Kernberg and Kohut concur that disorders of the self arise from deprivation of basic emotional needs, Kohut suggests that narcissistic disturbances are not innately pathological, as they constitute an arrest at an early stage of normal development, rather than a pathological structure that emerges to defend against instinctual conflict.

Kernberg and Kohut: a Brief Comparison

By way of introduction to Kohut’s theories, some fundamental differences between Kernberg and Kohut bear mentioning, most notably their respective divergence on the concept of self, the etiology of narcissistic pathology, and the relationship between self- and object-libido. Kernberg and Kohut both view the self as the locus of relationships. Like

Jacobson, Kernberg defines the self as part of the contents of the ego, a collection of representations that is a byproduct of the ego's activity in the interpersonal realm. Kohut's concept of self, however, is much more than a representation, as he grants it a functional role as the organizing center of personality—a supraordinate structure that displays functions previously attributed to the id, ego, and superego in drive theory (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1984)

Kohut's explanation as to the genesis of narcissistic disorders is also diametrically opposed to Kernberg's model. While both theorists consider the self's vulnerability to emotional deprivation to be the root cause of any narcissistic disturbance, each differs as to the nature of the adaptation. Whereas Kernberg (1995) adopts an instinctual conflict model wherein infantile rage generates a defensive, pathological structure by a splitting-off of negative elements of the self, Kohut (1984) proposes a nonjudgmental, almost humanistic model, wherein aggression is secondary to the initial injury to the self. Kohut suggests that one begins life with the germ of a self that derives emotional nourishment and develops in a cohesive manner via the internalization of relationships, a process that serves to maintain self-cohesion and self-esteem across the lifespan. If, in childhood, one experiences a dearth of adequate environmental responsiveness to developmentally-appropriate narcissistic needs, the result is an arrest at whatever stage of normal narcissism was left unfulfilled, an incomplete self, and a lifelong oscillation between self-cohesion and fragmentation (Kohut, 1978b).

What Kohut meant by healthy narcissism, then, was not merely self-directed libido or regulation of self-esteem (as Kernberg defines it), but that entire constellation of needs

that sustain one's emotional life. Narcissistic needs are so central to Kohut's developmental scheme that they are considered no less important than the physiological ones, for they sustain our experience of ourselves and define us all as living creative beings. Consequently, Kohut conceived of self- and object-libido as following separate (rather than intertwined) developmental trajectories. Narcissism may therefore lead not only to object love, but can also evolve into various mature forms, such as humor, empathy, and creativity (Kohut, 1984).

As a final comment, it is worth noting that the differences in narcissistic presentation described by these two models may reflect more than just theoretical allegiance. Shulman (1986) observes that clients whose narcissistic disturbance is the result of instinctual conflict tend to display aggression in their object relations, react to therapist empathy with contempt, and induce negative countertransference (i.e., feelings of being exploited), whereas clients whose disturbance is the result of developmental arrest display little aggression and tend to seek an empathic connection with the therapist, thereby promoting a benevolent therapeutic stance. Kernberg and Kohut may therefore be correctly describing two very different varieties of narcissistic pathology, each of which corresponds to a specific developmental outcome (Shulman, 1986).

Kohut***Theoretical Overview***

From early on I valued the gift of memory above all others. I understood that as we grow older we carry a whole nation around inside of us, places and ways that have disappeared, believing that they are ours, that we alone hold the torch for our past.... Memory still seems a gift to me and I hold tight to those few things that are forever gone and always a part of me.... (Hamilton, 1994, p. 39)

Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984, 1985) proposed that narcissistic needs mediate the lifelong relationship between the *self* (a psychic structure that serves as the center of initiative) and its *selfobjects* (experiences of significant others that provide the narcissistic supplies necessary for the self's development) (Basch, 1994). According to Kohut's developmental sequence, as the infant's experience of primary narcissism is inevitably disrupted, that "lost experience of global narcissistic perfection" is replaced by two narcissistic structures: the grandiose self and the idealized parent imago (Kohut, 1971, p. 25). The infant's nascent self therefore thrives when caregivers are experienced as echoing and approving of the infant's healthy grandiosity (i.e., provide adequate "mirroring"), and are available as an idealizable source of dependable strength and comfort. Given an emotionally responsive environment to balance the inevitable interruptions in parent-child empathic rapport, these two forms of narcissistic gratification lead, through a process Kohut (1984) termed *transmuting internalization*, to the development of the twin constituents of the mature *bipolar self*. Hence, sufficient "mirroring" by caregivers in infancy leads to a cohesive sense of one's self-worth and abilities as an adult (the pole of *ambitions*), and the experience of having a reliable calming presence in infancy is

metabolized into a secure sense of one's own strength, ability to self-soothe, and mature ideals (the pole of *ideals*). Kohut (1984) later conceived of the self as a *tripartite* entity, suggesting that the child's participation as "a human being among other human beings" evolves into the self's third facet -- a sense of likeness and belonging (the alterego or twinship function) (p. 200). Unlike drive theory which emphasizes the primacy of narcissism in infancy, Kohut's self psychology views these three types of selfobject relationships as the vehicle through which healthy narcissistic needs are met across the lifespan.

Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984, 1985) maintained that if a child's narcissistic needs are chronically thwarted, beyond what he termed *optimal frustration*, then even subtle deprivations may result in an incomplete self in adulthood. This damaged self—experienced as an impoverished sense of self-esteem, goal-lessness, anxiety, or emptiness—may attempt to locate people or things that, through the selfobject function, can temporarily fill rifts in self structure. Kohut and Wolf (1978) suggested that this search for gratification in one or more of the three need domains may constitute a major organizing influence even in a relatively healthy personality, and so proposed three tentative character types, each representing an adaptation to the frustration of one or more of the narcissistic needs. The mirror-hungry type is forever in search of appreciative responses, the ideal-hungry is sustained by affiliation with admired others, and the twinship-hungry seeks relationships that confirm a sense of self through similarity (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, Wolf, 1988, 1994). For each type, a built-in “disappointment clause” ensures that fulfillment is transitory; self-esteem fluctuates, but in the absence of external input (i.e., flattery, the presence of an idealized or similar other), the affective resting state is dysphoric. Thus, whatever attention the mirror-hungry receives soon

fades; the ideal-hungry inevitably discovers their ideal's imperfections; and the twinship-hungry realizes that they have not found their twin. Despite their externally-dependent stance, these types are meant to represent the subclinical range of three continua which include the pathological narcissistic need states (Kohut & Wolf, 1978).

Classification of Self-Disorders

Self-psychology divides narcissistic psychopathology into primary and secondary disorders of the self. Primary self-disorders reflect a profoundly damaged self-structure, as is found in the psychoses and borderline states. The hallmark of such disturbances is not just the location of the self-defect, but the *extent* of its manifestation. In contrast, secondary self-disturbances are those complaints that fall within the range of normal selfobject relations and reflect relatively minor defects in self structure, or simply the self's reactions to the vicissitudes of life. In such instances, it the *location* of the defect that determines the personality characteristics, rather than the extent (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, Kohut, 1984, Wolf, 1994).

Despite Kohut and Wolf's (1978) inclusion of the mirror-, ideal-, and twinship-hungry types among the secondary self-disturbances (i.e., within the normal range of functioning), they nevertheless represent a less-than-optimal interpersonal stance. When contrasted with healthy manifestations of selfobject relations, the three types most resemble persons whose (relatively mild) emotional disequilibrium compels them to continually seek the satisfaction of specific narcissistic needs—rather than those whose self is sustained by, but not desperately dependent upon, interactions with the significant people in their lives.

Kohut and Wolf (1978) describe two other character types which are to be considered plainly pathological. The *merger-hungry* personality is characterized by an intense need to fuse with and control the selfobject as a replacement for missing self-structure. The *contact-shunning* personality is characterized by social isolation motivated by an intense need for the selfobject, and an equally intense fear that the need cannot possibly be fulfilled. While these two pathological types likely exist as described here, it may be useful to think of the mirror-, ideal-, and twinship-hungry types as displaying either merger-hungry or contact-shunning characteristics. The degree to which each of the three types seeks merger or isolation could serve as further indication of the *extent* of the self-defect; mild manifestations would likely indicate normal functioning, whereas intense needs may suggest a compensatory strategy indicative of greater damage to self-structure.

The Three Types: Description, Operationalization, and Assessment Considerations

Mirror-hungry type

When somebody thinks you're wonderful
 What a difference in your day
 Seems as though your troubles disappear
 Like a feather in your way. (Woods, 1935)

Having one's innate worth recognized by others is a basic emotional need across the lifespan. The infant's nascent self, however, is particularly sensitive to the presence or absence of that "echoing presence" (Silverstein, 1999, p. 9), as phase-appropriate and timely responses to a child's being are incorporated as feelings of self-worth and vigor. For the

adult who obtained adequate mirroring in childhood, admiration and affirmation continue to play an important role in maintaining self-cohesion, but its absence (while sometimes uncomfortable) need not trigger a collapse of self esteem. Early mirroring-selfobject failure however, deprives the child's self of emotional nourishment, leaving feelings of emptiness, worthlessness, shame, and vulnerability to criticism—and an intense hunger for that missing attention (Kohut, 1984, Silverstein, 1999). In the adult, the search for admiration becomes a much more urgent affair, as it serves to temporarily stave off the feelings of fragmentation and dysphoria resulting from an incomplete self. The mirror-hungry personality, then, represents a state where one's sense of well-being and self-worth are overly dependent upon the appreciative responses of others (Kohut, 1984). Kohut and Wolf (1978) describe the mirror-hungry personality as follows:

Mirror-hungry personalities thirst for selfobjects whose confirming and admiring responses will nourish the famished self. They are impelled to display themselves and to evoke the attention of others, trying to counteract, however fleetingly, their inner sense of worthlessness and lack of self-esteem. Some of them are able to establish relationships with reliably mirroring others that will sustain them for long periods. But most of them will not be nourished for long, even by genuinely accepting responses. Thus, despite their discomfort about their need to display themselves and despite their sometimes severe stage fright and shame they must go on trying to find new selfobjects whose attention and recognition they seek to induce. (p. 421)

For the purposes of this study, a theory-driven approach was used to derive operational definitions from Kohut and Wolf's personality descriptions. It was assumed that what Kohut and Wolf (1978) describe as the two key features of the *pathological* narcissistic disorder syndrome—1) the behavioral expression of a narcissistic need, and 2) evidence of

labile self esteem contingent on need-fulfillment—would also constitute the dynamic underlying subclinical narcissistic disturbances. By employing these two features as a template, Kohut and Wolf's (1978) personality description was reduced to two constructs, one representing the behavioral manifestation of the need, and another for evidence of labile self esteem, each of which would later serve as scale definitions (see also: Research Objectives):

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|---------------------------------------|--|
| Behavioral manifestation of the need: | m1. Displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses. |
| Evidence of labile self-esteem: | m2. Low self-esteem (or other indication of narcissistic fragility, such as rage or cold rejection) in the absence of confirming and admiring responses. |

These two components capture the essential mirror-hungry dynamic: a persistent attempt to maintain, albeit temporarily, the notion that "I am perfect" (Kohut, 1971, p.27). However, because of the impossibility of healing a long standing self-defect by external means, self-esteem is transitory, contingent upon need-satisfaction.

While the portrait of the mirror-hungry type presented here is that of a subclinical narcissist who both craves attention, and may be at least *indirectly* aware of their fragile self-esteem, it likely falls in the middle of a continuum anchored at one end by a narcissistic manifestation described as grandiose/exhibitionistic, and at the other by vulnerable/insecure narcissism. Discussions of pathological narcissistic subtypes have variously labeled these two forms overt and covert (Wink, 1991, 1992), or arrogant and shy (Kernberg, 1995; Cooper, 1998; Ronningstam, 1999).

Overt/arrogant narcissism (termed *phallic* by Reich, 1949) is characterized by grandiosity, exhibitionism, and an arrogant/superior manner. Such persons appear to possess high self-esteem and composure in the face of life's ups and downs—unless exposed to a withdrawal of narcissistic gratification such as criticism or defeat—to which they react with defensiveness, rage, or coldness. While it has been suggested that the overt narcissist's grandiosity and self-inflation serve a defensive function to compensate for underlying (and often unacknowledged) fragile self-esteem (Kohut, 1971, 1977; Kernberg, 1975; Cooper, 1998; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991a, 1991b; Watson, Hickman, & Morris, 1996), scant empirical support exists for the overt narcissist's (clinically documented) sensitivity to criticism (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998; Arkin & Lakin, 2001).

The inherent problem, then, in designing a test to measure the mirror-hungry type is that grandiosity and denial of vulnerability may be mistaken for a healthy expression of mirror-needs.² As Millon (1998) states: “where to draw the line between self-confidence and healthy self-esteem compared with an artificially inflated and empty sense of self-worth is not always an easy task” (p. 90). The advantage in utilizing the operational definition presented here, is that test items based on the second component (*m2*: narcissistic vulnerability) are designed to bypass the overt narcissist's self-enhancement stance through *indirect* assessment of narcissistic fragility. Such items ask the respondent how he/she would

² Overt narcissists tend to emphasize positive attributes, rendering any self-report measure vulnerable to what has been termed a narcissistic self-enhancement bias (Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998)

react when denied narcissistic gratification.³ In effect, even if a grandiose-overt mirror-hungry respondent appeared to possess *healthy* high self esteem, the intensity of his/her reaction would constitute the evidence necessary to confirm the presence of an underlying narcissistic fragility.

Covert/shy narcissism also features an intense hunger for recognition and attention, but the need tends to be met in fantasy only (Kernberg, 1995). Covert types appear hypersensitive, shy, anxious, and report intense self-criticism and low self-esteem (Kernberg, 1995, Cooper, 1998, Ronningstam, 1999). The position taken here is that while the overt and covert forms are outwardly dissimilar, each represents a different manifestation of the same underlying mirror-hungry dynamic. However, the connection between these two variants and Kohut's mirror-hungry type has yet to be determined through research.

As noted above, the mirror-hungry type appears to be a fusion of two different narcissistic styles. The *m1* (attention-seeking) component appears conceptually related to the grandiose exhibitionism of the overt narcissist, whereas the *m2* (vulnerability) component seems more consistent with the covert narcissist's hypersensitivity. However, a test based on these two subcomponents might be able to detect *three* narcissistic styles, each representing a potential confound in the measurement of mirror-hungry narcissism. For example, those respondents with a high *m1* (attention-seeking) but low *m2* (vulnerability) profile might be said to demonstrate a kind of overt-yet-healthy narcissism –the assumption being that strong

³ For example: *If I had to work in a demanding job in which I received little or no feedback from my boss or co-workers as to whether I was doing it well...*

mirroring needs would be accompanied by stable self-esteem, as inferred from the relative absence of narcissistic fragility. Those respondents with a low *m1* (attention-seeking) but high *m2* (vulnerability) profile could be considered a covert narcissist group, characterized by a sensitivity to the denial of narcissistic gratification, while displaying no attention-seeking behaviors. The third possible configuration consists of those respondents with a high *m1*/high *m2* profile – a relatively intense manifestation of the mirror-hungry type characterized by the expression of both exhibitionism *and* vulnerability. The relationship of the *m1* component with overt narcissism, and the *m2* component with covert narcissism are explored in Convergent and Discriminant Validity. Research questions pertaining to the latter two subtypes (Low/High and High/High) are addressed in Additional Analyses.

Ideal-hungry type

When she tried to evoke her state of mind during the 1968 demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, she wrote instead about the state of her health. " I felt good, I could feel my body supple and strong and slim, and ready to run miles, and my legs moving sure and swift under me ... I felt real." Repeatedly she explains that association with important people made her feel important ... When the leaders she idealized disappointed her, as they always did, she looked for new heroes to take their place, hoping to warm herself in their "brilliance" and to overcome her feeling of insignificance. In their presence, she occasionally felt strong and solid—only to find herself repelled, when disenchantment set in again.... (Lasch, 1979, pp. 7-8, citing Susan Stern's memoirs of political life in the 1960's)

Kohut (1978) noted that: "our ideals are our internal leaders; we love them and are longing to reach them" (p. 437). During normal development a child gradually comprehends that the idealized parent - the temporary embodiment of the perfection and power once experienced as primary narcissism - is not perfect. If this realization occurs at an optimal pace, the child's experience of the idealized object is gradually metabolized into what Kohut (1971) termed the idealized parent imago⁴ sector of the self, forming the basis for the values, goals, and ideals that make up the ego ideal, as well as a mature capacity for self-soothing, healthy idealization, creativity, humor, empathy, and wisdom. If, however, this process is interrupted in a sudden or phase-inappropriate manner, assimilation of externally-experienced ideals ceases, resulting in a chronic hunger for idealizable figures (Kohut, 1971, 1977). The ideal-*hungry* type therefore resembles an adult analogue to the child who seeks to maintain a continuous union with the idealized object because he/she feels unhappy, powerless, and anxious when separated from it—as condensed in the phrase “you are perfect, and I am part of you,” (Kohut, 1971, p. 27). Kohut and Wolf (1978, p. 461) describe the ideal-hungry personality as follows:

Ideal-hungry personalities are forever in search of others whom they can admire for their prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or moral stature. They can experience themselves as worthwhile only so long as they can relate to selfobjects to whom they can look up. Again, in some instances, such relationships last a long time and are genuinely sustaining to both individuals involved. In most cases, however, the inner void cannot be forever filled by these means. The ideal-hungry feels the persistence of the structural defect and, as a consequence of this awareness, he begins to look

⁴ Kohut (1987) defines *imago* as “a complex of memories which are highly cathected, highly desired” (p. 101).

for—and of course he inevitably finds—some realistic deficits in his God. The search for new idealizable selfobjects is then continued, always in the hope that the next great figure to whom the ideal-hungry attaches himself will not disappoint him.

Root constructs were derived in the same manner as for the mirror-hungry type, including a behavioral manifestation of the need and evidence of labile self-esteem.⁵ It should be noted that the ideal-hungry type's inevitable discovery that their idol is imperfect is given as evidence of labile self-esteem, because disappointment signals the collapse of whatever feelings of vitality and self worth were felt while that admiration was maintained. Kohut and Wolf's emphasis on the cyclical nature of this personality type was preserved in the operational definition:

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| Behavioral manifestation of the need: | i1. Seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities (i.e., prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or views, etc.) |
| Evidence of labile self-esteem: | i2. Easily disappointed by idealized other. |

Just as healthy mirror-needs may be expressed without the vulnerability component, healthy idealization may present without its cycle of disappointment. Reich (1960) notes that in some instances, idealizing relationships may endure and be beneficial to both parties, but only if the one who idealizes possesses a mature ego (i.e., perfection is not sought, so disappointment is less likely to occur). This, however, is not the case for the ideal-hungry type. Although Kohut and Wolf's description falls within the compass of a "normal"

narcissism, it is clear that the ideal-hungry dynamic represents a certain frustrating slant on how one finds fulfillment in the world. Disappointment is inevitable because perfection can never be found, and the search continues for a new object upon whom ego ideal qualities may be conferred (Reich, 1960). Both the mirror- and ideal-hungry types yearn for the same lost perfection, but the ideal hungry person tries to find it in someone else. In either case, each displays the same ephemeral need-satisfaction.

Devising a test to measure the ideal-hungry type presents several difficulties, not the least of which is that idealization often appears in “relatively silent” or covert manifestations (Silverstein, 1999, p. 54). The second difficulty is that idealization is not always limited to relationships with people, and can manifest as the deification of ideas or art forms (Silverstein, 1999). The test proposed here is clearly confined to the assessment of relationships with people, a limitation that cannot be overcome at this time. However, the problem of detecting covert forms may be at least partly overcome by examining test scores where items based on the first component (seeks others to admire) are not endorsed, but items designed to elicit the second component (disappointment) are. If a respondent denies any ideal-needs (i.e., scores zero on first component items) but confirms that he/she is easily disappointed by an admired other, it may be assumed that a strong (covert) ideal-hunger is at work.

⁵ As with the operational definition for the mirror-hungry type, “evidence of labile self-esteem” is synonymous with *underlying vulnerability, or indirect evidence of missing self-structure*.

Another measurement issue concerns how one distinguishes between more and less archaic manifestations of the ideal-hungry type. For Kohut (1971), it is the degree of differentiation between self and selfobject that determines relative maturity. Archaic forms actively seek merger to provide an organizing function for the fragmented self, whereas mature forms display clear self-selfobject differentiation, and utilize the selfobject as a source of approval and provider of ideals and values (Silverstein, 1999). Despite theoretical differences, Kernberg (1995) also asserts that the more the idealization is characterized by a desire for self-object fusion, the more archaic (and intense) the need. Issues of merger versus differentiation are likely to be expressed in responses to items based on the first component, where the quality of affect related to the idealized other will be expressed (e.g., the subject states that being in the presence of the idealized one brings on feelings of bliss). However, the intensity with which a respondent endorses the second, disappointment-component may also indicate the degree of damage to the self: the more acute and inflexible the disappointment (particularly if outright rejection is evident), the more intense (and fragile) the need.

Twinship-hungry type

One of the great paradoxes of life is that self-awareness breeds anxiety. Fusion eradicates anxiety in a radical fashion – by eliminating self-awareness. The person who has ... entered a blissful state of merger, is not self-reflective because the questioning lonely *I* (and the attendant anxiety of isolation) dissolve into the *we*. Thus one sheds anxiety but loses oneself. (Yalom, 1989, p.11)

Kohut's (1984) concept of twinship describes the awareness that one is "a human being among other human beings" (p. 200). The twinship sector of the self emerges from the infant's experience of belonging to, and participating in, the world of human sounds and smells and goings-on. Our experience of these "undramatic everyday events" gradually becomes the foundation of a sense of identity through relationships and cultural belonging, what Kohut (1984) termed the "signposts of the human world" (p. 200). These experiences depend very much on available support and stimulation in the mirror and ideal sectors, and as such also reflect the skill repertoire one develops in conjunction with other people (Kohut, 1971, 1977, 1984).

In adulthood, the twinship selfobject provides silent emotional support and soothes feelings of alienation and isolation through a sense of likeness, in a "companionate or soulmate" capacity (Silverstein, 1999, p. 71). Such experiences may involve another person, or even a memory from childhood.⁶ In particular, twinship relationships tend to play a quietly supportive role at specific developmental junctures when one feels a need to shore up

⁶ Especially those memories involving skill acquisition. Kohut (1984) describes a young boy pretending to shave with his father, or young girl kneading bread alongside her mother in the kitchen.

the vulnerable self through identification with another (i.e., during adolescence, the transitions of young adulthood, or late-life struggles with mortality) (Kohut, in Elson, 1987, von Broembsen, 1988, Lothstein & Zimet, 1988, Lee, 1999). The twinship selfobject is therefore experienced as resonating with, and part of the self and in doing so, provides a deeply felt sense of security.

While healthy twinship may at times manifest as a similarity in external appearance, the true core of the twinship experience is what Kohut (1984) termed “identity of significance, similarity of function,” with a particular emphasis on shared feeling (p.198). Creative partnerships, for example, often contain a strong twinship element, as was the case with jazz great Duke Ellington and his longtime collaborator, Billy Strayhorn. In Ross Porter’s (2001) CBC Radio documentary *The Story of Duke Ellington*, Ellington’s sister, Ruth, describes this remarkable relationship:

I’ve seen them sit in his [Duke’s] dressing room, Billy would be there...and Duke would say to Billy: “Billy, you know that thing we were talking about...you think you could get that done?” And Billy was staring...for about ten minutes...Billy wouldn’t say a word...Duke wouldn’t say a word...and then Billy would get up and say...“okay.” They talked this way. I seen that happen time and time again. And Billy would go out and write it. Duke would go out to California, call Billy back...and Duke has told me, that when Billy would sing to him what he had written, it would be *exactly*—within a note or two—what Duke had written. That’s how close they were.” (Porter, 2001)

Ellington and Strayhorn’s working relationship demonstrates how the twinship experience may be characterized by a deeply intuitive and even transcendent, wordless exchange, what Silverstein (1999) describes as “an unspoken capacity to divine each other’s inner states” (p. 184).

Pathological forms of twinship can emerge as the direct result of disturbances in the twinship sector, or in a compensatory manner, because of mirroring and/or idealizing selfobject failure. Kohut (1984) suggested that if a latency-age child (many of his patients reported such disturbances as originating between the ages of 4 and 10) is deprived of the kinds of shared experiences described above, *and* no relief comes via mirroring or idealizing channels, that child might acquire a deficit in, and resultant hunger for twinship experiences, driven by a pervasive sense of insecurity and alienation. The need to compensate for the absence of those early experiences of connectedness may appear in a wide range of manifestations. Mature versions reflect a need for similarity (as is not uncommon among adolescents), whereas the more archaic forms exhibit a need for a merger with, and complete control over the selfobject (Kohut, 1984, Detrick, 1986, Lothstein & Zimet, 1988, Wahba, 1991). The twinship-hungry type⁷ appears to fall somewhere in the middle of this continuum (i.e., the subclinical range), with an element of the inflexibility characteristic of a more archaic need:

⁷ Kohut and Wolf (1978) refer to this personality type as the alterego-hungry personality. It must be noted, however, that Kohut used the terms “alterego” and “twinship” interchangeably. Detrick (1986) later insisted that although both alterego and twinship experiences describe a sustaining sense of alikeness, the alterego dimension suggests identification with a group, whereas twinship refers to shared characteristics in a dyadic relationship. This discussion will adopt Detrick's suggestion, and refer to Kohut and Wolf's alterego-hungry personality as the twinship-hungry personality.

[Twinship] personalities need a relationship with a selfobject that by conforming to the self's appearance, opinions, values confirms the existence, the reality of the self. At times the [twinship] personalities, too, may be able to form lasting friendships—relationships in which each of the partners experiences the feelings of the other as if it had been experienced by himself ... But again, in most instances, the inner void cannot be filled permanently by the twinship. The [twinship]-hungry discovers that the other is not himself and, as a consequence of this discovery, begins to feel estranged from him. It is thus characteristic for most of these relationships to be short-lived. Like the mirror- and ideal-hungry, the [twinship]-hungry is prone to look restlessly for one replacement after another. (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, pp. 461-462)

Twinship alliances can be considered a normal adaptation to destabilizing experiences, *unless* what is observed is the pursuit of "static sameness" (Detrick, 1986, p. 300). What Kohut and Wolf describe here is clearly not a transient adaptation to one of life's stressors, but a persistent, characterological orientation. For the purposes of this study, Kohut and Wolf's description was reduced to two key components, one representing a search for relationships based on similarity, and the other reflecting inevitable disappointment:

Behavioral manifestation of the need:	t1. Seeks relationships/ friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values.
Evidence of labile self-esteem:	t2. Becomes disappointed, angry or reverses previous feelings for partner when he/she discovers that the partner is not as identical to self as previously thought.

The reader will note that ideal- and twinship-hungry personalities present some structural similarities (i.e., disappointment signals a return to dysphoria—life without the valued selfobject), however, the twinship-hungry dynamic appears to represent a fundamentally different dynamic from that of the other two types. The mirror-hungry type seeks to confer grandiosity upon the self, and the ideal-hungry type seeks to confer grandiosity upon someone else, but neither need be characterized by a drive for self-selfobject fusion. The twinship hungry dynamic, however, appears to be distinguished by some degree of merger.⁸ Because normal twinship relationships involve connectedness (Gorney 1998), it follows that when one becomes twinship-*hungry*, a drive to connect may become a drive to merge.

Previous research supports the notion that subclinical twinship is characterized by merger-hunger. In responses from an earlier version of the test being developed here, twinship high-scorers were found to be xenophobic about interpersonal differences, and tended to equate happiness with the establishment of a static dyadic space, a sealed refuge

⁸ A dynamic that Detrick (1985) describes with the phrase “we are” (p. 242).

from the world⁹ (Estrin, 1994)— what Kohut (1984) termed a regressive recreation of a relationship designed to fulfill a specific need.

Assessment strategies for the twinship-hungry personality parallel those of the ideal-hungry type. It is assumed that overt manifestations will be evident in responses to the incomplete sentences based on the first component (the need for similarity in a relationship) (i.e., “it would be wonderful, it’s what I’ve been looking for”), whereas covert forms would be apparent in intense disappointment reactions, both being clear indicators of twinship. Desire for merger (expressed in responses to the first component), and intense disappointment in response to perceived interpersonal differences (expressed in responses to the second component), will also be taken as indicators of greater underlying vulnerability.

The Assessment of Narcissism

At present...narcissism is an unmanageably diverse and amorphous construct and, therefore, a highly problematic empirical entity. The process of unconstrained evolution which has characterized this construct for several decades has led to the unfortunate situation in which theoretical development is somewhat inversely related to the process of clarification and subsequent construct validation. (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992, pp. 821-822)

This empirical review is divided into three sections. It begins with a capsule history of the measurement of pathological grandiose narcissism, with an emphasis on two important developments: the appearance of the narcissistic personality disorder diagnosis,

⁹ For example, a characteristic twinship-hungry response to the incomplete sentence *having a partner who is very much like myself*: “would be two bodies as one, no deadly isolation. Intimacy and togetherness once again.”

and the recognition of a covert variant. Unresolved assessment issues are also discussed, as are relevant to the present study. The second section provides a detailed evaluation of the one measure of *subclinical* grandiose narcissism, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 1979, 1981). The third section surveys assessment instruments based on Kohut's ambitions/grandiosity and idealization constructs, and concludes with a brief summary of the Master's thesis research antecedent to the present study, followed by current research objectives.

Measures of Pathological Grandiose Narcissism

Prior to its appearance in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (3rd ed. [DSM-III]; American Psychiatric Association, 1980) the grandiose narcissism construct received scant empirical attention. Narcissism measures from this pre-DSM-III period fall into two categories: those that include narcissism as one of several subscales, and those in which it is the sole variable of interest (Raskin & Terry, 1988). Examples of the former include Murray's (1938) Narcism subscale (a measure of hypersensitive narcissism as an interpersonal variable), and Leary's (1956) inclusion of narcissism as one of sixteen interpersonal behavior descriptors. Narcissism measures from the latter category include both self-report and projective tests, with self-report instruments represented by three MMPI-derived scales: Pepper & Strong's (1958) Masculinity-Femininity (Mf) Ego-Sensitivity scale, Serkownek's (1975) Narcissism-Hypersensitivity (Mf) Scales, and Ashby, Lee, &

Duke's (1979) Narcissistic Personality Disorder Scale (NPDS).¹⁰ Stand-alone projective measures of narcissism include scoring indices for the Rorschach (Exner, 1969); TAT (Grayden, 1958); Rorschach, TAT, and Early Memories Test (Harder, 1979); Rorschach scoring indices for secondary narcissism (Urist, 1977); and sentence completion tests designed to measure narcissistic fantasies (Watson, 1965); and egocentricity (Exner, 1973). The inclusion of a narcissistic personality disorder diagnostic category in the DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) provided researchers with a common definition and led to the proliferation of new measures. The DSM-III defines narcissistic personality disorder as:

- A. A grandiose sense of self-importance.
- B. Preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love.
- C. Exhibitionism (requires constant attention and admiration).
- D. Cool indifference or marked feelings of rage, inferiority, shame, humiliation, or emptiness in response to criticism, indifference of others, or defeat.
- E. At least two of the following disturbances in interpersonal relationships:
 - 1. Entitlement (expectation of special favors without assuming reciprocal responsibilities).
 - 2. Interpersonal exploitiveness (taking advantage of others to indulge one's own desires or for self-aggrandizement and disregard for the personal integrity and rights of others).
 - 3. Relationships that oscillate between the extremes of over-idealization and devaluation.

¹⁰ In the context of the study presented here, Ashby, Lee, & Duke's (1979) NPDS represents something of a special case as it consists of items that successfully differentiated between non-narcissistic respondents and a criterion group of psychotherapy clients who exhibited a mirroring or idealizing transference—that is, based in part on Kohut's (1971, 1977) bipolar model of narcissism (Solomon, 1982).

4. Lack of empathy. (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 317)

Most researchers adopted the DSM-III *npd* diagnosis as the standard operational definition. DSM-III-based narcissism measures are divided between those designed to measure narcissism as one of several personality disorder categories (Millon, 1982; Hyler, Reider, & Spitzer, 1982; Morey, Waugh, & Blashfield, 1985), or as the sole variable of interest. Some of the more widely discussed self-report narcissism measures include Raskin & Hall's (1979, 1981) Narcissistic Personality Inventory (which assesses grandiose narcissism as a *normal* individual differences variable), O'Brien's (1987) self-report measure of pathological narcissism (based on the DSM-III-R definition and the writings of Alice Miller), Wink & Gough's (1990) California Personality Inventory Narcissism scale, and two MMPI-derived scales: Raskin & Novacek's (1989) MMPI-based alternate form of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory; and Wink & Gough's (1990) Narcissism scale for the MMPI. Exceptions to the DSM-inspired rule include Phares and Erskine's (1984) Selfism scale (a social learning-based measure of egocentricity); and Hendin & Cheek's (1997) Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale (an MMPI-alternate form of Murray's (1938) Narcism Scale).

Along with the proliferation of new assessment instruments came a growing realization that not all narcissism measures tapped into the same construct (Wink, 1991; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992; Hendin & Cheek, 1997), a problem that appeared to stem at least in part from a conceptual discontinuity between pre- and post-DSM-III narcissism measures. A watershed factorial study performed by Wink (1991) addressed this issue by examining the

relationship among six of the more widely-used tests. Wink's (1991) analysis found two uncorrelated factors: one represented by Ashby Lee and Duke's (1979) NPDS, and the two MMPI scales of Pepper & Strong (1958) and Serkownek (1975), and the other comprised of Raskin & Novacek's (1989) MMPI-based alternate form of the NPI, and the MMPI scales of Morey, Waugh, & Blashfield (1985) and Wink & Gough (1990).

Wink (1991) argued that these two factors (labeled Vulnerability-Sensitivity and Grandiosity-Exhibitionism, respectively) support Kernberg's (1975, 1986) and Kohut's (1977) clinically-based distinction between the covert narcissist who displays defensiveness, hypersensitivity and anxiety (with underlying self-indulgence, inflexible egocentricity, conceit and arrogance) and the overt narcissist who appears self-assured, aggressive, exhibitionistic, self-indulgent, and disregards the needs of others (with concealed or largely unconscious vulnerability) (Wink, 1991, p. 596). Wink's (1991) overt-covert distinction has been replicated (Rathvon & Holstrom, 1996; Soyer, Rovenpor, Kopelman, Mullins, & Watson, 2001), and widely adopted (i.e., Hendin & Cheek, 1997; Sturman, 2000).

It appears then, that the pathological grandiose narcissistic personality as described by the DSM-III (*and* DSM-IV) represents but one of two recognized subtypes (Akhtar & Thomson, 1982, Millon, 1998, Cooper, 1998). Currently accepted measures of the overt/grandiose/DSM type include the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 1979, 1981), the MMPI-based NPI alternate form (Raskin & Novacek, 1989), and the MMPI scales of Morey, Waugh, & Blashfield (1985) and Wink & Gough (1990). Tests designed to assess the covert form are limited to the older MMPI-based Pepper-Strong (1958) and

Serkownek (1975) scales, and Hendin & Cheek's (1997) recently developed Hypersensitive Narcissism scale.

Unresolved Assessment Issues

What does *not* currently exist is a narcissism measure that can assess both the overt and covert manifestations. The inherent difficulty in designing such a measure is that despite what are assumed to be similar underlying needs, each type—one characterized by overt grandiosity/covert vulnerability, and the other characterized by overt vulnerability/covert grandiosity—generates an altogether different type of interpersonal (mal)adjustment. It is not surprising then, that these two personality styles have yet to be addressed in one self-report measure. In the present study, the advantage in utilizing the mirror hungry personality type as the basis for a narcissism measure, is that it may be possible to use the mirror-hungry subscales (*m1*: attention-seeking, *m2*: vulnerability) either alone or in combination, to measure both the overt and covert styles (see Research Objectives, Additional Analyses).

Another measurement question arises from the problem of the “narcissistic paradox:” the notion that the overt narcissist's grandiose self-image serves to defend and conceal an unconscious vulnerability (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991a, 1991b). Despite abundant clinical evidence for the grandiose narcissist's extreme sensitivity to criticism (Kohut, 1971; Kernberg, 1995), empirical evidence for the coexistence of grandiosity and vulnerability is by necessity, indirect (Arkin & Lakin, 2001). For example, Kernis & Sun (1994) found NPI-assessed narcissism to moderate cognitive but not emotional reactions to negative feedback: NPI high scorers responded to negative feedback by questioning the

evaluator's competency and denying the legitimacy of the diagnostic technique, but because intense *emotional* responses were not apparent, it was suggested that such reactions may have been controlled (Kernis & Sun, 1994). By increasing the noxiousness of the negative feedback, Bushman & Baumeister (1996) found that NPI high scorers did display higher levels of aggression than low scorers in response to insultingly negative evaluations. Similarly, Rhodewalt & Morf (1998) found that NPI high scorers responded to failure conditions with more anger and anxiety than low scorers, and that high scorers displayed greater emotional extremes (especially fluctuations in self esteem and anger) in response to success and failure. It appears, then, that unless presented with certain provocations (i.e., insult or failure), overt narcissists may conceal their reactions to criticism (i.e., threats to a grandiose self-image). However, as indirect as this evidence may appear, it does suggest that the grandiose narcissist's self-esteem *is* vulnerable – to the extent that it is contingent upon need fulfillment, and, as recent research has found, increased defensiveness and reactivity *are* reliable indicators of unstable self-esteem (Paradise & Kernis, in press).

The best evidence for the validity of the “narcissistic paradox” is provided by research that examines the overt narcissist's reaction to negative feedback. The present study, however, employs a slightly different strategy: test items that comprise the *m2* subscale (indication of labile self-esteem, or narcissistic vulnerability) are designed to bypass the overt narcissist's defensive self-enhancement by asking the respondent how he/she would react

when denied narcissistic gratification.¹¹ In effect, even if a respondent were to display overt characteristics, the intensity of their reaction to *m2* items would constitute the evidence necessary to confirm the presence of an underlying fragility. Given that measures of overt narcissism and hypersensitivity/vulnerability have always been found to be unrelated (Wink, 1991; Sturman, 2000, Soyer, *et al*, 2001), no attempt will be made to demonstrate a direct association between vulnerability (as measured by the *m2* subscale) and overt narcissism (as measured by the NPI). It will, however, be predicted that those participants with a *combined* high *m1* (attention-seeking) and high *m2* (vulnerability) scoring profile will score higher than others on the NPI (see Research Objectives, Additional Analyses).

The NPI: Assessing Subclinical Grandiose Narcissism

Raskin & Hall's (1979, 1981) Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) represents the sole objective instrument to assess overt/grandiose narcissism as a normal individual differences variable. The NPI is a forced-choice questionnaire designed to measure subclinical manifestations of DSM-III narcissistic personality disorder characteristics, including: grandiosity, exhibitionism, fantasies of unlimited greatness, entitlement, exploitativeness, and lack of empathy (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 317), but not the diagnostic criteria of a) relationships that shift between idealization and devaluation, or b) sensitivity to criticism. Despite its pathological origins, the rationale underlying the

¹¹ For example: *If I had to work in a demanding job in which I received little or no feedback from my boss or co-workers as to whether I was doing it well ...*

construction of the NPI is that the DSM-III narcissistic personality disorder diagnostic entity is but the extreme end of a continuum that extends well into the normal range of functioning.

Structural Characteristics

Reliability

The NPI has demonstrated excellent psychometric properties. It began as an 80-item forced-choice questionnaire (Raskin and Hall, 1979). Raskin and Hall (1981) employed internal consistency procedures to reduce the NPI item pool from 80 to 54, resulting in a test with relatively high alpha coefficients, ranging from .80-.86 across several studies (Raskin & Terry, 1988). Initial estimates established an 8-week alternate-form reliability of .72, indicating that the trait-cluster measured by the NPI is reasonably stable (Raskin & Hall, 1981). The most recent revision (Raskin & Terry, 1988) produced the current 40-item NPI, which demonstrates a full scale correlation of .98 with the previous 54-item version, and an alpha coefficient of .83.

Content Validity

Efforts to determine the NPI's factor structure were undertaken in three consecutive studies. Emmons (1984) performed a principal components analysis with the 54-item measure ($N = 451$), employing a four factor solution with oblique rotation that yielded four moderately intercorrelated factors (mean $r = .32$) accounting for 72% of the total variance. Emmons (1984) tentatively named these factors Exploitativeness/Entitlement,

Leadership/Authority, Superiority/Arrogance, and Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration. As a test of the stability of the first factor analytic outcome, Emmons (1987) replicated the 1984 study ($N = 362$) and found the same four-factor structure, which accounted for a comparable proportion of the total variance (70 %), and a higher intercorrelation among factors (mean $r = .42$).

Following Emmons' (1984, 1987) analyses, Raskin & Terry (1988) expressed concern that the internal consistency strategy used thus far had the effect of oversimplifying what was an inherently complex construct. Raskin & Terry (1988) reasoned that a principal components analysis of the NPI's dichotomous items employing tetrachoric correlations rather than the interim phi coefficients used in both Emmons studies would provide a clearer picture of the underlying continuities and item structure. Using a substantially larger sample ($N = 1,018$), Raskin and Terry's (1988) analysis yielded a general narcissism component (accounting for 35% of the total variance) as well as seven first-order components (52% variance), labeled Authority, Self-Sufficiency, Superiority, Exhibitionism, Exploitativeness, Vanity, and Entitlement (with a mean intercorrelation of $r = .27$). The following section summarizes personality correlates of the full-scale NPI and its four- and seven-factor structures.

Construct Validity

Full scale correlates

The NPI has been associated with a variety of narcissism-congruent personality variables: self-esteem¹² (Emmons, 1984; Kernis & Sun, 1984; Watson, Taylor, & Morris, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991a, 1991b; Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993, Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995; Watson, Hickman & Morris, 1996; Brown & Bosson, 2001); the MCMI Narcissism scale in a normal (Auerbach, 1984) and clinical sample (Prifitera & Ryan, 1984); observer ratings of narcissism (Emmons, 1984; Raskin & Terry, 1988); those characteristics usually attributed to creative individuals (self-absorption, impulsivity, autonomy, dominance, exploitativeness, lacking empathy, aggressiveness, and need for recognition) (Raskin, 1980, p. 57); Machiavellianism (Biscardi & Schill, 1985; Soyer, Rovenpor, Kopelman, Mullins, & Watson, 2001), extraversion, psychoticism (i.e., solitary, not caring for people, lacking empathy, hostile) and social exploitiveness (Raskin & Hall, 1981); a grandiose and aggressive self-representation (Raskin & Terry, 1988); sensation-seeking (Emmons, 1981); achievement, dominance, aggression, extraversion, exhibitionism

¹² The association between the NPI and self-esteem has proved problematic. It has been suggested that the NPI high scorer maintains high self-esteem *defensively* through identification with a grandiose self-image (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991a, 1991b) to compensate for underlying low self-esteem. If that is the case (as has been suggested by every theorist since Freud), it would be impossible to differentiate between healthy and defensive self-esteem (or for that matter, detect low self-esteem) in the overt narcissist. However, Brown and Bosson (2001) recently noted that NPI high scorers tend to be high in explicit (i.e., self-reported) self-esteem, but low in implicit (i.e., unconscious) self-esteem, thereby providing some support for the hypothesis that overt narcissists use high self-esteem to conceal underlying low self-esteem. In short, all of the findings listed above show a correlation between the NPI and explicit self-esteem.

(Emmons, 1984); PRF Affiliation, Aggression, Autonomy, Dominance, and Exhibitionism (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992); self-report and observer ratings of dominance, extraversion, exhibitionism, aggression, impulsivity, self-centeredness, competitiveness, and self indulgence (Raskin & Terry, 1988); need for achievement (Mullins & Kopelman, 1988); egocentricity (Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988); the increased use of first-person singular pronouns (Raskin & Shaw, 1988); and a fantasy style centered around themes of achievement, heroism, sexuality, and self-admiration (Raskin & Novacek, 1991).

The NPI also displays negative relationships with anxiety (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), abasement, neuroticism (Emmons, 1984), social desirability (Auerbach, 1984; Mullins & Kopelman, 1988), circumplex Communion (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), empathy (Watson, Grisham, Trotter, & Biderman, 1984; Miller, Smith, Wilkinson, & Tobacyk, 1987; Watson & Morris, 1991), NEO Neuroticism and Agreeableness (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995), shame (Watson, Hickman, & Morris, 1996), and PRF Affiliation (Sturman, 2000).

These findings indicate that the NPI is directly associated with all but two of the overt/grandiose characteristics described by the DSM-III narcissistic personality diagnosis (idealization/devaluation and narcissistic vulnerability). Furthermore, its validity as a measure of overt narcissism has been demonstrated through convergence with proven self-report measures and observer ratings of narcissism, as well as negative or non-associations with measures of covert narcissism. The ambiguous relationship of the NPI with measures of Autonomy vs. Affiliation (i.e., circumplex Communion, PRF Affiliation), is discussed in the *Commentary* section.

Four-Factor Correlates

The four Emmons (1984, 1987) factors -- Exploitativeness/Entitlement (E/E), Leadership/Authority (L/A), Superiority/Arrogance (S/A), and Self-absorption/Self-admiration (S/S) -- together reflect the general NPI characteristics of dominance, grandiosity, egocentricity, and aggression (Emmons, 1984, 1987; Sturman, 2000). However, relationships among the four factors suggest that E/E measures maladaptive narcissism whereas the remaining factors reflect relatively adaptive features (Raskin *et al.*, 1991a; Watson & Biderman, 1993; Watson, Hickman, & Morris, 1996). The L/A, S/A, and S/S components have been found to be positively correlated with self-esteem, extraversion, and independence, and negatively correlated with abasement, neuroticism and social anxiety (Emmons, 1984). Leadership/Authority appears especially adaptive, as it is related to warmth, surgency, and boldness (Emmons, 1984), social responsibility (Watson & Morris, 1991), achievement motivation (Sturman, 2000), and displays the weakest association with neuroticism (Emmons, 1984).

Considerable evidence has accumulated to suggest that Exploitativeness/Entitlement (E/E) reflects some maladaptive aspects of overt narcissism. E/E is the only factor associated with pathological narcissism (the MCMI Narcissism scale) (Emmons, 1987) and NEO Neuroticism (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995). It is unrelated to self-esteem (Emmons, 1984, Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995); perspective-taking (Watson *et al.*, 1988); empathic concern and

social responsibility (Watson & Morris, 1991); three different empathy measures¹³ (Watson et al, 1984); and affiliation (Sturman, 2000). E/E has also been associated with suspiciousness, anxiety, neuroticism, and affective intensity/instability (Emmons, 1984); high levels of anxiety (Watson, McKinney, Hawkins, & Morris, 1988); personal distress (Watson & Morris, 1991); and anxiety and depression (Watson & Biderman, 1993).

Seven-Factor Correlates

Raskin & Terry's (1988) seven-factor solution (Authority, Self-Sufficiency, Superiority, Exhibitionism, Exploitativeness, Vanity, and Entitlement) has also been sorted into adaptive and maladaptive categories. Authority, Self-Sufficiency, and Superiority share a relatively adaptive-agentic stance (Raskin & Terry, 1988; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), but differ in specific ways. *Authority* represents a highly functional but aloof leadership factor: confident, critical, and autocratic (Raskin & Terry, 1988), negatively correlated with NEO Agreeableness and Neuroticism, and the only factor to demonstrate a positive association with Conscientiousness (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). *Self-Sufficiency* represents an assertive, dominant, autonomous, and achievement-oriented stance, with little interpersonal orientation (Raskin & Terry, 1988; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). *Superiority* represents a status-conscious, self-confident, (Raskin & Terry, 1988) agentic stance, tempered by associations with several interpersonal correlates: PRF Nurturance and Affiliation, circumplex

¹³ Watson *et al* (1984) examined the relationship between NPI narcissism and empathy. The full scale NPI displayed negative correlations with two measures of emotional "fellow-feeling," and a positive relationship with a measure of emotion-distant "intellectual/imaginative" empathy. E/E however, demonstrated a negative association with all three measures.

Communion, and NEO Openness (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). It is noteworthy that Superiority is the only factor related to Nurturance and Communion. However, unlike Authority and Self-Sufficiency, Superiority has also been associated defensive self-enhancement (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991a), and with Machiavellianism and job dissatisfaction (Soyer, Rovenpor, Kopelman, Mullins, and Watson, 2001), thus lending some ambiguity to its adaptive status.

Along with Exploitativeness, and Entitlement, *Exhibitionism* is associated with some starkly maladaptive features. Despite a positive association with NEO Extraversion and Agreeableness (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), Exhibitionism appears to reflect the exhibitionism, aggression, and aversion to interpersonal dependency characteristic of the ultra-dominant “warrior” narcissist. This factor has been associated with Machiavellianism (Soyer, *et al*, 2001), attention- and sensation-seeking, aggression, egocentricity, impatience, and lack of impulse control (Raskin & Terry, 1988). Exhibitionism is also positively correlated with PRF Dominance and negatively with Abasement (i.e., subordinating oneself before others) and displays the highest correlation of all the factors with PRF Aggression and Autonomy (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). *Exploitativeness* represents a frankly antisocial stance through associations with rebellion, non-conformity, aggression, unscrupulousness, hostility, tactlessness, and a lack of tolerance for others (Raskin & Terry, 1988), and Machiavellianism (Soyer *et al*, 2001). This factor also demonstrated negative correlations with NEO Agreeableness and circumplex Communion (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). *Entitlement* appears to be the least interpersonally-oriented of the seven factors. as it displayed the strongest negative relationship to circumplex Communion and PRF Nurturance. (Bradlee &

Emmons, 1992). Entitlement was also associated with hostility, ambition, toughness, power-seeking, dominance, a lack of self-control and tolerance for others (Raskin & Terry, 1988), Machiavellianism (Soyer *et al*, 2001), and negatively correlated with NEO Agreeableness (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). Lastly, the *Vanity* factor presented as the most stereotypically “narcissistic,” as it was associated with simply regarding oneself as physically attractive, or being rated by others as such (Raskin & Terry, 1988), and NEO Extraversion (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). Vanity also appears to straddle the line between adaptive and maladaptive: it has been associated with Machiavellianism (Soyer *et al*, 2001), emotional instability (along with Entitlement, Exploiteness, Exhibition) (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), and nondefensive (i.e., healthy) self-esteem (as were Authority and Self-Sufficiency) (Raskin *et al*, 1991a).

Commentary: Does the NPI Really Measure Subclinical Narcissism?

The Narcissistic Personality Inventory demonstrates considerable validity as a measure of overt/grandiose narcissism. Full scale correlates indicate that the NPI is associated with traits corresponding to the DSM-III narcissistic personality criteria (the exceptions being sensitivity to criticism and oscillation between idealization and devaluation). Emmons’ (1984, 1987) factor analytic studies present the heterogeneous NPI-defined construct as four interrelated factors that appear almost as separate narcissistic subtypes: one adaptive (Leadership/Authority), two somewhat adaptive (Superiority/Arrogance and Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration), and one clearly pathological (Exploitativeness/Entitlement). Raskin and Terry’s (1988) seven-factor solution provides a more fine-grained portrait, with clearly differentiated sets of personality correlates representing adaptive (Authority,

Superiority, and Self-Sufficiency), maladaptive (Exhibitionism, Exploitativeness, and Entitlement), and ambiguous (Vanity) aspects of narcissistic behavior. Given the impressive accumulation of reliability and validity evidence, the 40-item, seven-factor NPI appears to be the best measure of subclinical overt/grandiose narcissism to date.

The NPI does, however, present some ambiguities as to its *subclinical* status. Four concerns are raised here. The first, and most problematic is the association between the NPI and the MCMI Narcissism scale¹⁴ (Auerbach, 1984; Prifitera & Ryan, 1984), an index of pathological narcissism. The second arises from Sturman's (2000) distinction between adaptive and maladaptive overt narcissism. Sturman (2000) asserts that adaptive narcissism is associated with a need for both dominance and affiliation, whereas maladaptive narcissism is characterized by "dominance unchecked by affiliative concerns" (p. 404). The NPI has been shown to be associated with dominance (Raskin, 1980; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992; Emmons, 1984; Raskin & Terry, 1988), but its relationship to measures of affiliation is ambiguous. The NPI has been both shown both positive (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992) and non-significant associations (i.e., essentially zero) with PRF Affiliation, and a composite affiliation variable (Sturman, 2000).¹⁵ It is therefore unclear as to whether the NPI measures dominant/affiliative (adaptive) or dominant/non-affiliative (maladaptive) narcissism.

¹⁴ Auerbach (1984, p. 651) noted a correlation of $r(146) = .55, p < .001$, and Prifitera & Ryan (1984, p. 141) found a correlation of $r(48) = .66, p < .001$.

¹⁵ Bradlee & Emmons (1992) noted a positive correlation for NPI with PRF Affiliation ($r(145) = .21, p < .01$), whereas Sturman (2000) noted non-significant relationships for NPI with PRF Affiliation ($r(55) = -.07, ns$), and a composite affiliation variable ($r(55) = .04, ns$). Given the difference in sample size, Bradlee & Emmons' finding might be considered more reliable.

The latter two concerns are theoretical in nature. Self psychology theory suggests that the observed relationship between the NPI and sensation-seeking variables (Emmons, 1984) indicates narcissistic pathology, as sensation-seeking is believed to compensate for profound (and possibly unconscious) feelings of emptiness (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). Raskin *et al.*, (1991a, 1991b) propose another compensatory dynamic associated with NPI-narcissism: a defensive self-esteem strategy wherein the maintenance of a grandiose self serves to conceal and protect fragile sense of self. Functional as this dynamic may be for certain career choices,¹⁶ it too suggests some degree of pathology. To conclude, it bears stating that although the majority of NPI validity studies were conducted with non-clinical samples, more research is warranted to determine whether NPI *high* scorers can be legitimately said to represent the normal range of functioning.

Self Psychology-Based Narcissism Measures

Kohut and Wolf (1978) noted that disturbances in the mirror (ambitions), ideals, or twinship sectors of the self might present either as general disturbances in those self-sectors,¹⁷ or as distinct mirror-, ideal-, and twinship-hungry personality types. Prior to the present study and its antecedent (the Master's thesis described in the next section), efforts to develop self psychology-based assessment instruments investigated only the former (general) manifestations, with a focus on the bipolar self model (mirror/ambitions and ideals),

¹⁶ In *The Dark Side of Charisma*, Hogan, Raskin, & Fazzini (1990) note that corporate CEO's tend to be selected on the basis of grandiose narcissistic characteristics.

¹⁷ For example: as a maladaptive attempt to self-soothe, addictive behaviours might be interpreted as an ideals-related deficit.

excluding twinship.¹⁸ Because all of the studies described below employ constructs that are only indirectly related to the three personality types, and/or demonstrate a lack of construct validity (i.e., Robbins & Patton, 1985; Lapan & Patton, 1986; Slyter, 1989), none will be utilized for validation purposes in the current study.

The first two measures to appear were observer-rating scales rather than self-report instruments. Patton and Robbins (1982) assessed indices of mirror- and ideal-related self-disturbances in otherwise high-functioning students, with a particular focus on the (mal)adaptive strategies employed to defend against narcissistic vulnerabilities. Although not a self-report instrument, Patton and Robbins' (1982) work did highlight the prevalence of mild narcissistic disturbances in the college population, and provided an important foundation for later work (see: Patton, Connor & Scott, 1982; Patton & Robbins, 1985).

Patton, Connor, and Scott (1982) derived the Client Cohesion of Self-Schemata scales from three of Kohut's (1971, 1977) constructs: The Grandiose Self, the Idealized Parent Image, and Self-Functions. Ten observer rating scales assessed self-cohesion as an index of counseling process and success on a continuum ranging from fragmentation to

¹⁸ Although there is no shortage of discussion of twinship in theory (e.g., Kohut, 1984; Detrick, 1985, 1986; Kohut, 1987; Shane & Shane, 1989; Ulman & Paul, 1989; Kainer, 1990; Silverstein, 1999), or clinical case studies (e.g., Wolf, 1988; Lothstein & Zimet, 1988; von Broembsen, 1988; Wahba, 1991; Gorney, 1998; Wada, 1998; Lee, 1999; and Garfield & Tolpin, 1999), it has not been addressed empirically. The only partial exception is Silverstein's (1999) guidelines for assessing twinship in projective test protocols.

optimal self cohesion.¹⁹ The Patton *et al* (1982) scales were not utilized in the present study because: a) conceptual overlap between the Grandiose Self and Idealized Parent Image scales and the mirror- and ideal-hungry personality types was deemed insufficient for establishing convergent validity, and b) no validity data were provided. The importance of the Patton *et al* (1982) study, however, is that it adopted a strategy which Kohut would likely have found acceptable: by applying principles rather than behavioral checklists in their scoring strategy, and by rating client-counselor interactions, the authors remain true to Kohut's (paraphrased) assertion that "no amount of history taking or the cataloging of client complaints and symptoms will suffice to establish the presence of a disorder of the self" (Patton *et al*, p. 272).

Robbins and Patton's (1985) Superiority and Goal Instability scales represent the first self-report measure of the grandiosity and idealization constructs. Initially, the authors set out to construct two bipolar scales to assess both mature and immature manifestations of grandiosity and idealization, as expressed through college-level students' involvement in career planning and decisiveness, respectively. Both scales demonstrated adequate test-retest reliability and internal consistencies, and factor analysis yielded two independent factors. However, because of the nature of the content of the items that remained after item-

¹⁹ Three scales were designed to assess grandiose self constructs (exhibitionism, assertiveness, and ambitions), three represented aspects of self development related to the idealized parent imago (idealization/desire for merger, healthy admiration of others, and establishment of mature goals), and the remaining four measured self-functions (empathy, locus of self-esteem regulation, tension tolerance, and use of abilities). Patton *et al* (1982) reported low to moderate reliability for individual raters, and high reliability with Composite rater estimates. No validity data was provided.

selection procedures, the scales were renamed Superiority (reflecting an immature form of grandiosity characterized by gregariousness, interpersonal exploitiveness, and impulsivity), and Goal Instability (related to social withdrawal, depression, and a lack of ambitions and goals—a depletion-state commensurate with a deficit in the ideals sector) (Robbins & Patton, 1985; Robbins, 1989). Therefore, despite their original intention to create scales tapping into both the mature *and* immature range of self-functioning, Robbins & Patton (1985) found that they had constructed two scales that captured the immature aspects of grandiosity and idealization only. Because the Superiority scale assesses the grandiose aspect of mirror-type narcissism (which the NPI also does, but in a more comprehensive way) and Goal Instability addresses ideals-related dysphoria only, neither sufficiently resembles the mirror- or ideal-hungry types to be applicable to the present study.

Lapan and Patton's (1986) Pseudoautonomy and Peer-Group Dependence scales were developed to assess narcissistic disturbances in the grandiosity and idealization sectors in an adolescent sample. The authors developed two forced-choice, self-report scales displaying high scale reliability and factorial independence. The Pseudoautonomy scale was deemed to represent “the adolescent's defensive independence and nonconformity” whereas the Peer-Group Dependence scale was inferred to assess “the adolescent's defensive reliance on, and need for assurance from, friends” (Lapan & Patton, 1986, p.141). Both scales were presumed to represent unhealthy narcissistic behavior patterns employed by adolescents to maintain their sense of self during this turbulent developmental phase (Lapan & Patton, 1986). There is some question, however, as to whether the behaviors and attitudes described by these two scales are, as the authors suggest, indices of self-fragmentation—or typical

strategies employed by the narcissistically-vulnerable young person whose self fragments and reintegrates in the process of adolescent psychic growth. While these scales may misrepresent some typical adolescent behaviors as pathological, the authors correctly suggest that high scores are likely indicators of self-related disturbances in adolescents (Lapan & Patton, 1986).

Slyter's (1989) Inventory of Self Psychology represents the most recent attempt to represent Kohut's theory of the bipolar self and its functions in a self-report measure. Slyter (1989) set out to design an instrument that would reflect "the multidimensional nature of the self and the comprehensiveness of Kohut's psychology of the self paradigm" (p.43) in four scale dimensions designed to capture healthy and defensive aspects of the bipolar self: the Healthy Grandiose Self, Defensive Grandiose Self, Healthy Idealized Parent Image, and Defensive Idealized Parent Image.²⁰

Despite impressive scale definitions and adequate reliability, convergent and discriminant validity results did not support the validity of the four scales, nor was support found for criterion-related validity in which therapist ratings were compared with client

²⁰ The *Healthy Grandiose Self* scale was designed to assess expressions of realistic and stable positive self-esteem: the capacity to enjoy oneself, healthy assertiveness, abundant energy, and resiliency in the face of disappointment (p. 55). The *Defensive Grandiose Self* scale refers to expressions of labile self-esteem: need for attention and approval, arrogance, belief in one's superiority or uniqueness, fantasies of perfection and domination, and difficulty in accepting praise (p. 56). The *Healthy Idealized Parent Image* scale is characterized by a capacity for "enthusiasm and healthy admiration for the realistic qualities of others," as well as the ability to effectively self-soothe, experience empathy and humor, and possess a system of goals, values, and ambitions (p.57). The *Defensive Idealized Parent Image* scale describes a need to look up to, and live through idealized others, with a tendency toward: a) reactive criticism, sarcasm, or depression when disappointed by the idealized one, or b) reliance on others for a sense of confidence, strength, direction and calm, and the tendency to react with depression or withdrawal in response to separations from others, (Slyter, 1989, p.57-58).

scores on the four dimensions (Slyter, 1989). Two scales in particular were found to be related to characteristics contrary to their intended themes: the Healthy Grandiose Self scale was associated with an immature, arrogant grandiose stance and defensive self-esteem maintenance strategies, whereas the Defensive Grandiose Self displayed only a weak relationship with defensive narcissism (Slyter, 1989). Although the Defensive Grandiose Self and Defensive Idealized Parent Image scale descriptions suggest conceptual overlap with the mirror- and ideal-hungry types (see footnote 12), neither demonstrated sufficient validity to be used in the current study.

Master's Thesis: Study I

The present study builds upon the Master's thesis research that preceded it (Study I), and will hereafter be referred to as Study II. Study I will be outlined in brief below, and then described in greater detail, in tandem with Study II research objectives.

Estrin (1994) constructed a Sentence Completion test (SCT) and scoring manual designed to identify Kohut and Wolf's (1978) mirror-, ideal-, and twinship-hungry personality types in a student sample. Subscale definitions were derived from Kohut and Wolf's (1978) descriptions of the personality types, such that each type was represented by two root constructs for the behavioral manifestation of the narcissistic need, and one for labile self esteem (or narcissistic vulnerability). A pool of 195 sentence stems designed to "pull for" the nine root constructs was culled through rational and internal consistency procedures, reducing the item pool to 27 stems. The resulting test consisted of nine, three-item clusters, such that each personality type was represented by a nine-item composite of

three item-clusters (e.g., the mirror-hungry, or M-Composite scale is a combination of the m1, m2, and m3 clusters). A scoring manual was constructed by sorting pilot study responses into ascending values of one, two, and three for each sentence stem. Responses were typed into tables to remove identifying features, and two raters matched each response to the scoring levels. Analyses were undertaken for inter-rater reliability, content validity, and convergent and discriminant validity.

Study I findings are presented here. Inter-rater reliability was strongest for mirror-hungry items, with a greater number of ideal- and twinship-hungry item kappas in the “poor” to “fair” range. Internal consistency was satisfactory for mirror and twinship subscales, but mixed for ideal. Content validity analyses provided adequate confirmation of mirror and twinship content structures, whereas only the labile self-esteem, or “disappointment” component of the ideal-hungry type was clearly represented. As predicted, convergence was found between the three SCT Composite scales and corresponding Self Rating scales (an *ad hoc* parallel form consisting of narrative-type descriptions of each personality, accompanied by a self-rating Likert scale). Expected relationships between the SCT Composite scales and selected Personality Research Form–E (Jackson, 1987) scales were, for the most part, confirmed for M- and T-Composite, but not for I- Composite (see Research Objectives for a complete account). Overall, Study I provided some evidence of construct validity for the M- and T-Composite scales, but it was apparent that the I-Composite scale required revision. A brief overview of Study II research objectives is presented below, followed by a detailed account of research goals and hypotheses.

Overview of Study II Research Objectives

1. *Employ a larger and more heterogeneous sample:* In addition to student participants, Study II will include a psychotherapy client subsample, with the goal of obtaining a broader range of response than that of Study I (which enlisted student participants only).
2. *Improve the structural characteristics of the test:*
 - a. Refine the operational definitions.
 - b. Reconstruct the subscales using theory-based (rather than internal consistency) item-selection criteria.
3. *Rebuild the scoring manual and assess inter-rater reliability.*
4. *Examine the Composite scale and subscale scoring patterns.*
5. *Obtain further evidence of construct validity for the three personality types:*
 - a. Determine whether content validity findings bear a structural resemblance to the model proposed by Kohut and Wolf (1978).
 - b. Demonstrate convergence between:
 - i. Two self-rating measures: the three SCT Composite scales (M, I, T) and the three Self Rating scales (e.g., participant's ratings of their resemblance to descriptions of the three personality types).
 - ii. One self-rating and one other-rating measure: the six SCT subscales (m1, m2, i1, i2, t1, t2) and corresponding Therapist Rating Scales (e.g., scales that enable therapists to rate their clients on the six subscale dimensions measured by the SCT).
 - c. Construct a nomological network for the three personality types via convergent and discriminant validity analyses using Personality Research Form-E scales and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (See Research Objectives for a complete account).
6. Address additional issues relevant to the broader forum of narcissism research:
 - a. Determine whether the SCT can be used to assess both overt and covert narcissistic styles.
 - b. Demonstrate an association between overt narcissism and narcissistic vulnerability.

Research Objectives

1. Sample Characteristics

Study I findings and the resulting Study II scoring manual were based on the responses of 107 student participants. For Study II, a larger sample was collected ($N = 160$), including a clinical sub-sample ($n = 140$ student participants; $n = 20$ psychotherapy clients), with the goal of obtaining SCT responses in the pathological range. Analyses of group mean differences will determine whether clinical participants do, on average, respond in a more extreme manner than student participants on all narcissism measures (SCT, Self-Rating Scales, Narcissistic Personality Inventory). An analysis of gender difference will also be undertaken, with no specific hypotheses offered.

2. Refining the Operational Definitions

In Study I, the operational definition for each personality type consisted of three root constructs: two representing the behavioral expression of the narcissistic need, and one for the dynamic underlying labile self-esteem (or narcissistic vulnerability). The Study II operational definitions were revised to be more consistent with Kohut and Wolf's (1978) personality type descriptions by reducing the behavioral expression of the need to one component. Support for this decision came from both theoretical and empirical sources. Wolf (1988, 1994), for example, describes each type as having only two aspects: the manifestation of the narcissistic need, and the characteristic that brings about the inevitable drop in self-esteem. Empirical support came from Study I content validity findings, which also supported the simpler model. The Study II operational definitions are as follows:

Mirror-Hungry

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Behavioral manifestation of the need: | m1. Displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses. |
| Evidence of labile self-esteem: | m2. Low self-esteem (or other indication of narcissistic fragility, such as rage or cold rejection) in the absence of confirming and admiring responses. |

Ideal-Hungry

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Behavioral manifestation of the need: | i1. Seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities (i.e., prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or views, etc.) |
| Evidence of labile self-esteem: | i2. Easily disappointed by idealized other. |

Twinship-Hungry

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Behavioral manifestation of the need: | t1. Seeks relationships/ friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values. |
| Evidence of labile self-esteem: | t2. Becomes disappointed, angry or reverses previous feelings for partner when he/she discovers that the partner is not as identical to self as previously thought. |

3. Subscale Revision

The SCT subscales were revised and augmented for two reasons. First, new test items were needed because changes to the operational definitions had reduced the number of sentence stems from 27 to only 18. In order to provide better coverage of test content, the number of items was to be increased from 3 to at least 4 sentence stems per subscale. Second, Study I findings indicated that the *i1* (seeks others to admire) sentence stems were in

need of revision.²¹ Consequently, new stems were written for each of the six root constructs, piloted in undergraduate psychology tutorials ($N = 155$), and added to the original item pool. Pilot work resulted in a 40-item test, with 5 to 8 sentence stems per subscale (see Appendix A).

After scoring the Study II responses ($N = 160$), further item analysis was undertaken to reduce the number of items to 4 per subscale. Rather than use an internal consistency strategy (as was done in Study I), it was decided that a sufficiently rigorous, theory-driven methodology would not only be more consistent with the intensive, qualitative approach used thus far (see scoring manual construction below), it would also allow for more heterogeneous subscale content. By applying the following questions to each set of sentence stem responses, the item pool was reduced from 40 to 24 stems, (only 9 of which were retained from the Study I version of the test):

- i) Is the stem an *effective trigger* for the targeted response: does it ask the (right) question, and pull for expression of the root construct?
- ii) Does the stem provoke a *spontaneous response*, or does it require reflection and perhaps allow defensiveness to develop?
- iii) Does the stem *encourage depth and breadth* of response, or shallow, socially desirable, or clichéd response sets?

²¹ In Study I, the *i1* ("seeks others to admire") subscale displayed the poorest inter-item reliability ($r = .11$), and demonstrated no factorial evidence for a coherent construct, suggesting that these stems were not eliciting the desired content. While piloting the new *i1* stems, it was determined that two characteristics were to be avoided: a) wording that respondents tended to interpret as an expression of neediness (e.g., *It sometimes seems as though I am always searching for a person who ...*), or b) stems that described the object of admiration as exceptional. The former instance elicited defensive responses, while the latter tended to trigger feelings of self-consciousness or jealousy. Because this effect was so widespread (and not particularly useful in helping raters distinguish degree of ideal-hunger), Study II *i1* stems were rewritten so that the object of admiration was described in relatively neutral terms, and therefore less likely to promote defensiveness or feelings of inadequacy in the respondent (e.g., *When I think of someone I admire, I feel...*).

- iv) Do the responses fall into groupings that *help raters discriminate* among scoring levels? For some stems, distinguishing between scoring levels was difficult, and very much dependent on rater judgment, whereas for others it manifested as a sharp discontinuity - an easily recognizable qualitative difference (the latter being preferred).
- v) For a given sentence stem, does the ratio of obtained 0, 1, and 2 responses fit what one would expect, given a) the question asked, and b) the narcissistic need being addressed?²²

As a final screen for socially desirability, each item was correlated with PRF-E Desirability (see Results). The resulting set of 24 stems is presented in Appendix A.

4. Scoring Manual Revision and Inter-Rater Reliability

Scoring Manual Revision

Development of the SCT scoring rules followed a process similar to that used by Loevinger (1993), whereby each successive iteration of the manual assimilates and is reshaped by the set of responses to which it has been applied. The initial scoring manual was assembled from a collection of theoretically-informed rules and pilot study protocols ($N = 10\text{-}30$ per sentence stem), and used to score the Study I responses ($N = 107$). Once scoring

²² Application of this item-screening criterion varied according to the response pattern of each sentence stem. In the case of the mirror-hungry stems, it was expected that because this study uses a predominantly “normal” sample, and because the targeted content represents a range of functioning somewhere *between* normal and pathological, 70-90 percent of responses would likely occur in the average-expectable (*zero/one*) range. Correspondingly, it was expected that the proportion of subclinical and clinically significant (*two*) responses would occupy 30 percent or less of the total, but not so few (i.e., less than 10 percent) as to indicate that the scoring rules were too stringent, or that the stem only triggered such responses in pathological subjects. These assumptions did not, however apply to the ideal- or (especially) the twinship-hungry stems, wherein the number of responses in the *two* range not only tended to fall well below 10 percent of the total, but, in some instances, it was determined that a small number of *two* responses actually indicated a highly effective stem (i.e., some stems were considered especially effective for detecting high scorers because of the specific (i.e., intense) response elicited in a small number of subjects).

was complete, these same responses were then used to create the Study II manual. As a first step, all 107 responses to each of the 24 sentence stems were sorted into three response-intensity levels (low, medium, high), *without* the use of the scoring manual, and then further subdivided into thematic categories as needed. By comparing these “naturally occurring” classes of response to the scoring levels and exemplars used in the Study I manual (with particular attention paid to types of responses that did not fit existing scoring rules), it was possible to determine which scoring rules should be retained, removed, or replaced by the new data. The resulting Study II scoring system employs sets of exemplars grouped under descriptive headings corresponding to scoring levels of 0 (“no indication of the targeted response”), 1 (“some indication...”), or 2 (“clear indication...”) (see Appendix G).

Inter-Rater Reliability

Study I item kappas for two raters ($N = 100$) ranged from “poor” (.50) to “strong” (.76). An item-level comparison of Study I and Study II inter-rater reliability was not possible because the two tests share only 9 items in common. Furthermore, because Study I *subscale* kappas were incorrectly calculated (by averaging), and because the raw data are no longer available (due to computer error), there is no basis for a comparison by subscale. Study II inter-rater agreement (intraclass correlation) estimates were obtained for three raters.

5. Scoring Patterns

It was predicted that because the twinship-hungry type appears slightly more pathological (i.e., more merger-hungry), elevated T-Composite scores would be encountered less often than elevated M- or I-Composite scores. Study I confirmed this expectation to the

extent that the T-Composite frequency distribution displayed very few high scores (e.g., the M-Composite frequency distribution was symmetrical around the range midpoint, the I-Composite distribution displayed fewer scores above the midpoint than M-Composite, and the T-Composite distribution was very positively skewed). For Study II, it is predicted (using sign tests, rather than a visual examination of frequency distributions) that overall M-Composite scores will be significantly higher than I-Composite scores, and I-Composite scores will be higher than T-Composite scores.

6. Content Validity

Two content validity research questions are to be addressed: a) are the six SCT subscale content domains supported, and b) are they interrelated in a manner suggestive of Kohut and Wolf's (1978) personality descriptions (i.e., *m1* with *m2*, *i1* with *i2*, *t1* with *t2*)? These question will be explored by examining correlations among subscales and the results of a principal components analysis.

Subscale Intercorrelations

Study I findings: significant correlations were found for *m1* (exhibitionism) with *m2* (vulnerability) ($r = .23, p < .01$), *t1* (seeks similarity) with *t2* (twinship-disappointment) ($r = .54, p < .001$), but not *i1* (seeks others to admire) with *i2* (ideal-disappointment) ($r = .10, ns$). It was unclear whether the non-relationship between *i1* and *i2* was the result of differences in the underlying dynamics (i.e., *i1* content has to do with being *drawn to* someone, whereas *i2* content involves rejection), or simply a matter of *i1* being psychometrically inadequate. A positive correlation was also found for *i2* (ideal-disappointment) with *t2* (twinship-

disappointment) ($r = .23, p < .01$). From a theoretical standpoint, the association between $i2$ (disappointed by imperfection in the idealized other), and $t2$ (disappointed by lack of similarity) suggests that both dynamics may be a reaction to the other's failure to meet the demands of the ego ideal.

Study II predictions: it is predicted that the $m1$ subscale will be positively correlated with $m2$, and $t1$ with $t2$. Given an improved $i1$ subscale, it is predicted that $i1$ will be positively correlated with $i2$. It is also predicted that a positive correlation will again be obtained for $i2$ with $t2$. It is not expected that any significant correlations will be found among the three Composite scales.

Principal Components Analysis

The *Study I* principal components analysis employed a four-factor solution with oblique rotation, accounting for 34.2% of the total variance. All $t1$ and $t2$ subscale items showed positive loadings on the first factor (13.1% variance), $m1$ and $m2$ items on the second (8.5% variance), and all $i2$ items on the third (6.4% variance). The $i1$ subscale was not well determined by the factor model, as it had only one interpretable positive loading on the fourth factor (which was itself difficult to interpret, accounting for 6.2% variance).

Study II predictions: it is predicted that the subscales will appear as three groupings in the factor model: $t1/i2$, $m1/m2$, and $i1/i2$, with some overlap between $i2$ and $t2$.

7. Convergent and Discriminant Validity

Predicted Convergence Between the SCT Composite Scales and the Self-Rating Scales

Convergence is sought between self-report (SCT) and self-rating (Self-Rating scales) measures. The Self-Rating scales (SRS), are a self-report parallel form (see Appendix C) completed by both the student and clinical sample ($N = 160$). Participants indicate their agreement with the three SRS personality descriptions by using Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (“least like me”) to 7 (“most like me”).

Study I findings: a significant correlation was found for each SCT Composite scale with its SRS counterpart (Mirror $r = .26, p < .01$; Ideal $r = .27, p < .01$; Twinship $r = .23, p < .05$), as well as positive correlations for I-Composite with Self-Rating Twinship ($r = .23, p < .01$), and T-Composite with Self-Rating Ideal ($r = .23, p = .05$).

Study II predictions: having modified the SRS narratives to reflect changes in the operational definitions, the same relationships are predicted for Study II: that each SCT Composite (M, I, T) scale will be associated with its Self-Rating Counterpart (SRM, SRI, SRT). In addition, it is hypothesized that, because of the assumed relationship between the ideal- and twinship-hungry “disappointment” components ($i2$ and $t2$), I-Composite will be associated with Self-Rating Twinship, and T-Composite with Self-Rating Ideal (see Table 1).

Table 1:***Predicted Convergence Between the SCT Composite Scales and Self-Rating Scales***

Composite Scale	Self-Rating Scale		
	SRM	SRI	SRT
M	+		
I		+	+
T		+	+

Predicted Convergence Between the SCT Subscales and the Therapist Rating Scales

Convergence is sought between self-report (SCT) and other-rating (Therapist Rating scales) measures, based on clinical sample data ($n = 20$). The Therapist Rating scales (TRS), are a set of other-rating scales (see Appendices C, D, E) that allow therapists to rate their clients (the clinical sample) along the same dimensions as the SCT subscales. Therapists are asked to rate the extent to which the client displayed characteristics of each of the six SCT subscale root constructs, using a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (“no indication”) to 3 (“strong indication”).

Predictions: it is expected that each SCT subscale will be positively associated with its Therapist-Rating counterpart. It is also predicted that the *i2* subscale will be positively associated with Therapist-Rating *i2*, and the *t2* subscale with Therapist-Rating *i2* (see Table 2).

Table 2:***Predicted Associations Between the SCT Subscales and Therapist Rating Scales***

SCT Subscale	Therapist Rating Scale					
	m1	m2	i1	i2	t1	t2
m1	+					
m2		+				
i1			+			
i2				+		+
t1					+	
t2				+		+

Predicted Associations between SCT Scales and Selected Personality Research Form-E Scales***Preliminary Analysis:******Correlation Between "Overt Narcissism" PRF-E Scales and the NPI***

For the purpose of those convergent and discriminant analyses involving the M-Composite scale and its subscales, a specific set of PRF-E scales was designated as being representative of overt narcissism. These scales were chosen on the basis of established NPI correlates, including: needs for affiliation (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), aggression (Raskin, 1980; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Emmons, 1984), dominance (Raskin, 1980; Emmons, 1984; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), exhibitionism (Emmons, 1984; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), and social recognition (Raskin, 1980). As a means of testing the assumed relationship between the selected PRF-E scales and overt narcissism, it is predicted that the

NPI will be positively associated with PRF-E Affiliation, Aggression, Defence, Dominance, Exhibition, and Social Recognition, and be negatively correlated with Abasement (the inverse of Dominance). PRF-E Defence is included not because it is a proven correlate of overt narcissism, but as a means of testing whether overt narcissism can be shown to be related to general defensiveness (which, in the context of self psychology theory suggests narcissistic vulnerability).

Mirror-Hungry Scales

Study I findings: Kohut and Wolf (1978) describe the mirror-hungry type as being characterized by attention- and recognition-seeking, and defensiveness. In Study I, these predictions were supported: the M-Composite scale was found to be positively associated with PRF-E Exhibition ($r = .42, p < .05$), Social Recognition ($r = .36, p < .05$), and Defence ($r = .28, p < .05$). No attempt was made to examine the relationship between individual subscales ($m1, m2$, etc.) and PRF-E scales.

Study II predictions:

- i) It is predicted that the M-Composite scale will be positively associated with PRF-E Exhibition, Social Recognition, and Defence. (see Table 3).
- ii) It is expected that the $m1$ (exhibitionism) subscale will be associated with both grandiose-conspicuous attention-seeking (PRF-E Exhibition) and (the more reputation-conscious) recognition- and approval-seeking (PRF-E Social Recognition). It is also hypothesized that the $m1$ subscale will be positively associated with those characteristics of overt narcissism represented by PRF-E Affiliation, Aggression, Defence, and Dominance, and negatively associated with Abasement (suggesting dominance/arrogance) (see Table 3).

iii) It is hypothesized that because the *m2* (vulnerability) subscale assesses narcissistic reactivity, it will be associated with defensiveness, as measured by PRF-E Defence. It is also hypothesized that the narcissistic reactivity measured by *m2* will be found to be related to (but not necessarily conceptually equivalent to) covert narcissism. Clinical accounts of covert narcissism describe an intense but concealed hunger for recognition and attention, accompanied by hypersensitivity, shyness, anxiety, self-criticism, and low self-esteem (Kohut, 1971; Kernberg, 1995, Cooper, 1998, Ronningstam, 1999). Similarly, empirical accounts find covert narcissism to be associated with hypersensitivity (defensiveness), social anxiety, and introversion, and either negatively or non-significantly associated with measures of aggression, dominance, and exhibitionism (Wink, 1991; Sturman, 2000). It is therefore predicted that the *m2* subscale will, in addition to being related to defensiveness, demonstrate no significant association with PRF-E Affiliation, Aggression, Dominance, Exhibition, and Social Recognition. (see Table 3).

Ideal-Hungry Scales

Study I findings: it was predicted that the I-Composite scale would be associated with a dependent, deferential, and defensive social stance, and would therefore be positively associated with PRF-E Succorance (i.e., dependency), Abasement (i.e., interpersonally deferential), and Defence (characteristic of all three narcissistic types), and negatively associated with Dominance (i.e., deferential) and Autonomy (i.e., dependency). These predictions were confirmed for Defence only ($r = .33, p < .05$). It appears that these results were the result of an incorrect portrayal of the ideal hungry type as dependent and deferential. In an exploratory analysis, however, two non-significant PRF-E correlates did suggest a disturbance in the ideals sector of the self: a negative correlation with Endurance (r

= -.23, *ns*) (i.e., inability to adhere to goals), and Order ($r = -.23$, *ns*) (i.e., the need for externally-supplied structure).

Study II predictions: given that the aforementioned *non-significant* correlates are more consistent with the Self Psychology model (being dependent and deferential were not listed by Kohut and Wolf (1978) as ideal-hungry characteristics), and assuming that the revisions to the *i1* and *i2* subscales will contribute to a more coherent measure, it is predicted that the I-Composite scale will be positively associated with PRF-E Defence, and negatively associated with Endurance and Order (see Table 3). These predictions will also be tested separately with the *i1* and *i2* subscales.

Twinship-Hungry Scales

Study I findings: it was predicted that the twinship-hungry type would be associated with a need for support from a partner (positive correlation with PRF-E Succorance), Dependency (negative correlation with Autonomy), a dislike of change (negative correlation with Change), and the defensiveness characteristic of the narcissistic types (Defence). The T-Composite scale was found to be associated with Succorance ($r = .37$, $p < .05$) (but not Defence), and was negatively associated with Autonomy ($r = -.28$, $p < .01$) and Change ($r = -.29$, $p < .05$).

Study II predictions: it is expected that the T-Composite scale will be positively associated with PRF-E Succorance, and Defence, and negatively associated with Autonomy, and Change (see Table 3). These predictions will also be explored separately with the *t1* and *t2* subscales.

Table 3:***Predicted Relationships: SCT and PRF-E***

PRF-E Scale	SCT Composite Scale			SCT Subscale					
	M	I	T	m1	m2	i1	i2	t1	t2
Abasement				-					
Affiliation				+	<i>na</i>				
Aggression				+	<i>na</i>				
Autonomy			-					-	-
Change			-					-	-
Defendence	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Desirability									
Dominance				+	<i>na</i>				
Endurance		-				-	-		
Exhibition	+			+	<i>na</i>				
Order		-				-	-		
Social Recog.	+			+	<i>na</i>				
Succorance			+					+	+

Note. *na* = a prediction of no significant correlation between variables.

Predicted Relationship between the SCT Scales and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory.

Predictions for this section stem from three objectives:

Objective I: demonstrate that the M-Composite scale and the NPI assess similar, but not identical narcissism constructs. The mirror-hungry type (as measured by the M-Composite scale) represents a combination of exhibitionistic (*m1*) and vulnerable (*m2*) narcissistic characteristics, whereas the NPI taps into the exhibitionistic/overt form only. It is therefore predicted that the M-Composite scale will be positively (but modestly) associated with the NPI and the Exhibitionism content scale (see Table 4). No predictions were made regarding the relationship between the M-Composite scale and the remaining NPI content scales.

Objective II: demonstrate that the *m1* (exhibitionism) subscale measures overt narcissism. It is predicted that *m1* will be positively correlated with both the full-scale NPI and the NPI Exhibitionism content scale (see Table 4), and that the magnitude of association will be greater than that found for M-Composite scale with the NPI and Exhibitionism. No hypotheses are offered regarding the relationship between *m1* and the remaining NPI content scales.

Objective III: obtain discriminant validity for the *m2* (vulnerability) subscale by demonstrating that it is not significantly related to overt narcissism as measured by the full-scale NPI and/or its content scales (see Table 4).

Objective IV: demonstrate discriminant validity for the ideal- and twinship-hungry scales by showing no significant relationship between those SCT scales and the NPI and/or its content scales.

Table 4:

Predicted NPI Correlates

SCT Scale	NPI Content Scales							
	NPI	Au	Ex	Su	En	Exp	S/S	Va
M	+		+					
m1	+		+					
m2	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>na</i>

Note. *na* = a prediction of no significant correlation between variables.. M = M-Composite, Au = Authority, Ex = Exhibitionism, Su = Superiority, En = Entitlement, Exp = Exploitativeness, S/S = Self-Sufficiency, Va = Vanity.

8. Additional Analyses

Measuring Covert Narcissism

As noted in the literature review, no measure exists that can assess both overt and covert narcissism. It is proposed here that the *m1* (exhibitionism) subscale will be found to measure overt narcissism, whereas the *m2* (vulnerability) subscale, being a measure of narcissistic reactivity/hypersensitivity, will be related to, but not identical to covert narcissism. However, it is expected that those participants who score simultaneously low on *m1* (exhibitionism) and high on *m2* (vulnerability) will represent a purely covert group. Prior

empirical investigations have found covert narcissism to be related to defensiveness (hypersensitivity), social anxiety, and introversion, and either negatively or non-significantly associated with aggression, dominance, exhibitionism (Wink, 1991; Sturman, 2000), and overt narcissism as measured by the NPI (Wink, 1991; Rathvon & Holstrom, 1996; Hendin & Cheek, 1997; Sturman, 2000).

In order to demonstrate that low $m1$ /high $m2$ participants do display the characteristics of covert narcissism, it was hypothesized that a low $m1$ /high $m2$ group would score significantly higher than others on PRF-E Defence and lower than others on Affiliation, Aggression, Dominance, Exhibition, Social Recognition, and the full-scale NPI. However, for methodological reasons which will be fully explained in Results, a transformed low $m1$ /high $m2$ product term variable (LH) was created (an index of a participant's resemblance to the low $m1$ /high $m2$ prototype), allowing the hypothesis to be restated in correlational terms. It is therefore predicted that the LH product term variable will be positively associated with PRF-E Defence, and negatively associated with PRF-E Affiliation, Aggression, Dominance, Exhibition, Social Recognition, and the full-scale NPI. An interaction is predicted, rather than the simple sum of the main effects for being simultaneously low on $m1$ and high on $m2$.

Finding an Association Between Narcissistic Vulnerability and Overt Narcissism

Scant empirical support has been found for the clinically-documented "narcissistic paradox" - the idea that grandiosity serves to defend against an underlying fragility (Kohut, 1971; Kernberg, 1995). Studies that assess the overt narcissist's reaction to negative feedback

claim to provide indirect evidence for the coexistence of grandiosity and vulnerability (see: Kernis & Sun, 1994; Bushman & Baumeister, 1996; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998). Rather than assess sensitivity to criticism, the present study assumes that the intensity of a respondent's reaction when denied narcissistic gratification is perhaps a more accurate index of narcissistic fragility. However, it is not possible to demonstrate a *direct* association between the *m2* subscale (which is designed to assess such reactivity) and overt narcissism (as measured by the NPI), the non-association between the NPI and measures of hypersensitivity being well documented (Wink, 1991; Sturman, 2000; Soyer *et al*, 2001). In order to demonstrate some relationship between *m2* and the NPI, the variable of interest, then, is the special case of the *m1* high/*m2* high scoring profile, wherein the characteristics of attention-seeking and vulnerability are both activated (a kind of unstable, aggravated state). As with the previous analysis, an initial hypothesis was presented: those participants who are simultaneously high on *m1* and *m2* will score higher than others on the NPI. Using a transformed *m1* high/*m2* high variable (HH), the hypothesis was restated in terms of a correlation: it is predicted that the HH product term variable will be positively associated with the NPI, which is to say that an interaction is predicted, rather than the simple sum of the main effects for being high on *m1* and *m2*.

METHOD

Participants

One hundred and forty Simon Fraser University undergraduates recruited between February 2000 and June 2000 (68 women, 72 men, between the ages of 18–30, $M = 20.01$, $SD = 2.34$) participated in exchange for course credit. Clinical sample participants (and their therapists) were recruited between July 2000 and March 2002. Twenty SFU Clinical Psychology Center psychotherapy clients (18 women, 2 men) between the ages of 22–60 ($M = 38.40$, $SD = 10.49$) who had completed at least 8 therapy sessions,²³ participated in exchange for test feedback.²⁴ Therapists were Masters and Doctoral level students from the SFU clinical psychology program, whose participation was dependent upon client suitability, and motivated in part by the opportunity to be present at their client's test feedback session. The student sample was ethnically diverse, including persons of Asian, Caucasian, East Asian, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern descent, whereas the clinical sample was, with two exceptions, Caucasian.

Solicitation of therapy sample participants followed specific protocols. Therapists asked for their client's consent regarding being contacted by the researcher, but did not

²³ It was reasoned that by 8 sessions, the therapist would know their client well enough to complete a rating scale on their client's interpersonal behaviour.

²⁴ Clinical participants were offered a half-hour feedback session, either alone, or in a joint session with their therapist. Seventeen clients chose a joint session, two received feedback without their therapist, and one declined any feedback.

request their participation. The formal request to take part was made in a phone call by the principal investigator, who informed clinical participants that their decision had no bearing on their client status. All participants were told that they were taking part in a study of social style, gave their informed consent, and were fully debriefed following testing. Participating therapists were made aware of the nature of the study at the outset, gave their informed consent, and were asked to take an impartial role regarding their client's participation—or lack thereof (see Appendix H for complete texts of the consent forms).

Procedure

Both the student and clinical participants completed the same test package, administered in the same order (SCT, SRS, PRF-E, NPI), in a standardized setting. Therapists completed a rating scale on their clients, at which time they were blind to their client's other test results.

Measures

Sentence Completion Test (SCT). The Sentence Completion test is a 24-item semi-projective measure. Sentence stems are designed to elicit responses corresponding to either the mirror-, ideal-, or twinship-hungry narcissistic personality types (see Appendix B for the 40-item test administered to participants, and Appendix A for a list of the 24 sentence stems retained for this study). Examples of test items are: “*If I had to work in a demanding job in which I received little or no feedback from my boss or co-workers as to whether I was doing it well ...*,” and “*When a mentor or role model disappoints me, I ...*,” and “*Having a partner who is very much like myself ...*” Sentence

completions are coded according to theory-based rules, with scoring values ranging from 0 (“no indication of targeted response”), to 1 (“some indication...”), to 2 (“clear indication...”), summed across 4 test items per subscale (m1, m2, i1, i2, t1, t2), or 8 items per Composite scale (M, I, T) scores. Subscales each have a maximum score of 8, and Composite scales a maximum score of 16.

Self-Rating Scales (SRS). The Self-Rating scales (see Appendix C) are brief, face valid, narrative style personality descriptions written to closely match the content of the SCT Composite (M, I, T) scales (with a male or female protagonist, depending on the sex of the participant).

Participants indicate their agreement with the three Self-Rating Scales personality descriptions using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“least like me”) to 7 (“most like me”).

Therapist Rating Scales (TRS). The Therapist Rating scales are a set of other-rating scales that enable therapists to rate their clients along the same dimensions as the SCT subscale root constructs (m1, m2, i1, i2, t1, t2) (see Appendixes D, E, and F). The therapist is presented with: a) general descriptions of each personality type, and b) focused descriptions of the root constructs corresponding to each subscale. After reading the introductory material, the therapist rates the extent to which the client displays characteristics of each root construct, using a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (“no indication”) to 3 (“strong indication”). Ratings are repeated across three domains: a) the therapeutic relationship, b) the client’s life in general (familial, marital, work, etc.), and c) current manifestation of the presenting problem. Whichever domain score is highest is taken as the client’s actual score for a given root construct.

Personality Research Form-E (PRF-E). The PRF-E (Jackson, 1984) is a 352-item true/false questionnaire consisting of 20, 16-item content scales (plus two validity scales), based on the manifest needs outlined by Murray (1938). It is designed to measure dimensions of normal functioning with “behavior-in-situation” items (Paunonen & Jackson, 1990, p. 483), some of which display conceptual overlap with characteristics described by the narcissistic personality types. Sample items are: “*I like to be in the spotlight,*” and “*I don’t mind having my mistakes pointed out to me at times when other people can hear.*” All items have been meticulously tested for social desirability (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992).

Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI). The NPI (Raskin & Hall, 1979, 1981, Raskin & Terry, 1988) is a 40-item forced-choice questionnaire based on the DSM-III narcissistic personality disorder diagnostic criteria: grandiosity, fantasies of unlimited success, exhibitionism, sense of entitlement, and interpersonal exploitiveness (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). It represents, to date, the only objective instrument to measure individual differences in grandiose narcissism as a normal personality trait. Sample items are: “*I really like to be the center of attention,*” and “*I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.*” The NPI has excellent psychometric properties, and efforts to establish its construct validity have yielded a general narcissism factor as well as seven other first-order components/subscales: Authority, Self-Sufficiency, Superiority, Exhibitionism, Exploitativeness, Vanity, and Entitlement (Raskin & Terry, 1988).

Scoring

Sentence completion responses were typed into tables to remove identifying features. For the purpose of establishing inter-rater reliability, three judges scored 124 student and 13 clinical sample protocols.²⁵ The remaining 23 protocols were scored by the author alone. The first ten responses for each item in the student sample were employed as a pretest (scored and discarded) to permit discussion and minimize scoring drift. Clinical sample responses were combined with student sample responses (so that raters were blind to the respondent's group status), and scored with no pretest. After all responses for a given stem were scored, disagreements were discussed, and a consensus score reached. Personality Research Form-E tests were computer scored by a professional testing service. Three student participants' test results were deemed invalid owing to a disrespectful test-taking stance on the SCT, and an elevated (greater than two standard deviations) PRF-E Infrequency scale score.

²⁵ Due to life circumstances, the trained raters were not available to score the last seven psychotherapy sample protocols.

RESULTS

Item Correlation with PRF-E Desirability

Correlations between individual sentence stems and PRF-E Desirability are presented in Table 5. A significant positive correlation was found for test item i1c with Desirability ($r = .15, p < .05$), the magnitude of which was insufficient to warrant removal of the test item. The final list of sentence stems is presented in Appendix A.

Table 5:

Correlations between Sentence Stems and PRF-E Desirability

Sentence Stem	<i>r</i>	Sentence Stem	<i>r</i>	Sentence Stem	<i>r</i>
m1a	.10	i1a	-.06	t1a	-.01
m1b	-.01	i1b	-.18*	t1b	.04
m1c	.08	i1c	.15*	t1c	.03
m1d	-.03	i1d	-.06	t1d	.05
m2a	-.05	i2a	.04	t2a	.01
m2b	.01	i2b	-.01	t2b	.11
m2c	-.16	i2c	-.12	t2c	.07
m2d	-.09	i2d	-.14	t2d	.06

* $p < .05$

Inter-Rater Reliability

A set of three judges provided ratings for all sentence completions from 124 student and 13 clinical sample protocols. The first ten responses for each item in the student sample were utilized as a pretest and discarded. Inter-rater reliability was assessed using an intraclass correlation coefficient described by McGraw and Wong (1996) as a two-way model (A, 1), which assumes random effects for subjects (rows) and judges (columns). ICC (A, 1) coefficients were calculated for single measurements (the ratings of each judge, for individual item scores), based on absolute agreement. Table 6 contains the ICC (A, 1) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. Point estimates indicate that, with the exception of four stems (i1b, i2d, m2b, and i1a), level of agreement is strong ($r(\text{ICC A, 1}) = .75$ or greater) (Fleiss, 1981). However, a more conservative approach is taken here, such that ICC estimates are evaluated according to the magnitude of the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval. The reader will note that Table 6 is divided into four sections: section A contains those 8 stems displaying strong inter-rater agreement (95% CI lower limits range from $r(\text{ICC, A, 1}) = .75$ to $.84$); section B contains those 10 stems for which level of agreement may be considered fair (95% CI lower limits range from $r(\text{ICC, A, 1}) = .70$ to $.73$); inter-rater agreement for the four stems in section C may be considered borderline acceptable (95% CI lower limits range from $r(\text{ICC, A, 1}) = .61$ to $.68$); and the two stems in section D display poor inter-rater agreement (95% CI lower limits range from $r(\text{ICC, A, 1}) = .56$ to $.58$).

Table 6:***Inter-Rater Reliability***

Section	Item	3 Judges							
		ICC	CI						
A	m1c	.88	(.84, .91)						
	i1d	.88	(.84, .91)						
	t1c	.85	(.80, .89)						
	m1b	.83	(.79, .87)						
	m1d	.83	(.78, .88)						
	m1a	.82	(.76, .86)						
	t1b	.82	(.76, .86)						
	t1a	.81	(.75, .85)						
B	i2b	.80	(.74, .85)						
	m2d	.80	(.73, .85)						
	m2c	.79	(.73, .84)						
	i1c	.79	(.73, .85)						
	i2c	.78	(.72, .84)						
	t1d	.78	(.72, .84)						
	m2a	.78	(.71, .83)						
	t2b	.78	(.71, .83)						
	i2a	.77	(.70, .83)	Judges 1 and 3		Judges 1 and 2		Judges 2 and 3	
	t2d	.77	(.70, .83)	ICC	CI	ICC	CI	ICC	CI
C	t2c	.76	(.68, .82)	.79	(.71, .85)	.79	(.71, .85)	.69	(.56, .78)
	t2a	.75	(.68, .81)	.83	(.76, .88)	.71	(.61, .79)	.71	(.61, .79)
	i1b	.70	(.61, .77)	.73	(.64, .81)	.71	(.61, .79)	.65	(.52, .74)
	i2d	.70	(.61, .77)	.76	(.66, .82)	.74	(.64, .81)	.60	(.46, .70)
D	m2b	.67	(.58, .75)	.65	(.53, .74)	.66	(.54, .75)	.70	(.60, .79)
	i1a	.66	(.56, .74)	.60	(.43, .72)	.66	(.53, .76)	.72	(.62, .80)

Note. ICC = Single measure intraclass correlation (ICC A, 1), two-way random effects model, absolute agreement. CI = 95% confidence interval.

As a means of determining whether inter-rater agreement for those six stems in sections C (borderline acceptable) and D (poor) was the result of deficiencies in the scoring rules, or rather, a matter of one or more judges adopting different scoring anchor points, intraclass correlations (ICC, A, 1) were calculated for all combinations of judges (see Table 6). For the two stems in section D (*m2b* and *i1a*), combinations excluding judge 1 yielded higher agreement, suggesting that judge 1 employed different anchor points for scoring than did judges 2 and 3. However, removing judge 1 improved agreement only to the extent that it could be considered borderline-acceptable rather than poor (95% CI lower limits ranging from $r(\text{ICC}, A, 1) = .60$ to $.62$, rather than $.56$ to $.58$), indicating a need for improvement in the *m2b* and *i1a* scoring rules. In section C, stem *t2a*, the exclusion of judge 2 resulted in a sufficiently improved coefficient of agreement (95% CI lower limit $r(\text{ICC}, A, 1) = .76$, rather than $.68$) to suggest that a difference in that judge's anchor points, rather than the scoring rules, contributed to lower inter-rater reliability. For stems *t2c*, *i1b* and *i2d*, level of agreement is improved for the judges 1/3 and 1/2 combinations, but lower for the 2/3 combination, suggesting that disagreement between judges 2 and 3 (presumably the result of a lack of clarity in the scoring rules) was the contributing factor. To summarize, analysis of inter-rater reliability indicates strong agreement for nine stems (*t2a* being included as a result of the rationale described above), fair agreement for ten stems, borderline-acceptable agreement for three stems (*t2c*, *i1b*, *i2d*), and poor agreement for two stems (*m2b*, *i1a*).

Intraclass correlations (ICC, A, 1) were also calculated for summed subscale, Composite scale, and full scale scores (see Table 7). Lower-bound confidence interval coefficients indicated borderline-acceptable agreement for the *i1* subscale (95% CI lower

limit r (ICC, A, 1) = .67), and strong agreement for all other subscales (95% CI lower limit r (ICC, A, 1) ranging from .75 to .86). Level of agreement is strong for the Composite scales (95% CI lower limit r (ICC, A, 1) ranging from .75 to .87) and the full scale (95% CI lower limit r (ICC, A, 1) = .86).

Table 7:

Inter-Rater Reliability for Subscales, Composite Scales, and Full Scale SCT

Subscale	3 Judges		Composite Scale	3 Judges			3 Judges	
	ICC	CI		ICC	CI		ICC	CI
m1	.90	(.86, .93)	M	.90	(.87, .93)	Full Scale	.89	(.86, .92)
m2	.81	(.75, .86)	I	.81	(.75, .86)			
i1	.75	(.67, .81)	T	.89	(.86, .92)			
i2	.81	(.76, .86)						
t1	.88	(.84, .91)						
t2	.84	(.78, .88)						

Note. ICC = Single measure intraclass correlation (ICC A, 1), two-way random effects model, absolute agreement. CI = 95% confidence interval.

Descriptive Statistics

Tables 8 through 11 provide descriptive data for the SCT subscales and Composite scales (based on the final, 24-item version of the test), Self-Rating scales, and the Therapist Rating Scales. Frequency distributions for the SCT subscales and Composite scales are presented in figures 2, 3, and 4. Study II SCT subscale and Self-Rating scale scores were not deemed comparable with Study I counterparts owing to substantial changes to subscale

composition. All descriptive data for the 22 PRF-E scales and the full-scale NPI and its content scales are to be found in Appendix I. Two instances of missing data were noted, both within the clinical sample: one Narcissistic Personality Inventory (case 153) and one Self-Rating scale (case 146). Analyses of mean differences by group and gender for all narcissism measures are presented below, followed by an examination of scoring patterns.

Table 8:

Descriptive Statistics, Sentence Completion Subscales

Sample	Subscale	<i>N</i>	Range	Min	Max	<i>M</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>S</i> ²
Full	m1	160	8	0	8	3.71	1.84	3.39
	m2	160	8	0	8	3.69	1.46	2.13
	i1	160	6	0	6	2.83	1.20	1.44
	i2	160	7	0	7	2.34	1.53	2.33
	t1	160	7	0	7	2.21	1.50	2.26
	t2	160	8	0	8	1.30	1.43	2.04
Student	m1	140	8	0	8	3.77	1.81	3.29
	m2	140	8	0	8	3.64	1.47	2.16
	i1	140	6	0	6	2.76	1.14	1.31
	i2	140	7	0	7	2.34	1.53	2.34
	t1	140	7	0	7	2.22	1.52	2.30
	t2	140	8	0	8	1.36	1.44	2.09
Clinical	m1	20	6	0	6	3.25	2.02	4.09
	m2	20	5	1	6	4.00	1.38	1.89
	i1	20	5	1	6	3.30	1.49	2.22
	i2	20	5	0	5	2.35	1.53	2.34
	t1	20	5	0	5	2.15	1.42	2.03
	t2	20	5	0	5	0.90	1.25	1.57

Note: Full sample *N* = 160, student sample *N* = 140, clinical sample *N* = 20.

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics, Sentence Completion Composite Scales

Sample	Composite Scale	N	Range	Min	Max	M	S	S ²
Full	M	160	15	0	15	7.39	2.64	6.97
	I	160	9	1	10	5.17	1.97	3.86
	T	160	12	0	12	3.51	2.28	5.22
Student	M	140	15	0	15	7.41	2.65	7.01
	I	140	9	1	10	5.10	1.91	3.66
	T	140	12	0	12	3.58	2.34	5.45
Clinical	M	20	10	2	12	7.25	2.65	7.04
	I	20	7	3	10	5.65	2.30	5.29
	T	20	8	0	8	3.05	1.88	3.52

Table 10: Descriptive Statistics, Self-Rating Scales

Sample	Self-Rating Scale	N	Range	Min	Max	M	S	S ²
Full	SRM	159	6	1	7	4.51	1.67	2.80
	SRI	159	6	1	7	3.42	1.61	2.60
	SRT	159	6	1	7	3.55	1.73	3.00
Student	SRM	140	6	1	7	4.49	1.66	2.77
	SRI	140	6	1	7	3.48	1.60	2.57
	SRT	140	6	1	7	3.66	1.71	2.93
Clinical	SRM	19	5	2	7	4.68	1.77	3.12
	SRI	19	5	1	6	3.00	1.67	2.78
	SRT	19	5	1	6	2.74	1.69	2.87

Table 11: Descriptive Statistics, Therapist Rating Scales

Sample	Scale	N	Range	Min	Max	M	S	S ²
Clinical	m1	20	3	0	3	1.60	0.88	0.78
	m2	20	2	1	3	2.15	0.81	0.66
	i1	20	3	0	3	1.25	0.85	0.72
	i2	20	3	0	3	1.30	0.86	0.75
	t1	20	3	0	3	1.10	0.97	0.94
	t2	20	3	0	3	0.80	0.83	0.69

Statistical Analyses of Group and Gender Differences

Analyses of group (student, clinical) and gender differences were undertaken for the Sentence Completion test subscales, the Self-Rating scales, and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Therapist Rating scale scores (clinical sample only) were not assessed for gender differences for two reasons: a) uneven numbers of men (2) and women (18) in the clinical sample, and b) the absence of rater reliability data, making it impossible to determine whether gender differences were a product of the raters or those who were rated. Analyses of mean differences due to age were also not undertaken because age is confounded with group (Table 12 demonstrates that because the student and clinical samples occupy different age ranges, any age difference can also be considered a group difference).

It was hypothesized that the clinical sample would display higher mean scores on all narcissism measures. No predictions were made regarding gender differences. All analyses employed the full sample ($N = 160$), calculated as a group by gender MANOVA, Brown-Forsythe (heteroscedastic) formula.

Sentence Completion Test

No significant group differences were found for the Sentence Completion test subscales. However, a significant difference due to gender was found for mean $m2$ ('narcissistic vulnerability') subscale scores ($F(1,4) = 9.61, p < .04$). Cohen's d indicated that females scored, on average, a moderate .7 standard deviations (one point) higher than males on the $m2$ subscale (female $M = 3.99, SD = 1.41$; male $M = 2.99, SD = 1.08$).

Table 12: Crosstabulated Age Data


Age	Student		Clinical		Total
	Female	Male	Female	Male	
18	26	12			38
19	16	21			37
20	12	14			26
21	4	11			15
22	5	5	1		11
23	1	3			4
24					0
25	2	2			4
26		1	1		2
27	2		1		3
28		1	1		2
29		1			1
30		1			1
31			1		1
32					0
33					0
34			1		1
35			3	1	4
36			1		1
37			2		2
38					0
39			1		1
40					0
41				1	1
42					0
43					0
44					0
45					0
46					0
47					0
48					0
49					0
50			1		1
51			1		1
52			1		1
53					0
54					0
55					0
56					0
57			1		1
58					0
59					0
60			1		1
Total	68	72	18	2	160

Self-Rating Scales

A significant difference due to group was found for mean *ideal-hungry Self-Rating* scores ($F(1, 26) = 8.40, p < .008$). The d statistic indicated that student participants scored, on average, a moderate .6 standard deviations (about one point) higher than clinical participants on the *ideal-hungry Self-Rating scale* (student $M = 3.48, SD = 1.61$; clinical $M = 2.56, SD = 1.73$).

Narcissistic Personality Inventory

Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) scores showed significant differences due to group ($F(1, 25) = 59.49, p < .0001; d = 1.2$) and gender ($F(1, 29) = 5.93, p < .02; d = .2$). Student participants scored, on average, a substantial 1.2 standard deviations (about 8.5 points) higher than clinical participants on the NPI (student $M = 17.57, SD = 7.08$; clinical $M = 9.08, SD = 3.58$), whereas male participants scored, on average, a relatively trivial .2 standard deviations (about 1.3 points) higher than female participants (female $M = 12.66, SD = 6.32$; male $M = 14.00, SD = 4.34$). There was also a significant Group x Gender interaction ($F(1, 28) = 8.55, p < .007$), demonstrating that males scored 4.85 points higher than females in the student sample (male $M = 20.00, SD = 7.27$; female $M = 15.15, SD = 6.70$), whereas females scored 2.17 points higher than males in the clinical sample (female $M = 10.17, SD = 5.75$; male $M = 8.00, SD = 1.41$). However, given that there are only *two* males in the clinical sample, the only valid comparison to be made was between males and females in the student sample: student males scored significantly higher than females ($t(138) = 4.06, p < .0001$), with a moderate d value of .7 standard deviations between means.

Figure 1:***NPI: Group \times Gender Interaction***

The obtained NPI male/female student means and d index were then compared to normative data from a study with 1029 female and 1060 male student participants (female $M = 15.40$, $SD = 4.84$; male $M = 16.82$, $SD = 5.06$) (Tschanz, Morf, & Turner, 1998). Adjusting for different sample sizes and significant heteroscedasticity (males $F(71, 1059) = 2.06$, $p < .0001$; females $F(67, 1028) = 2.03$, $p < .0001$), a significant difference was found for male means (Behrens-Fisher t' (Welch-Satterthwaite $df' 74.61$) = 3.66, $p < .0001$), but not for female means (Behrens-Fisher t' (Welch-Satterthwaite $df' 71.10$) = .29, ns) (Myers & Well, 1995). The d index for the Tschanz, Morf, & Turner (1998) student sample showed a relatively trivial difference of .3 standard deviations between male and female means, as compared to the more substantial difference of .7 found here.

The general conclusion to be drawn from these results is that although no significant group differences were found for the Sentence Completion test subscales, it was the *student* sample, and not (as predicted), the clinical sample that tended to manifest higher mean scores on other narcissism measures. Student scores were, on average, moderately higher than clinical for the ideal-hungry Self-Rating scale, and substantially higher for the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Gender differences were present to a moderate degree for the m2 (“vulnerability”) subscale, and marginally so for the NPI. Within the student sample, males scored substantially higher on the NPI than females, accounting for the greater difference between male and female means than that found in a previous study based on a much larger sample.

Scoring Patterns

It was predicted that overall M-Composite scores would be higher than I-Composite scores, and I-Composite scores would be higher than T-Composite scores. The three Composite scales are judged to be *a priori* comparable because the possible range is the same for each (0 to 16). All pairwise sign tests were significant at $p < .001$, confirming the predicted relationships (see Table 13). The ordering of d values demonstrates the greatest separation between M- and T-Composite. These scoring patterns may also be observed in the three Composite scale frequency distributions (see Figure 2): M-Composite being relatively symmetrical, I-Composite displaying a moderately positive skew, and T-Composite being very positively skewed.


Table 13:**Sign Tests for SCT Composite Scales**

M > I: 109	M = I: 19	M < I: 32	$\chi = 6.49, p = .001$	$d = .48$
M > T: 133	M = T: 11	M < T: 16	$\chi = 9.82, p = .001$	$d = .73$
I > T: 103	I = T: 19	I < T: 38	$\chi = 5.48, p = .001$	$d = .41$


Note. M = M-Composite, I = I-Composite, T = T-Composite.

Figure 2:**Composite Scale Frequency Distributions**


M-Composite



I-Composite



T-Composite



The foregoing analysis was repeated with first-component (m1, i1, t1) and second component (m2, i2, t2) subscales (see Tables 14 and 15). All pairwise sign tests were significant at $p < .001$, confirming the $M > I > T$ ordering found among the Composite scales. The order of magnitude of d values indicated the greatest degree of separation between m1 and t1, and m2 and t2. These findings are reflected in the subscale frequency distributions, with the greatest degree of positive skew observed for the t1 and t2 distributions (see Figures 3 and 4).

Table 14:

Sign Tests for SCT First-Component Subscales

m1 > i1: 95	m1 = i1: 23	m1 < i1: 42	$z = 4.53, p = .001$	$d = .33$
m1 > t1: 114	m1 = t1: 9	m1 < t1: 37	$z = 6.27, p = .001$	$d = .48$
i1 > t1: 96	i1 = t1: 20	i1 < t1: 44	$z = 4.40, p = .001$	$d = .33$


Table 15:

Sign Tests for SCT Second-Component Subscales


m2 > i2: 102	m2 = i2: 24	m2 < i2: 34	$z = 5.87, p = .001$	$d = .43$
m2 > t2: 133	m2 = t2: 15	m2 < t2: 12	$z = 10.05, p = .001$	$d = .76$
i2 > t2: 96	i2 = t2: 38	i2 < t2: 26	$z = 7.04, p = .001$	$d = .44$

*Figure 3:**First-Component Subscale Frequency Distributions*

m1 subscale: displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses.



i1 subscale: seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities (i.e., prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or views, etc.)



t1 subscale: seeks relationships/friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values.






Figure 4:***Second-Component Subscale Frequency Distributions***


m2 subscale: low self-esteem (or other indication of narcissistic fragility, such as rage or cold rejection) in the absence of confirming and admiring responses.



i2 subscale: easily disappointed by idealized other.



t2 subscale: becomes disappointed, angry, or reverses previous feelings for partner when he/she discovers that the partner is not as identical to self as previously thought.



Sign tests were repeated to determine whether the same ordering would be found for the Self-Rating scales. Pairwise sign tests indicated that overall Self-Rating Mirror scores were significantly higher ($p < .001$) than Self-Rating Ideal and Self-Rating Twinship, but that Self-Rating Ideal scores were not significantly higher than Self-Rating Twinship scores. The

order of magnitude of d values indicated the greatest degree of separation between Self-Rating Mirror and Self-Rating Ideal (see Table X).

Table 15:

Sign Tests for SCT Second-Component Subscales

SRM > SRI: 98	SRM = SRI: 27	SRM < SRI: 35	$z = 5.46, p = .001$	$d = .39$
SRM > SRT: 87	SRM = SRT: 30	SRM < SRT: 43	$z = 3.86, p = .001$	$d = .28$
SRI > SRT: 63	SRI = SRT: 25	SRI < SRT: 72	$z = .77, p = ns$	$d = .06$

Note. SRM = Self-Rating Mirror, SRI = Self-Rating Ideal, SRT = Self-Rating Twinship.

Content Validity

Subscale and Composite Scale Intercorrelations

It was hypothesized that the $m1$ (exhibitionism) subscale would be positively correlated with $m2$ (vulnerability), $i1$ (seeks others to admire) with $i2$ (ideal-disappointment), and $t1$ (seeks similarity) with $t2$ (twinship-disappointment). It was also predicted that $i2$ would be positively correlated with $t2$ (twinship-disappointment). Correlations were tested as two-tailed Monte Carlo permutation tests of the Pearson r , using 10^5 permutations. As predicted, $m1$ was positively correlated with $m2$ ($r = .27, p < .01$), and $t1$ with $t2$ ($r = .22, p < .05$). However, $i1$ was not significantly related to $i2$ ($r = .03, ns$), nor was $i2$ with $t2$ ($r = .13, ns$) (See Table 16).

Table 16:**Subscale Intercorrelations**

Subscale	Subscale					
	m1	m2	i1	i2	t1	t2
m1	1.00	.27**	.06	.13	-.06	-.05
m2		1.00	.12	.09	.05	-.05
i1			1.00	.03	.13	.16
i2				1.00	-.09	.13
t1					1.00	.22*
t2						1.00

Note. Boxes indicate correlations about which there were hypotheses. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$.

It was hypothesized that there would be no relationship among the three Composite scales. As predicted, M-Composite was not associated with I-Composite ($r = .17$, *ns*) or T-Composite ($r = -.05$, *ns*), and I-Composite was not associated with T-Composite ($r = .13$, *ns*) (see Table 17). Correlations for Composite scales with subscales are presented for descriptive purposes (see Table 18).

Table 17:**Composite Scale Intercorrelations**

Scale	Scale		
	M	I	T
M	1.00	.17	-.05
I		1.00	.13
T			1.00

Table 18:***Correlations for Composite Scales with Subscales***

Subscale	Composite Scale		
	M	I	T
m1	.85**	.14	-.07
m2	.74**	.14	.01
i1	.12	.63**	.19
i2	.14	.79**	.02
t1	-.01	.01	.79**
t2	-.06	.20	.78**

Note. ** $p < .01$.

Principal Components Analysis

Both Pearson and polychoric correlations were computed for the 24 test items, and the resulting matrices were subjected to a principal components analysis. Inspection of scree plots (see Figure 5) suggested that the correct number of factors to retain was either 2 or 4 (because the eigenvalues for the third and fourth factors were so close, a 3-factor solution was not supportable). The polychoric correlation matrix was retained because the corresponding component matrices were more interpretable. 2- and 4-factor solutions were produced (accounting for 20.65% and 36.40% of the variance, respectively), and rotated orthogonally (varimax) and obliquely (promax). It was determined that the varimax rotation offered the most economical description, given that: a) each rotation produced similar factor loadings, and b) the correlations among oblique factors were poorly determined by the data (i.e., the coefficients were so small that nothing was lost by treating them as zero,


descriptively). Of the two solutions, the 4-factor solution was found to be most interpretable - without reference to the theoretical model (see Table 19 for SCT item loadings on 2- and 4-factor varimax-rotated principal components, and Table 20 for a complete text of SCT item loadings for the 4-factor solution). A factor loading interpretation threshold of .315 was determined by examining the inside-out plot (see Appendix J). Qualitative interpretations were made on the basis of sentence stem content and scoring rules, with greater weight given to stem content.

The 4-factor solution suggests two factors whose interpretation is simple (1 and 3), and two that are complex (2 and 4). These factors were tentatively named: disappointment (1), vulnerability-exhibitionism (2), other-seeking (3), and grandiosity (4).

The *disappointment* factor (1) showed positive loadings for all four *t2* (twinsip-disappointment) items, and item *i2b* (an ideal-disappointment item, with a moderately high loading of .58). The two *t2* items with the highest loadings (*t2b* at .74, and *t2a* at .68) pose the same “sudden realization” situation, whereas the *t2* items in the lower range (*t2d* at .51, and *t2c* at .40) invite a more considered, less reflexive response. Apart from a common disappointment theme, a possible explanation as to why *i2b* – and not the other *i2* items – showed a positive loading on factor 1, is that *i2b* is the only *i2* item that explicitly describes the underlying ideal-hungry disappointment reaction (e.g., “*not as faultless as I initially imagined*”), and in that sense may also be considered a “sudden realization” sentence stem.

Figure 5:

Scree Plots for Pearson and Polychoric Correlation Matrices



The *vulnerability-exhibitionism* factor (2) included positive loadings for all *m2* (narcissistic vulnerability) items (ranging from .45 to .70). However, the second and third highest loadings were for *m1* (exhibitionism) items: *m1d*, loading at .56, and *m1b* at .55. An ideal-disappointment item (*i2a*, loading at .35) was sufficiently non-contiguous to the *m1/m2* grouping (and close enough to the interpretive threshold) to be considered peripheral to the central meaning of this factor. Salient item loadings therefore suggested two overlapping content-groups: vulnerability (*m2a, b, c, d*) and exhibitionism (*m1b, d*).

The highest item loadings on the *other-seeking* factor (3) were for the *t1* (seeks similarity) sentence stems (ranging from .46 to .70). Factor 3 also demonstrated positive item loadings for *i1a* (an other-focused idealizing sentence stem) with a loading of .40, *t2d* (a relatively open-ended twinship stem, scored for disappointment, which nevertheless pulled for a need for similarity) with a loading of .41, and negative loadings for two *i2* (ideal-disappointment/rejection) items, *i2a* (-.34), and *i2b* (-.39). This factor, then, appears to represent an “other-seeking” dimension, as evidenced by positive loadings for items representing a “focused on others” dynamic (*t1* items, *i1a*), and negative loadings for items pulling for a “pushing others away” dynamic (*i2a* and *i2b*).

The *grandiosity* factor (4) included positive loadings for three *m1* (exhibitionism) items (*m1a, m1b, and m1c*, loading at .67, .32, and .66, respectively), one *i1* (seeks others to admire) item suggesting “grandiosity by association” (*i1d*, with a loading of .35), two items targeting the expectation of perfection in admired others (*i2c* and *i2d*, loading at .60 and .32), and a

negative loading for one twinship-similarity item (*t1d*, with a loading of $-.38$).²⁶ Factor 4 therefore suggests a combination of grandiose (mirror-type) characteristics, including: exhibitionism, the need to maintain the illusion of perfection in those with whom one associates, and an aversion to similarity-based relationships.

In summary, these results provided clear evidence of content validity for the *m2*, *t1*, and *t2* subscales, and partial evidence for the *m1* subscale, which loaded primarily on factor 4, but also on factor 1. The *i2* subscale showed positive loadings on factors 1, 2, and 4, and negative loadings on 3, but was nevertheless interpretable. No content validity evidence was found for the *i1* (seeks others to admire) subscale because: a) only one *i1* item loading exceeded the $.315$ criterion, and b) low communalities were observed for all *i1* items, indicating that the 4-factor model did not adequately explain the correlation of those test items with the other item-variables. The four hypothesized content-groupings (*m1* with *m2*, *i1* with *i2*, and *t1* with *t2*,) were not cleanly replicated: all *m2* items and two *m1* items loaded on factor 2, *t1* and *t2* items loaded on different factors (3 and 1, respectively), and because *i1* did not manifest in a coherent manner, it was not possible to determine its relationship to *i2*.

²⁶ A conceptually-consistent finding, given that grandiose narcissists would perceive similar others as competition, and therefore a threat.

Table 19:**Loadings of SCT Test Items on Varimax-Rotated Principal Components (N = 160)**

2-Factor Solution				4-Factor Solution				
Item	Factor		h^2	Factor				h^2
	1	2		1	2	3	4	
m1a	-.08	.27	.08	-.23	.06	.12	.67	.52
m1b	-.08	.61	.38	-.22	.55	-.06	.32	.45
m1c	-.08	.43	.19	-.15	.19	-.07	.66	.50
m1d	.28	.49	.32	.21	.56	-.03	.04	.36
m2a	.03	.43	.19	-.14	.52	.09	.04	.30
m2b	-.03	.55	.31	-.15	.70	-.07	-.18	.54
m2c	.21	.44	.24	.10	.48	.03	.12	.26
m2d	.39	.30	.25	.26	.45	.18	-.01	.30
i1a	.09	-.08	.01	-.13	.08	.40	.01	.19
i1b	.24	.06	.06	.11	.10	.25	.20	.12
i1c	.25	.06	.06	.24	.12	.04	-.06	.08
i1d	.25	.11	.07	.23	.01	.06	.35	.17
i2a	.00	.37	.14	.11	.35	-.34	-.15	.28
i2b	.34	.27	.19	.58	.13	-.39	.06	.51
i2c	.17	.27	.10	.24	-.02	-.17	.60	.45
i2d	.13	.04	.02	.08	-.04	.10	.32	.12
t1a	.28	-.37	.21	-.03	-.18	.70	.12	.53
t1b	.37	-.09	.15	.07	.25	.60	-.20	.46
t1c	.51	-.21	.31	.31	-.07	.53	.16	.41
t1d	.44	-.18	.23	.25	.17	.46	-.38	.45
t2a	.63	-.16	.43	.68	-.09	.16	.00	.49
t2b	.67	-.06	.45	.74	-.05	.07	.08	.56
t2c	.29	.17	.11	.40	.09	-.16	.12	.20
t2d	.59	-.33	.46	.51	-.18	.41	-.04	.46

Note. h^2 = communalities. Factor loadings of .315 or greater are interpreted. Light shading indicates positive values, dark shading indicates negative values.

Table 20:

**Summary of SCT Items and Factor Loadings for Varimax Four-Factor Solution
(N = 160)**

m1a	If I told a joke at a social gathering, and several people turned to listen ...	-.23	.06	.12	.67
m1b	If I were asked to take part in a play ...	-.22	.55	-.06	.32
m1c	A person stands in the spotlight, while another stands off to one side. <i>If I were in this scene, I would be ...</i>	-.15	.19	-.07	.66
m1d	When I share my successes with other people, my secret wish is that they21	.56	-.03	.04
m2a	If I had to work in a demanding job in which I received little or no feedback from my boss or co-workers as to whether I was doing it well ...	-.14	.52	.09	.04
m2b	If I worked very hard preparing for a party (or family gathering), and someone else took all the credit...	-.15	.70	-.07	-.18
m2c	When my talents and abilities aren't acknowledged, what I do is...	.10	.48	.03	.12
m2d	I am walking down the street, looking my best. An attractive person passes by without even glancing at me. I...	.26	.45	.18	-.01
i1a	The kind of person who holds a real fascination for me ...	-.13	.08	.40	.01
i1b	In my life, having someone I can look up to...[because]	.11	.10	.25	.20
i1c	When I think of someone I admire, I feel...[because]	.24	.12	.04	-.06
i1d	Some people are fascinated by regular people, whereas others seek to discover people who are exceptional. I...	.23	.01	.06	.35
i2a	Try to bring to mind someone you held in very high esteem, but who you did not know all that well. Over time, as you got to know him/her better11	.35	-.34	-.15
i2b	When someone I look up to displays a character flaw - that is, show that they are not as faultless as I initially imagined...	.58	.13	-.39	.06
i2c	When a mentor or role model disappoints me I...	.24	-.02	-.17	.60
i2d	When someone I admire lets me down...	.08	-.04	.10	.32
t1a	Having a partner who is very much like myself ...	-.03	-.18	.70	.12
t1b	Some of the people I know are very similar to me, whereas others are very different from me. I feel the most comfortable with07	.25	.60	-.20
t1c	Think of your best friend. Is it the similarities or differences in your personalities that makes you friends? For me, what really makes the friendship "click"31	-.07	.53	.16
t1d	Having a partner who is very different from myself25	.17	.46	-.38
t2a	If I arrive at the realization that someone who I consider to be a close friend is very different from me in some respect68	-.09	.16	.00
t2b	If I discover that a friend and I are very dissimilar74	-.05	.07	.08
t2c	In my close friendships, a difference in outlook or lifestyle40	.09	-.16	.12
t2d	Consider these two scenes: In the first one, two friends stand side by side. It is obvious that they are quite different from one another. In the second scene, two other friends stand together, but unlike the first two, they are alike in many ways. <i>If I were in the first scene, I would feel ...</i> <i>If I were in the second scene I would feel ...</i>	.51	-.18	.41	-.04

Convergent and Discriminant Validity

All convergent and discriminant validity analyses employed the full sample ($N = 160$), except for correlations between SCT subscales and Therapist Rating scales, which were based on clinical sample data ($n = 20$). Correlations were tested by two-tailed Monte Carlo permutation tests of the Pearson r , with 10^5 permutations. Group and gender differences for correlations were tested with Fisher's Z transformation. Given that Fisher's Z is sensitive to departures from normality, valid z -tests were not possible for T-Composite correlates, and any reported differences for I-Composite correlates were interpreted with caution (see Figures 2, 3, and 4 for subscale and Composite scale frequency distribution histograms).

Correlation Between SCT Composite Scales and Self-Rating Scales

It was hypothesized that each SCT Composite (M, I, T) scale would be significantly associated with its Self-Rating Counterpart (SRM, SRI, SRT). It was also predicted that I-Composite would be positively correlated with Self-Rating Twinship, and T-Composite with Self-Rating Ideal. As predicted, M-Composite was positively correlated with Self-Rating Mirror ($r = .38, p < .01$). I-Composite scale was positively correlated with Self-Rating Ideal ($r = .21, p < .05$), the magnitude of which was significantly higher for the student sample (Student $r = .28, p < .01$; Clinical $r = -.14, ns; z = 2.13, p < .02$). T-Composite was positively correlated with Self-Rating Twinship ($r = .53, p < .01$). Predicted associations for I-Composite with Self-Rating Twinship ($r = .08, ns$), and T-Composite with Self-Rating Ideal ($r = .11, ns$) were not borne out (see Table 21).

Table 21:**Correlations for SCT Composite Scales with Self-Rating Scales**

Composite Scale	Self-Rating Scale		
	SRM	SRI	SRT
M	.38**	-.01	-.03
I	.17	.21*	.08
T	.02	.11	.53**

Note. Boxes indicate correlations about which there were hypotheses. SRM = Self-Rating Mirror, SRI = Self-Rating Ideal, SRT = Self-Rating Twinship. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

The relationship between individual subscales ($m1$, $m2$, $i1$, $i2$, $t1$, $t2$) and the Self-Rating scales was also examined. Self-Rating Mirror was positively correlated with the $m1$ ($r = .27, p < .01$) and $m2$ ($r = .36, p < .01$) subscales. Self-Rating Ideal was positively correlated with $i2$ ($r = .21, p < .05$), but not $i1$ ($r = .08, ns$). Self-Rating Twinship was positively correlated with $t1$ ($r = .46, p < .01$) and $t2$ ($r = .37, p < .01$) (see Table 22).

Correlation Between the SCT Subscales and Therapist-Rating Scales

It was predicted that each SCT subscale ($m1$, $m2$, $i1$, $i2$, $t1$, $t2$) would be positively correlated with its Therapist-Rating counterpart. It was also predicted that the $i2$ subscale would be positively associated with Therapist-Rating $t2$, and the $t2$ subscale with Therapist-Rating $i2$. Correlations were based on clinical sample data ($n = 20$).

Table 22:***Correlations for SCT Subscales with Self-Rating Scales***

Subscale	Self-Rating Scale		
	SRM	SRI	SRT
m1	.27**	-.04	-.08
m2	.36**	.05	.05
i1	.12	.08	.07
i2	.12	.21*	.05
t1	.01	.02	.46**
t2	.03	.16	.37**

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Correlations for the *m1* subscale with Therapist Rating scale *m1* ($r = .35$, *ns*), and for the *m2* subscale with Therapist Rating scale *m2* ($r = .38$, *ns*) were positive but non-significant. Correlations for the *i1* subscale with Therapist Rating scale *i1* ($r = .27$, *ns*) and for the *i2* subscale with Therapist Rating scale *i2* ($r = .39$, *ns*) were also positive but non-significant. The predicted association between the *t1* subscale and Therapist Rating scale *t1* ($r = -.03$, *ns*) was non-significant and of low magnitude, and for the *t2* subscale with Therapist Rating *t2* ($r = -.47$, *ns*), the correlation was both non-significant and in the opposite direction to what was predicted. Expected positive correlations for the *i2* subscale with Therapist Rating *t2* ($r = .02$, *ns*), and for the *t2* subscale with Therapist Rating *i2* ($r = -.02$, *ns*) were not borne out (see Table 23).

Table 23:**Correlations for SCT Subscales with Therapist Rating Scales ($n = 20$)**

SCT Subscale	Therapist Rating Scale					
	m1	m2	i1	i2	t1	t2
m1	.35	.01	-.04	.11	.04	-.22
m2	.35	.38	.23	.13	-.16	-.18
i1	-.22	-.43	.27	.01	-.42	-.33
i2	.54	.46	-.11	.39	-.03	.02
t1	.05	-.07	.32	.39	-.03	.02
t2	-.23	.02	-.07	-.02	-.56	-.47

Note. Boxes indicate correlations about which there were hypotheses.

Having found no significant correlations for the SCT subscales with Therapist Rating scales, the relationship between the clinical sample ($n = 20$) Self-Rating scales and Therapist Rating scales was examined (see Table 24). It was predicted that Self-Rating Mirror would be positively associated with Therapist Rating *m1* and *m2*, Self-Rating Ideal with Therapist Rating *i1* and *i2*, and Self-Rating Twinship with Therapist Rating *t1* and *t2*. None of the obtained correlations were significant at the .05 level, and were negative in all but one instance: Self-Rating Mirror with Therapist Rating *m1* ($r = .01$, *ns*) and *m2* ($r = -.17$, *ns*); Self-Rating Ideal with Therapist Rating *i1* ($r = -.08$, *ns*) and *i2* ($r = -.46$, *ns*); Self-Rating Twinship with Therapist Rating *t1* ($r = -.18$, *ns*) and *t2* ($r = -.27$, *ns*).

Table 24:***Correlations for Self-Rating Scales with Therapist Rating Scales (n = 20)***

Self-Rating	Therapist Rating Scale					
	m1	m2	i1	i2	t1	t2
M	.01	-.17	.08	.06	.05	-.05
I	-.24	.04	-.08	-.46	.07	.08
T	-.33	-.30	.04	-.18	-.18	-.27

Note. M = Self-Rating Mirror, I = Self-Rating Ideal, T = Self-Rating Twinship.

In summary, convergence was found between each SCT Composite scale and its Self-Rating scale counterpart. The magnitude of this relationship, however, was markedly lower for the correlation of I-Composite with Self-Rating Ideal. Upon further examination of the relationship between individual subscales and the Self-Rating scales, it was found that although both *m1* and *m2* were associated with Self-Rating mirror, and *t1* and *t2* were likewise associated with Self-Rating Twinship, only *i2* was significantly associated with Self-Rating Ideal. The hypothesized convergence between Sentence Completion subscales and corresponding Therapist-Rating scales was not supported.

*Correlation with PRF-E Scales**Preliminary Analysis:**Correlation Between "Overt Narcissism" PRF-E Scales and the NPI*

For those correlational analyses involving the M-Composite scale and its subscales, hypothesized PRF-E correlates of overt narcissism were: Affiliation, Aggression, Defence, Dominance, Exhibition, and Social Recognition, and a negative association with Abasement. As predicted, the NPI was positively correlated with PRF-E Affiliation ($r = .29, p < .01$), Aggression ($r = .41, p < .01$), Defence ($r = .28, p < .01$), Dominance ($r = .57, p < .01$), Exhibitionism ($r = .63, p < .01$), and Social Recognition ($r = .24, p < .05$), and negatively correlated with Abasement ($r = -.32, p < .01$). An exploratory analysis also found a positive correlation for NPI with Play ($r = .42, p < .01$), and a negative correlation with Harmavoidance ($r = -.39, p < .01$), suggesting characteristics of playfulness and risk-taking, respectively (see Table 25). The correlation of NPI with Abasement was found to be significantly larger (in a negative direction) for the student sample (Student $r = -.33, p < .01$, Clinical $r = .09, ns; z = 2.15, p < .02$), whereas the clinical sample demonstrated a significantly higher positive correlation for NPI with Affiliation (Student $r = .17, ns$; Clinical $r = .54, p < .05; z = 2.15, p < .02$). In summary, these findings support the predicted relationship between the selected PRF-E scales and a measure of overt narcissism.

Table 25:**Correlations for NPI with Selected PRF-E Scales**

	PRF-E Scale								
	Ab	Af	Ag	De	Do	Ex	Ha	Pl	Sr
NPI	-.32**	.29**	.41**	.28**	.57**	.63**	-.39**	.42**	.24*

Note. Italicized values indicate exploratory findings. Ab = Abasement, Af = Affiliation, Ag = Aggression, De = Defence, Do = Dominance, Ex = Exhibitionism, Ha = Harmavoidance, Pl = Play, Sr = Social Recognition. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Mirror-Hungry Scales*M-Composite with PRF-E Scales*

It was hypothesized that the M-Composite scale would be positively associated with PRF-E Defence, Exhibition, and Social Recognition. As predicted, M-Composite was positively correlated with PRF-E Defence ($r = .26, p < .01$), Exhibition ($r = .36, p < .01$), and Social Recognition ($r = .30, p < .01$) (see Table 26). The correlation of M-Composite with Exhibition was significantly higher for the clinical sample (Student $r = .33, p < .001$; Clinical $r = .65, p < .01$; $z = 2.15, p < .05$).

Table 26:**Correlations for M-Composite with Selected PRF-E Scales**

	PRF-E Scale		
	De	Ex	Sr
M-Composite	.26**	.36**	.30**

Note. De = Defence, Ex = Exhibitionism, Sr = Social Recognition. ** $p < .01$

m1 Subscale with PRF-E Scales

It was hypothesized that the *m1* (exhibitionism) subscale would be positively associated with PRF-E Affiliation, Aggression, Defence, Dominance, Exhibition, and Social Recognition, and a negatively associated with Abasement. As predicted, the *m1* subscale was positively correlated with Affiliation ($r = .30, p < .01$), Aggression ($r = .25, p < .05$), Dominance ($r = .43, p < .01$), and Exhibitionism ($r = .56, p < .01$), but not to a significant degree with Defence ($r = .15, ns$) or Social Recognition ($r = .20, ns$). The predicted negative correlation with Abasement ($r = -.12, ns$) was non-significant. An exploratory analysis found a significant correlation for *m1* with Play ($r = .29, p < .01$) (see Table 27). Clinical sample correlations were significantly higher for *m1* with Affiliation (Student $r = .21, ns$; Clinical $r = .73, p < .01$; $z = 3.56, p < .0002$), Abasement (Student $r = -.17, ns$; Clinical $r = .33, ns$; $z = 2.56, p < .001$), Exhibition (Student $r = .52, p < .01$; Clinical $r = .79, p < .01$; $z = 2.46, p < .01$), and Play (Student $r = .23, p < .05$; Clinical $r = .53, ns$; $z = 1.77, p < .04$).

Table 27:***Correlations for m1 Subscale with Selected PRF-E Scales***

	PRF-E Scale							
	Ab	Af	Ag	De	Do	Ex	Pl	Sr
m1 Subscale	-.12	.30**	.25*	.15	.43**	.56**	.29**	.20

Note. *Italicized values indicate exploratory findings.* Ab = Abasement, Af = Affiliation, Ag = Aggression, De = Defence, Do = Dominance, Ex = Exhibitionism, Pl = Play, Sr = Social Recognition. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

m2 Subscale with PRF-E Scales

It was predicted that the *m2* (vulnerability) subscale would be positively associated with PRF-E Defence, but would not be significantly associated with Aggression, Dominance, Exhibition, or Social Recognition. As predicted, *m2* was positively correlated with Defence ($r = .28, p < .01$), and (as predicted) not significantly associated with Affiliation ($r = -.08, ns$), Aggression ($r = .17, ns$), Dominance ($r = .01, ns$), or Exhibition ($r = -.05, ns$). Contrary to expectations, *m2* was positively associated with Social Recognition ($r = .29, p < .01$) (see Table 28). An exploratory analysis using the remaining 14 PRF-E scales found a non-significant, but noteworthy correlation between *m2* and Sentience ($r = .20, ns$) ($p < .01$ before Bonferroni correction).

Table 28:**Correlations for the *m2* Subscale with Selected PRF-E Scales**

	PRF-E Scale					
	Af	Ag	De	Do	Ex	Sr
m2 Subscale	-0.08	.17	.28**	.01	-.05	.29**

Note. Values enclosed in boxes indicate expected *non-significant* correlations. Af = Affiliation, Ag = Aggression, De = Defence, Do = Dominance, Ex = Exhibitionism, Sr = Social Recognition. ** $p < .01$.

The general conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that *m1* correlates were consistent with overt narcissism (Affiliation, Aggression, Dominance, and Exhibition), whereas *m2* correlates were more indicative of covert narcissism (an association with Defence and Social Recognition, and no relationship with Affiliation, Aggression, Dominance, and Exhibition). M-Composite findings emerged as expected. The association between *m1* with Play was concordant with manipulation check findings, further supporting the validity of *m1* as a measure of NPI-type overt narcissism.

Ideal-Hungry Scales

It was hypothesized that the I-Composite scale would be positively associated with Defence, and negatively associated with Endurance and Order. No significant correlations were obtained for Defence ($r = .14$, *ns*), Endurance ($r = -.07$, *ns*), and Order ($r = -.08$, *ns*). Repeating the analysis with the *i1* (seeks other to admire) and *i2*

(disappointment) subscales yielded a positive correlation for i2 and Defence ($r = .22, p < .05$) (see Table 29).

Table 29:

Correlations for the I-Composite Scale and Subscales with Selected PRF-E Scales

SCT Scale	PRF-E Scale		
	De	En	Or
I-Composite	.14	-.07	-.07
i1 Subscale	-.05	-.01	-.08
i2 Subscale	.22*	-.08	-.04

Note. De = Defence, En = Endurance, Or = Order. * $p < .05$.

Twinship-Hungry Scales

It was hypothesized that the T-Composite scale would be positively associated with PRF-E Succorance and Defence, and negatively associated with Autonomy and Change. As predicted, T-Composite correlated positively with Succorance ($r = .23, p < .05$), and negatively with Autonomy ($r = -.25, p < .01$). The expected positive association with Defence ($r = .01, ns$), and negative association with Change ($r = -.13, ns$) were not borne out. Repeating the analysis with the *t1* (seeks similarity) and *t2* (disappointment) subscales found *t1* to be positively correlated with Succorance ($r = .20, p < .05$) and negatively correlated with Autonomy ($r = -.24, p < .01$). An exploratory analysis using the remaining 15 PRF-E scales found a significant correlation for T-Composite with Harmavoidance ($r = .27, p < .05$), and *t2* with Harmavoidance ($r = .25, p < .05$) (see Table 30).

Table 30:***Correlations for the T-Composite Scale and Subscales with Selected PRF-E Scales***

SCT Scale	PRF-E Scale				
	Au	Ch	De	Ha	Su
T-Composite	-.25**	-.13	.01	.27*	.23*
t1 Subscale	-.24**	-.15	-.01	.17	.20*
t2 Subscale	-.14	-.05	.03	.25*	.16

Note. Italicized values indicate exploratory findings. Au = Autonomy, Ch = Change, De = Defence, Su = Succorance. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Correlation with the NPI and Content Scales***M-Composite***

It was hypothesized that the M-Composite scale would be positively associated with the NPI and the NPI Exhibitionism content scale. As predicted, the M-Composite scale correlated positively with the NPI ($r = .36, p < .001$) and the Exhibitionism content scale ($r = .37, p < .001$). Unplanned significant correlations were also found for M-Composite with the Authority content scale ($r = .23, p < .01$), Superiority ($r = .34, p < .01$), Entitlement ($r = .29, p < .01$), and Exploitativeness ($r = .24, p < .01$) (see Table 31). Clinical sample correlations were significantly higher for M-Composite with the NPI (student $r = .36, p < .001$; clinical $r = .61, p < .01$; $z = 1.65, p < .05$), Superiority (student $r = .31, p < .001$; clinical $r = .61, p < .01$; $z = 1.93, p < .03$), and Self-Sufficiency (student $r = -.04, ns$; clinical $r = .28, ns$; $z = 1.63, p < .05$).

m1 and m2 Subscales

It was hypothesized that the *m1* (exhibitionism) subscale would be positively associated with the NPI and the NPI Exhibitionism content scale (see Table 31), and that the degree of association would be greater than that found for M-Composite with NPI and Exhibitionism. It was also hypothesized that the *m2* (vulnerability) subscale would demonstrate no relationship to the NPI or its content scales. As predicted, the *m1* subscale correlated positively with the full-scale NPI ($r = .48, p < .001$) and Exhibitionism ($r = .51, p < .001$), both coefficients being (as predicted) greater than the M-Composite with NPI and Exhibitionism (but not significantly so). As predicted, the *m2* subscale was not significantly associated with the full-scale NPI ($r = .05, ns$) or its content scales. Unplanned significant correlations were also found for *m1* with Authority ($r = .48, p < .01$), Superiority ($r = .42, p < .01$), Entitlement ($r = .30, p < .01$), and Exploitativeness ($r = .23, p < .01$) (See Table 31). Clinical sample correlations were significantly higher for *m1* with NPI (Student $r = .46, p < .001$, Clinical $r = .68, p < .001$; $z = 1.84, p < .03$), Superiority (Student $r = .39, p < .001$, Clinical $r = .64, p < .01$; $z = 1.72, p < .04$), and Self-Sufficiency (Student $r = -.01, ns$, Clinical $r = .46, p < .05$; $z = 2.50, p < .006$).

I-Composite, T-Composite, and subscales

As predicted the I- and T-Composite scales and subscales were not significantly associated with the NPI or its content scales (see Table 31).

In summary, the relationship between M-Composite and the NPI appeared to be the result of a strong positive association between the *m1* (exhibitionism) subscale and the NPI.

The *m1* subscale was found to be associated with all NPI content scales except for Self-Sufficiency and Vanity. As expected, no relationship was found between the *m2* subscale and the NPI. No relationship was found between the I- and T- Composite scales (or subscales) and the NPI.

Table 31:

Correlations for SCT Scales with the NPI and Content Scales

SCT Scale	NPI Content Scale							
	NPI	Au	Exh	Su	En	Exp	S/S	Va
M-Composite	.36***	.23**	.37***	.34**	.29**	.24**	-.02	.12
<i>m1</i>	.48***	.40**	.51***	.42**	.30**	.23**	.06	.10
<i>m2</i>	.05	-.09	.03	.08	.15	.14	-.08	.08
I-Composite	.02	-.09	.04	.09	.09	.06	-.09	.09
<i>i1</i>	-.05	-.18	.03	.08	.01	-.03	-.13	.08
<i>i2</i>	.07	.02	.02	.05	.11	.10	-.02	.05
T-Composite	-.05	-.11	-.10	.01	.01	.02	-.03	.10
<i>t1</i>	-.09	-.14	-.16	.00	-.04	.03	-.06	.08
<i>t2</i>	.02	-.04	-.00	.01	.07	-.00	.01	.08

Note. Boxes indicate correlations for which there was a hypothesized positive relationship. Au = Authority, Exh = Exhibitionism, Su = Superiority, En = Entitlement, Exp = Exploitativeness, S/S = Self-Sufficiency, Va = Vanity. $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Additional Analyses

Hypotheses

Two hypotheses are presented below. The first states that those participants who are low on *m1* (exhibitionism) but high on *m2* (vulnerability) will demonstrate *covert* narcissist characteristics, and will therefore score higher than others on PRF-E Defence (a covert correlate), and lower than others on PRF-E Affiliation, Aggression, Dominance, Exhibition, Social Recognition, and the full-scale NPI (overt correlates). The second hypothesis represents an attempt to demonstrate a relationship between *overt* narcissism and narcissistic vulnerability. It is predicted that those participants who are high on both *m1* and *m2* will score higher than others on the NPI.

Design

The methodology employed here was informed by findings indicating that the dichotomization of continuous variables leads to a considerable loss of statistical power (Cohen, 1983), and in some instances, spurious significant results (Maxwell & Delaney, 1992). Therefore, rather than designate cutoff scores to create high and low groups, a graded response was adopted. To that end, the *m1* and *m2* variables were linearly transformed to a 0-to-1 range and relabeled $m1_{\text{new}}$ and $m2_{\text{new}}$. The general formula for the transformation is: $x_{\text{new}} = (x - \min + d/2) / (\max - \min + d)$, where *min* and *max* are the minimum and maximum possible x-scores, and *d* is the minimum possible difference between two x-scores. For *m1* and *m2*, $\min = 0$, $\max = 8$, and $d = 1$.

The product of the transformed variables $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$ was designated HH, and is an indicator of a person being simultaneously high on $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$. Similarly, the variable HL, is $m1_{new}(1 - m2_{new})$, and is an index of a person being simultaneously high on $m1_{new}$ and low on $m2_{new}$; the variable LH is $(1 - m1_{new}) m2_{new}$, an index of being simultaneously low on $m1_{new}$ and high on $m2_{new}$; and the variable LL is $(1 - m1_{new})(1 - m2_{new})$, an index of being simultaneously low on $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$. For the purposes of the following two analyses, the particular variable of interest is LH, and, to some extent, HH.

The hypotheses were then restated in correlational terms. It was predicted that a) LH would be positively associated with PRF-E Defence, and negatively associated with PRF-E Affiliation, Aggression, Dominance, Exhibition, Social Recognition, and the full-scale NPI, and b) that HH would be positively associated with the NPI. In both instances, an interaction was predicted rather than the simple sum of the main effects for being (in the former case) simultaneously low on $m1$ and high on $m2$, or (in the latter), high on $m1$ and $m2$.

Predictions were tested in two stages. The first was to examine the correlation between product term and variable of interest. Given a significant finding, a second level of analysis employed multiple regression to determine whether the correlation could be reinterpreted as evidence of one or two main effects (i.e., $m1_{new}$ and/or $m2_{new}$), rather than an interaction (i.e., HH). In those cases where a significant correlation was followed by a non-significant product term in the regression, the correlation was nonetheless accepted as support for the research hypothesis, but the (non-significant) regression findings were taken

to indicate a lack of sufficient evidence to provide strong backing for the notion of an interaction (i.e., the data were not capable of distinguishing which explanation was correct).²⁷

Interpretative Considerations

The use of product terms in multiple regression requires mention of certain interpretative considerations. First, it is acknowledged that one cannot ordinarily use a product term (i.e., LH) in a regression analysis without its constituent elements (i.e., $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$), a potential problem that was circumvented by first re-scaling the elements, to remove any potential arbitrary additive constituents. Second, because of the functional relationship between the constituents $m1_{new}$, $m2_{new}$, and product terms LH and HH, the usual notion of a regression weight as the expected change in the dependent variable for a unit change in any one of the independent variables (holding all of the other variables constant) does not apply; it was not possible to change one independent variable and leave the other two unchanged. Third, because the constituents $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$ are correlated with both LH and HH, the tests are limited in the extent to which effects can be delineated, and in stating which effects are significant and which are not (see Table 32).

²⁷ In order to *definitively* demonstrate that the correlation of the product term with the dependent variable was *not* due to an interaction, all points within the interaction *B* weight confidence interval would have to be close to zero (preferably containing zero).

Table 32:***Correlations Between Transformed Variables***

Transformed Variable	Transformed Variable					
	m1 _{new}	m2 _{new}	HH	HL	LH	LL
m1 _{new}	1.00	.27**	.82**	.72**	-.65**	-.83**
m2 _{new}		1.00	.73**	-.42**	.50**	-.71**
HH			1.00	.18	-.24*	-.89**
HL				1.00	-.82**	-.34**
LH					1.00	.12
LL						1.00

Note. HH = m1 High/m2 High, HL = m1 High/m2 Low, LH = m1 Low/m2 High, LL = m1 Low/m2 Low. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Measuring Covert Narcissism

It was hypothesized that LH would be positively associated with PRF-E Defence, and negatively associated with Affiliation, Aggression, Dominance, Exhibition, Social Recognition and the full-scale NPI. The expected positive correlation for LH with Defence ($r = .07$, ns) was not found. As predicted, LH was negatively associated with Affiliation ($r = -.26$, $p < .01$), Dominance ($r = -.39$, $p < .01$), and Exhibition ($r = -.51$, $p < .01$), but not Aggression ($r = -.13$, ns), or Social Recognition ($r = .03$, ns). As expected, the LH variable was negatively associated with the NPI ($r = -.39$, $p < .01$) (see Table 33).

Table 33:***Correlations Between Transformed Variables and Overt/Covert Correlates***

Transformed Variable	PRF-E Scale						NPI
	Af	Ag	De	Do	Ex	Sr	
m1 _{new}	.30**	.25**	.15	.43**	.56**	.20	.48**
m2 _{new}	-.08	.17	.28**	.01	-.05	.29**	-.08
HH	.12	.29**	.25**	.32**	.35**	.29**	.37**
HL	.36**	.08	-.05	.35**	.53**	-.02	.37**
LH	-.26**	-.13	.07	-.39**	-.51**	.03	-.39**
LL	-.20**	-.24**	-.25**	-.28**	-.35**	-.28**	-.34**

Note. HH = m1 High/m2 High, HL = m1 High/m2 Low, LH = m1 Low/m2 High, LL = m1 Low/m2 Low. Af = Affiliation, Ag = Aggression, De = Defence, Do = Dominance, Ex = Exhibition, Sr = Social Recognition.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Standard multiple regression analyses were performed between the three independent variables (m1_{new}, m2_{new}, and LH) and the four dependent variables for which significant correlations were obtained (Affiliation, Dominance, Exhibition, and NPI). Assumptions were tested by examining normal probability plots of residuals and scatter diagrams of residuals versus predicted scores. No violations of normality, linearity, or homoscedasticity were detected. Results are listed by dependent variable.

Affiliation

Having found a negative correlation for LH with Affiliation ($r = -.26, p < .01$), it was predicted that in the multiple regression equation for Affiliation, the weight for LH would be negative. The adjusted R^2 for Affiliation with $m1_{\text{new}}$, $m2_{\text{new}}$, and LH was .12, and significantly non-zero ($F(3, 156) = 8.35, p < .0001$). Individual standardized regression weights were significant for $m1_{\text{new}}$ ($\beta = .76, p < .001$), $m2_{\text{new}}$ ($\beta = -.53, p < .007$), and LH ($\beta = .49, p < .05$) (see Table 34). The weight for LH was therefore significant, but not in the predicted direction.

Table 34:***Multiple Regression Results for Affiliation***

Model	Correlation with Af	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	<i>t</i>	Sig.
		<i>B</i>	Std. Error	β		
(Constant)		41.84	4.68		8.93	.0001
$m1_{\text{new}}$.30**	32.21	9.36	.76	3.44	.001
$m2_{\text{new}}$	-.08	-28.31	10.34	-.53	-2.74	.007
LH	-.26**	37.17	18.57	.49	2.00	.05

Note. ** $p < .01$

Dominance

Having found a negative correlation for LH with Dominance ($r = -.39, p < .01$), it was predicted that in the multiple regression equation for Dominance, the weight for LH

would be negative. The adjusted R^2 for Dominance with $m1_{\text{new}}$, $m2_{\text{new}}$, and LH was .20, and significantly non-zero ($F(3, 156) = 13.89, p < .0001$). Although the LH weight was negative, ($\beta = -.37, ns$), none of the individual regression weights were significant (see Table 35). The multiple regression analysis was then repeated using $m1_{\text{new}}$ and $m2_{\text{new}}$ as predictors (see Table 36). The adjusted R^2 for PRF-E Dominance with $m1_{\text{new}}$ and $m2_{\text{new}}$ was .19, and significantly non-zero ($F(3, 156) = 19.42, p < .0001$), and the regression weight for $m1_{\text{new}}$ was significant ($\beta = .46, p < .0001$).

Table 35: Multiple Regression Results for Dominance

Model	Correlation with Do	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	β		
(Constant)		51.21	4.95		10.36	.0001
$m1_{\text{new}}$.43**	7.20	9.88	.15	.73	.45
$m2_{\text{new}}$.01	9.06	10.92	.15	.83	.41
LH	-.39**	-30.77	19.60	-.37	-1.57	.12

Note. ** $p < .01$

Table 36: Multiple Regression Results for Dominance (No Product Term)

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	β		
(Constant)	44.37	2.35		18.89	.0001
$m1_{\text{new}}$	21.73	3.49	.46	6.23	.0001
$m2_{\text{new}}$	-6.63	4.40	-.11	-1.51	.134

Exhibition

Having found a negative correlation for LH with Exhibition ($r = -.51, p < .01$), it was predicted that in the multiple regression equation for Exhibition, the weight for LH would be negative. The adjusted R^2 for PRF-E Exhibition with $m1_{new}$, $m2_{new}$, and LH was .34, and significantly non-zero ($F(3, 156) = 28.76, p < .0001$). The LH weight was negative ($\beta = -.39, ns$), but only the regression weight for $m1_{new}$ was significant ($\beta = .55, p < .005$) (see Table 37). The regression analysis was then repeated using $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$ only as predictors (see Table 38). The adjusted R^2 for PRF-E Exhibition with $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$ was .35, and significantly non-zero ($F(3, 156) = 43.29, p < .0001$), and the regression weights for both $m1_{new}$ ($\beta = .62, p < .0001$) and $m2_{new}$ ($\beta = -.22, p < .001$) were both significant.

Table 37:***Multiple Regression Results for Exhibition***

Model	Correlation with Ex	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	<i>t</i>	Sig.
		<i>B</i>	Std. Error	β		
(Constant)		46.84	4.63		10.11	.0001
$m1_{new}$.56**	26.69	9.26	.55	2.88	.005
$m2_{new}$	-.05	-9.76	10.23	-.16	-.96	.34
LH	-.51**	-7.16	18.36	-.08	-.39	.70

Note. ** $p < .01$

Table 38:***Multiple Regression Results for Exhibition (No Product Term)***

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	<i>t</i>	Sig.
	<i>B</i>	Std. Error	β		
(Constant)	45.25	2.19		20.71	.0001
$m1_{new}$	30.07	3.24	.62	9.27	.0001
$m2_{new}$	-13.42	4.10	-.22	-3.28	.001

NPI

Having found a negative correlation for LH with NPI ($r = -.39, p < .01$), it was predicted that in the multiple regression equation for NPI, the weight for LH would be negative. The adjusted R^2 for NPI with $m1_{new}$, $m2_{new}$, and LH was .23, and significantly non-zero ($F(3, 156) = 16.52, p < .0001$). Although the LH weight was negative ($\beta = -.24, ns$), none of the individual regression weights were significant (see Table 39). The regression analysis was then repeated using $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$ as predictors (see Table 40). The adjusted R^2 for NPI with $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$ was .23, and significantly non-zero ($F(3, 156) = 24.24, p < .0001$), and the regression weight for $m1_{new}$ ($\beta = .50, p < .0001$) was significant.

Table 39:**Multiple Regression Results for NPI**

Model	Correlation with NPI	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	<i>t</i>	Sig.
		<i>B</i>	Std. Error	β		
(Constant)		13.26	3.87		3.43	.001
m1 _{new}	.48**	11.35	7.73	.30	1.47	.14
m2 _{new}	-.08	4.07	8.54	.09	.48	.63
LH	-.39**	-15.81	15.34	-.24	-1.03	.30

Note. ** $p < .01$

Table 40:**Multiple Regression Results for NPI (No Product Term)**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	<i>t</i>	Sig.
	<i>B</i>	Std. Error	β		
(Constant)	9.75	1.83		5.32	.0001
m1 _{new}	18.81	2.72	.50	6.92	.0001
m2 _{new}	-3.99	3.43	-.08	-1.16	.25

Summary

Partial support was found for the hypothesis that the LH variable is associated with covert narcissism. As predicted, LH correlated negatively with PRF-E Affiliation,

Dominance, Exhibition, and the full-scale NPI (the expected negative correlation with Social Recognition, and positive correlation with Defence were not borne out). In the multiple regression equations for Dominance, Exhibition, and NPI, the weight for LH was negative but non-significant; whereas when the dependent variable was Affiliation, the weight for LH was positive and significant (i.e., in the opposite direction to what was predicted). It appears that, given the inherent limitations of the data, it was not possible to make strong inferences regarding the relationship between the interaction term LH and PRF-E Dominance, Exhibition, and the NPI. However, the relationship between LH and Affiliation was clearly contrary to the research hypothesis.

Demonstrating an Association Between Narcissistic Vulnerability and Overt Narcissism

It was hypothesized that the HH variable would be positively associated with the NPI. An $m1_{new}$ with $m2_{new}$ (HH) interaction was predicted, rather than the simple sum of the main effects for being high on $m1$ and $m2$ simultaneously. Having found a positive correlation for HH with NPI ($r = .37, p < .01$), it was predicted that in the multiple regression equation for NPI, the weight for HH would be positive. A standard multiple regression analysis was performed between the independent variables ($m1_{new}$, $m2_{new}$, and HH) and the dependent variable (NPI). The adjusted R^2 for NPI with $m1_{new}$, $m2_{new}$, and HH was .23, and significantly non-zero ($F(3, 156) = 16.52, p < .0001$). Although the weight for HH was positive ($\beta = .30, ns$) none of the individual regression weights were significant (see Table 41). Repeating the multiple regression analysis with $m1_{new}$ and $m2_{new}$ as predictors yielded an adjusted R^2 of .23, which was significantly non-zero ($F(3, 156) = 24.24, p <$

.0001), and a significant regression weight for $m1_{\text{new}}$ ($\beta = .50$, $p < .0001$) (see Table 42). In summary, some support was found for the hypothesis that the HH interaction term is associated with overt narcissism. However, as with the previous analysis, it was not possible to state whether the interaction or main effect(s) explanation was correct.

Table 41:

Multiple Regression Results for NPI

Model	Correlation with NPI	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	<i>t</i>	Sig.
		<i>B</i>	Std. Error	β		
(Constant)		13.26	3.87		3.43	.001
$m1_{\text{new}}$.48**	11.35	7.73	.30	1.47	.14
$m2_{\text{new}}$.05	-11.74	8.26	-.25	-1.42	.16
HH	.37**	15.81	15.34	.30	1.03	.30

Note. ** $p < .01$

Table 42:

Multiple Regression Results for NPI (No Product Term)

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	<i>t</i>	Sig.
	<i>B</i>	Std. Error	β		
(Constant)	9.75	1.83		5.32	.000
$m1_{\text{new}}$	18.81	2.72	.50	6.92	.000
$m2_{\text{new}}$	-3.99	3.43	-.08	-1.16	.25

DISCUSSION

Inter-Rater Reliability

A central goal of this study was to reconstruct the Sentence Completion test scoring system and demonstrate satisfactory inter-rater reliability.²⁸ To that end, the scoring manual was refined and expanded by incorporating new information from Study I responses: old scoring rules were either validated or replaced, and the number of prototype exemplars increased. In order to further systematize the process of scoring, two new procedures were adopted. First, as a means of establishing agreed-upon standards for the three raters' interpretations of scoring anchor points, and to allow for preliminary adjustments to the scoring rules, the first ten responses for each stem were scored, discussed, and discarded as a pretest. Second, in an effort to maintain conceptual focus during scoring, the entire set of responses to a given sentence stem were scored in a single session, followed by the resolution of rater disagreements to obtain consensus scores.

Inter-rater reliability was high for the Sentence Completion test as a whole (95% CI lower limit $r(\text{ICC}, A, 1) = .86$). The Composite scales all demonstrated strong agreement, with I-Composite being somewhat lower (.75) than M-Composite (.87) and T-Composite

²⁸ As noted in Results, it was not possible to compare Study I and II inter-rater reliability data. Study I kappas were calculated correctly at the item level, but incorrectly calculated at the subscale level. Because the Study I raw data were unavailable, this computational error could not be rectified, and a comparison of inter-rater reliability by subscale was therefore not possible. Furthermore, an item-level comparison could not be undertaken because the two tests share only nine items in common.

(.86). Among the six subscales, the strongest agreement was obtained for *m1* and *t1* (.86 and .84, respectively), followed by *t2* (.78), *i2* (.76), and *m2* (.75), whereas *i1* subscale agreement was borderline-acceptable (.67). At the item level, inter-rater reliability findings indicated strong agreement for nine stems, fair for ten, borderline-acceptable for three, and poor agreement for two stems. Overall, it was determined that, with the exception of one item (*t2a*),²⁹ instances of borderline-acceptable (*i1b*, *i2d*, *t2c*) or poor (*m2b*, *i1a*) inter-rater reliability were, for the most part, the result of deficiencies in the scoring rules rather than differences in the judges' implicit anchor points.

Among those sentence stems with fair to strong inter-rater reliability, agreement was highest for those that elicited responses with a relatively explicit statement of need, such as *m1* (need for attention) and *t1* (need for similarity) stems, and lower for those that required greater interpretive skill, as was the case for the *m2* (vulnerability) stems. However, instances of borderline-acceptable or poor agreement tended to occur for a variety of different reasons, some of which are illustrated here. 1) Incomplete scoring rules: stem *m2b* (*If I worked hard preparing for a party, and someone else took all the credit...*) demonstrated low agreement (.58) apparently because the scoring rules did not sufficiently distinguish between a "typical" versus narcissistically-wounded response, raters were forced to rely more on their own judgement. 2) An unusual response pattern: In the case of *t2c* (*In my close friendships, a difference*

²⁹ For stem *t2a*, the exclusion of judge 2 resulted in a sufficiently improved coefficient of agreement (95% CI lower limit $r(\text{ICC}, A, 1) = .76$, rather than .68) to suggest that a difference in that judge's anchor points, rather than the scoring rules, contributed to lower inter-rater reliability. Consequently, *t2a* was deemed to demonstrate strong inter-rater agreement.

in outlook or lifestyle...) low agreement (.68) was to a great extent caused by the preponderance of “true zero” scores. Because this stem tended to elicit rather philosophical, emotion-distant completions, very few responses warranted a score of one or two, which led raters to interpret (out of confusion) some zero responses as one responses. 3) A combination of factors: Low levels of agreement for stems *i1a* (.56) (*The kind of person who holds a real fascination for me...*) and *i1b* (.61) (*In my life, having someone I can look up to...*) appeared to be the product of: a) awkward stem syntax eliciting vague responses, b) poorly delineated scoring levels, and c) in the case of *i1b*, differences in rater interpretation of the scoring anchor points.³⁰

In summary, inter-rater reliability findings reflected the adequacy of both the scoring system, and the test items. The next version of the scoring manual will incorporate information from four sources: inter-rater reliability findings, the actual responses (used to validate the scoring levels and supply new exemplars), various “lessons learned” (as listed above), and rater feedback as to the logic and clarity of the scoring rules.

Group and Gender Differences

Group Differences

It was hypothesized that clinical participants would, on average, score higher than student participants on all narcissism measures. The author’s experience providing therapy

³⁰ These two stems will be replaced. Possible substitutes might be designed to access the respondent’s feelings when they experience the admired other. For example, something analogous to “*When I am with someone I admire I feel...*”

services to clients at the facility from which the clinical participants were drawn suggested that a relatively high proportion would demonstrate some form of narcissistic disturbance. The findings, however, did not support the research hypothesis. While no significant group differences were found for the Sentence Completion test subscales, student participants demonstrated a moderately higher (by .6 standard deviations) mean score for the ideal-hungry Self-Rating scale (SRI), and a substantially higher (by 1.2 standard deviations) mean score for the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI).

These results suggest that in forming the research hypothesis, the author did not take into account the equal, if not greater likelihood of narcissistic disturbances among the adolescents and young adults that comprised the student sample. The transition to university life is a complex developmental challenge that tends to disrupt the sources of narcissistic gratification that served to maintain self-esteem throughout childhood (i.e., a supportive mirroring parent or the presence of admired others³¹), and often generates significant stresses related to academic success, romantic involvement, and career choice -- all of which may trigger intense, but usually transient, narcissistic behaviors (Kohut, 1987; Ronningstam, 1999). Such disruptions may also evoke feelings that resonate with earlier emotional disturbances:

...the step from adolescence into adulthood ... shakes up a particular image of oneself, a particular mode in which one sees oneself. It echoes, therefore, old trauma about the self, old modes in which self-esteem is shaken. (Kohut, in Elson, 1987, p. 12)

³¹ One might expect this to be true of twinship also, but no such group difference was noted.

Young adults may also retain aspects of adolescent narcissism, such as grandiosity, egocentricity, being overly concerned with appearance, and the tendency to idealize role models (which may be cast off and replaced with some frequency). It is therefore not surprising that student participants showed higher mean scores on self-report measures of ideal-hunger and grandiose narcissism, as these results indicate a confounding of group and age. Given the mean ages for each sample (student $M = 20.01$, $SD = 2.34$; clinical $M = 38.40$, $SD = 10.49$), the two groups – student and clinical – represent distinct developmental cohorts, one very much in the process of individuation (and all of its attendant anxieties), and the other being more “settled.”

Gender Differences

The present study found significant gender differences for the NPI and the $m2$ subscale. NPI gender differences were marginal for the full sample, with males scoring, on average, a trivial .2 standard deviations higher than females, whereas in the student sample alone, males scored a moderate .7 standard deviations higher than females. Two lines of evidence suggest that the “true” magnitude of the NPI gender difference is closer to the full sample result. First, it was apparent that by increasing the sample size from $N = 140$ to $N = 160$, the magnitude of the obtained gender difference was reduced from moderate to trivial. This in and of itself suggests that were the sample appreciably larger, the difference would remain small. Second, in a previous study of NPI gender differences using a substantially larger student sample ($N = 1029$ females and 1060 males) males were found to score only .2 standard deviations higher than females (Tschanz, Morf, & Turner, 1998). It is therefore

likely that the *student* NPI gender difference obtained here was more a reflection of the characteristics of this particular student sample, rather than an unbiased estimate of the population parameter. In effect, no appreciable gender difference was found for overt-dominant (NPI) narcissism.

Conversely, female participants scored, on average, .6 standard deviations higher than males on the *m2* subscale. The *m2* subscale was designed to measure a participant's sensitivity to the absence or denial of narcissistic gratification, and was therefore taken to be an indirect measure of narcissistic vulnerability (or at the very least, narcissistic *reactivity*). Given that the *m2* subscale was found to be associated with approval-seeking and certain characteristics suggestive of covert narcissism (defensiveness, low affiliative, aggression, dominance and exhibition needs), it is possible that female participants may have demonstrated, on average, a more covert type of narcissism not detectable by the NPI.

Gender differences in *m2* responding represent a finding worthy of further study. It is possible that a) the *m2* subscale measures a type of covert narcissism that manifests itself only when mirroring needs are thwarted, and b) that women are more prone to this particular variant. As it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze differences in narcissistic vulnerability, this hypothesis was not pursued further. However, a subsequent study that tested for gender differences among established measures of overt and covert narcissism might be used to explore this tentative hypothesis.

Another avenue of study might examine the extent to which the obtained *m2* difference reflects the influence of traditional gender roles. Given that sensitivity and vulnerability represent stereotypical female traits, it may be that for female participants,

narcissism was to some extent expressed in a manner consistent with a traditional female gender role.³² This particular hypothesis has support from a body of research demonstrating that women who violate the feminine gender role expectations of warmth, sensitivity, and compassion tend, as a result, to experience considerable negative social and career consequences (Tschanz, Morf, & Turner, 1998).

Scoring Patterns

It was hypothesized that the three narcissistic personality types, as measured by the Sentence Completion test, would be encountered in the student/clinical sample with varying degrees of frequency: the mirror-hungry type being the most common, followed by the ideal-hungry, and then the twinship-hungry. This prediction was confirmed to the extent that overall M-Composite scores were higher than I-Composite scores, and I-Composite scores were higher than T-Composite scores, with a similar ordering found for first- (*m1*, *i1*, *t1*) and second-component (*m2*, *i2*, *t2*) subscales.

The scoring pattern hypothesis was informed by a variety of sources, including Kohut's self psychology, cultural commentaries, literature on the projective assessment of

³² There was even some question as to whether *m2* subscale gender differences might be the result of male participants being less likely to respond to *m2* stems that describe stereotypical female gender role themes. Specifically, it was hypothesized that female participants would be found to score, on average, significantly higher on those *m2* sentence stems that described the characteristics of: a) the domestic sphere (*m2b*: "If I worked very hard preparing for a party (or family gathering), and someone else took all the credit...") and b) concern with appearance (*m2d*: "I am walking down the street, looking my best. An attractive person passes by without even glancing at me. I..."). However, the results of a group by gender MANOVA (using the four *m2* items as dependent variables) showed no significant main effects for gender (or group) for any individual *m2* items. Nevertheless, there was anecdotal evidence to suggest that the party preparation question was perhaps too gender specific. As one young male participant stated: "Man, this is a chick question, not a guy question."

self psychology constructs, Study I findings, and the author's own clinical experience. With respect to the relative frequency of the mirror-hungry type for example, clinical theorists have noted that both healthy and pathological expressions of the need for attention and praise are readily observed in a wide range of interpersonal contexts (Horney, 1939; Kohut, 1977, 1984; and Miller, 1994). Cultural critics have even suggested that mirror-hunger permeates and to some extent defines popular Western culture (Lasch, 1979). It follows, then, that the mirror-hungry type – as expressed through the characteristics of attention-seeking and vulnerability – might be a relatively common social phenomenon.

Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984) notes that the experience of the idealized selfobject is as important to the growth and maintenance of self-structure as is mirroring. The majority of student and clinical participants, for example, openly acknowledged the importance of mentors and role models in their lives. The ideal-*hungry* dynamic, however, suggests a much greater gulf between an impoverished self and idealized other. Consequently, in a culture that values independence and personal agency, one might be less inclined to admit to (or even be consciously aware of) the role idealized others play in maintaining a coherent sense of self – *if* that need is particularly intense. A social stigma may therefore attach when there are persistent attempts to restore a sense of calm or raise self-esteem through association with an idealizable figure,³³ resulting in the idealizing need being less openly expressed (and therefore less frequently observed) than the need for mirroring.

³³ One such example being the stereotype of the person who follows a cult leader.

While the cultural hypothesis serves to explain overall lower *i1* (seeks others to admire) scores, it does not necessarily apply to the *i2* (disappointment) component, as there is little reason to suspect that society considers the tendency to become disappointed in idealized others to be an undesirable trait.³⁴ A more compelling hypothesis is that upper-range *i2* responses displayed a greater degree of narcissistic disturbance than upper-range *m1*, *m2*, or even *i1*³⁵ responses, and were therefore relatively rare in comparison. For example, very few participants displayed the hallmark disappointment/rejection dynamic, but those who did tended to express either: a) a markedly judgmental stance, or b) a feeling of being lost, confused, and/or depressed, all of the above suggesting some degree of dysfunction, if not self-disorder.

T-Composite scores were, as predicted, significantly lower than both M- and I-Composite scores. One possible reason for this finding is that twinship (in the general instance) may simply be a less common selfobject function. Silverstein (1999), for example, has noted the relative rarity of twinship content in projective test protocols, and further emphasizes that a single response is usually insufficient to confirm the presence of this subtly-expressed need.³⁶ A second hypothesis (which does not preclude the first) is that the

³⁴ On the contrary, knocking our idols off their pedestals could be described as something of a national pastime.

³⁵ Sign test results indicated that *i2* scores were significantly lower than *i1* scores: $i1 > i2 = 83$; $i1 = i2 = 52$; $i1 < i2 = 25$; $z = 5.58$, $p < .001$, $d = .36$.

³⁶ Silverstein (1999) further notes that "the necessary evidence to make the case lies not in simple or superficial percepts, but rather in the vividness or depth of the elaboration...and several responses are often necessary to be confident that a twinship function has been mobilised" (p. 177). This is precisely the strategy adopted by the current test. Sentence stems presented the simple percept (i.e., the image of the twin), and what was scored was the affective intensity and/or depth of the response.

specific instance of the twinship-*hungry* type represents a somewhat more regressive, and therefore less frequent dynamic than the mirror- or ideal-hungry types. Two lines of thought support this particular hypothesis. First, both the theoretical model and test responses suggest that twinship relationships may involve merger, which, according to self psychology theory, indicates an archaic need (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). Second, the *t2* (disappointment) component suggests the inflexibility and fragility characteristic of a personality style that is built around a significant self-deficit (Kohut, 1977, 1984).³⁷ These hypotheses will be revisited in the final section of the discussion.

Content Validity

This study undertook to improve the structural characteristics of the Sentence Completion test. To that end, the operational definitions and corresponding test items were revised in light of theoretical and empirical considerations. The purpose of these changes was twofold: the first being to create operational definitions that more accurately reflected Kohut and Wolf's (1978) personality type descriptions, and second, by evaluating sentence stems using a qualitative, theory-driven methodology, it was possible to: a) identify test items that were most effective in pulling for target content, while b) allowing subscales to be more heterogeneous than those produced by an internal consistency approach. After determining

³⁷ One might argue that *both* the ideal- and twinship-hungry types present less versatility with respect to the acquisition of narcissistic supplies than does the mirror-hungry type. That is to say, it is possible to have the need for mirroring met from a variety of sources, whereas the soothing or invigorating function of the idealizing or twinship selfobject tends to be located in one person.

that no test items were meaningfully related to a measure of social desirability, this process resulted in a 24-item test with 6, 4-item subscales or 3, 8-item Composite scales. Content validity analyses were then employed to determine whether: a) each of the six SCT subscales would be clearly represented in a factor model, and b) whether those subscales were interrelated in a manner consistent with Kohut and Wolf's (1978) personality descriptions.

A principal components analysis of the SCT test items resulted in four oblique factors,³⁸ suggesting: 1) disappointment, 2) vulnerability-exhibitionism, 3) other-seeking, and 4) grandiosity. The *Disappointment* factor included sentence stems that elicited disappointment or rejection in response to a) a perceived dissimilarity (*t2a*, *t2b*, *t2c*, *t2d*) or b) a flaw in an admired other (*i2b*).³⁹ The second factor (*Vulnerability-Exhibitionism*) was somewhat more complex, with two overlapping content domains: narcissistic vulnerability/reactivity (*m2a*, *m2b*, *m2c*, *m2d*), and exhibitionism (*m1b*, *m1d*).⁴⁰ The third factor appeared to represent an *Other-Seeking* dimension, with positive loadings for five items representing a “drawn to others” dynamic (*t1a*, *t1b*, *t1c*, *t1d*, and, *i1a*), and negative loadings for two items suggesting a

³⁸ Principal components analysis findings were roughly comparable to those found in Study I, in terms of number of factors (4), variance accounted for (34.2% for Study I, 36.4% for the present study), and the finding of twinship-hungry content loading on the first factor, mirror-hungry content on the second, and overall marginal content validity for the *i2* subscale and poor content validity for the *i1* subscale.

³⁹ *I2b* (“When someone I look up to displays a character flaw - that is, show that they are not as flawless as I initially imagined...”) is the only *i2* stem that explicitly mentions the discovery of a flaw in the admired person.

⁴⁰ It is possible that *m1b* and *m1d* loaded on this factor because, unlike *m1a* and *m1c*, their wording both encouraged introspection and allowed for the expression of vulnerability.

⁴¹ It appears that *i1a* (“The kind of person who holds a real fascination for me...”) loaded on this factor because, unlike the other three *i1* stems, it does not mention admiration.

“pushing away” dynamic (*i2a, i2b*).⁴² Lastly, the *Grandiosity* factor suggested a constellation of grandiose narcissistic characteristics, including: exhibitionism (*m1a, m1b, and m1c*), the expectation of perfection in admired others (*i2c, i2d*), grandiosity-by-association (*i1d*), and an aversion to similarity-based relationships (negative loading for *t1d*). With respect to the theoretical model, content validity was demonstrated to the extent that four of the subscales were embedded within these factors: *t1* (in *Other-Seeking*), *t2* (in *Disappointment*), *m2* (in *Vulnerability-Exhibitionism*), and *m1* (split between *Grandiosity* and *Vulnerability-Exhibitionism*). Both the *i1* and *i2* subscales were poorly represented in the factor model.

These four factors might be interpreted as representing four different modes of narcissistic functioning. For example, *Vulnerability-Exhibitionism* suggests Kohut and Wolf's mirror-hungry type – the vulnerable narcissist who both craves attention and is sensitive to the absence of narcissistic supplies, whereas *Grandiosity* resembles the narcissistic personality described by Kernberg, who maintains an inflated sense of self through exhibitionism, associating with high-status others, and the avoidance of similarity-based relationships (i.e., similar others might be viewed as competition, and therefore a threat to self-esteem). Because *Grandiosity* suggests overt narcissism, and *Vulnerability-Exhibitionism* appears more a combination of overt and covert characteristics, future research might examine overlap between these two factors and Wink's (1992) covert Vulnerability-Sensitivity and overt Grandiosity-Exhibitionism factors.

⁴² It is not clear as to why the other two *i2* stems (*i2c* and *i2d*) do not show significant negative loadings on factor three – apart from a slight difference in content (both specify disappointment more explicitly than *i2a* and *i2b*).

Although *Other-Seeking* and *Disappointment* are predominantly twinship factors, they also suggest the attraction and rejection dynamics common to both the ideal- and twinship-hungry types – or, more broadly stated, Kohut and Wolf's (1978) merger-hungry and contact-shunning dimensions. One might also interpret *Other-Seeking* as being representative of Freud's (1914) concept of the narcissistic object choice – the idea that one may love a person because he/she is similar to oneself, or represents what one would like to be (p. 33), whereas *Disappointment* suggests narcissistic rigidity/fragility. In summary, these findings suggest two forms of mirror-type narcissism (one vulnerable, and the other, grandiose) and the attraction and rejection dynamics underlying twinship-hunger (and to a minor extent, ideal-hunger).

As predicted, the correlations of *m1* with *m2*, and *t1* with *t2* supported the theoretical model. There are two possible reasons as to why no association was found between *i1* and *i2*, the most likely being poor content validity for the *i1* subscale. However, it is also possible that the *i1* characteristic of “other-seeking” and the *i2* characteristic of “disappointment-rejection” represent opposite ends of a relational continuum, and therefore need not be related. This hypothesis received indirect support from the finding that the *t1* (“other-seeking”) and *t2* (“disappointment-rejection”) subscales loaded on different factors. Lastly, the predicted association between the *i2* (ideal-disappointment) and *t2* (twinship-disappointment) subscales (which was found in Study I) was not supported, presumably because of changes to the operational definitions.

Convergent and Discriminant Validity

Correlation Between SCT Composite Scales and Self-Rating Scales

As predicted, each Composite scale was significantly associated with its Self-Rating counterpart, thereby demonstrating that self-ratings using face-valid measures of the three personality types were generally consistent with semi-projective SCT scores. The relationship between the SCT *subscales* and Self-Rating scales was roughly equivalent for *m1* and *m2* with Self-Rating Mirror, and *t1* and *t2* with Self-Rating Twinship, whereas the association between I-Composite and Self-Rating Ideal was almost completely accounted for by the correlation of the *i2* subscale with Self-Rating Ideal, presumably because of poor content validity for the *i1* subscale. Predicted associations for I-Composite with Self-Rating Twinship and T-Composite with Self-Rating Ideal were not borne out, thereby providing further disconfirming evidence of any relationship between the ideal- and twinship-hungry “disappointment” components (*i2* and *t2*).

Correlation Between the SCT Subscales and Therapist-Rating Scales

Although the predicted convergence between the SCT subscales and Therapist Rating scales was not supported, it would be premature to conclude that no such relationship exists. Because of the inherent coarseness of the Therapist Rating scales (having a scoring range of 0-3, as opposed to the 0-8 range used by the SCT subscales), tie blocks formed in the correlation scatterplots, thereby obscuring any potential linear relationship. The predicted relationships between the clinical sample Self-Rating scales and Therapist Rating scales were also not substantiated (presumably for the same reason).

Correlation with PRF-E Scales

Preliminary Analysis:

Correlation Between “Overt Narcissism” PRF-E Scales and the NPI

For the purpose of the following convergent and discriminant validity analyses, a specific set of PRF-E scales was hypothesized to be representative of overt narcissism. A test of that hypothesis demonstrated that, as predicted, PRF-E Affiliation, Aggression, Defence, Dominance, Exhibition, and Social Recognition were positively related, and Abasement was negatively related to overt narcissism as measured by the NPI. An exploratory analysis also found the NPI to be positively associated with Play and negatively associated with Harmavoidance. In short, this collection of scales portrays an attention-seeking, aggressive-dominant (yet sociable), risk-taking narcissist (see for example, Raskin, 1980; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992; Emmons, 1984; Wink, 1991), who displays the “thin-skinned” characteristic (i.e., Defence) noted in both clinical (Kohut, 1971; Kernberg, 1995) and empirical accounts (Bushman & Baumeister, 1996; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998).⁴³

In addition to supporting the predicted relationship between the selected PRF-E scales and overt narcissism (as measured by the NPI), these findings suggest three points of

⁴³ When grouped according to Jackson’s (1984) PRF-E conceptual categories, these scales form clusters of both adaptive and maladaptive elements, including ascendancy, interpersonal orientation, non-interpersonal orientation, low impulse control, and a play rather than work orientation. Similarly, when interpreted within the 5-factor model, these scales emerge as a composite of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Non-Agreeableness, Non-Conscientiousness (Conn & Ramanaiah, 1990), and Non-Neuroticism (McCrae & Costa, 1988) – a personality constellation that has been described as “extraverted yet disagreeable, and low in anxiety” (Bradlee & Emmons, (1992, p. 828).

particular significance, the first being that the observed relationship between overt narcissism and defensiveness (PRF-E Defence with NPI) provides indirect evidence for the so-called “narcissistic paradox” – the notion that the overt narcissist’s grandiosity conceals an underlying fragility (as demonstrated by defensiveness).⁴⁴ This particular research question is pursued further in the Additional Analyses section.

The second point concerns Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan’s (1991a; 1991b) characterization of the NPI narcissist as a competitive, nonconforming “warrior” who maintains self-esteem through grandiose self-enhancement (defensive competition) – as opposed to the “worrier” who bolsters self-esteem by seeking others’ approval and acceptance (defensive affiliation). The significance of the present analysis is that it found the NPI to be associated with both grandiose (as represented by PRF-E Exhibition) *and* approval-seeking (as represented by PRF-E Social Recognition) strategies.⁴⁵ Consistent with Raskin *et al.’s* (1991a; 1991b) findings, however, the correlation of NPI with Exhibitionism was substantially higher ($r = .63, p < .01$) than with Social Recognition ($r = .24, p < .05$), suggesting that for overt narcissism, grandiose self-enhancement is perhaps the principal, but not the only means of supporting self-esteem.

The last point of significance concerns group differences in the relationship between overt narcissism and the interpersonal strategies of affiliation and dominance. For the

⁴⁴ Future research might explore the relationship of defensiveness with the NPI content scales, to see whether the so-called maladaptive, and not the adaptive scales, are associated with defensiveness.

⁴⁵ PRF-E Social Recognition represents the need for recognition and admiration as expressed in a “respectable” manner, whereas Exhibition (combined with the negative association with Harmavoidance) suggests grandiose attention-seeking with less consideration of social rules.

student sample, overt narcissism was more strongly associated with interpersonal dominance (as demonstrated by a negative correlation with PRF-E Abasement), whereas for the clinical sample, overt narcissism was more strongly associated with PRF-E Affiliation. These results suggest that for student participants, narcissistic needs may have been met in an “agentic-competitive” manner, whereas for clinical participants, the modality may have been more “affiliative-cooperative.” According to Bradlee & Emmons (1992) and Sturman (2000), the former suggests a relatively maladaptive interpersonal stance, whereas the latter is decidedly adaptive. However, it is more likely that, viewed in the context of age-cohort differences, these findings represent immature and mature expressions of narcissistic functioning.

Mirror-Hungry Scales

M-Composite with PRF-E Scales

As predicted, PRF-E correlates of the M-Composite scale (Exhibition, Social Recognition, Defence) corresponded to Kohut and Wolf's (1978) description of the mirror-hungry type as being both attention- and recognition-seeking, and defensive, thereby replicating Study I findings. The next stage in the analysis undertook to demonstrate convergence for *m1* (seeks attention) with exhibitionism, recognition-seeking, and overt narcissism, and for *m2* (vulnerability) with defensiveness and covert narcissism.

m1 Subscale with PRF-E Scales

The *m1* (seeks attention) subscale was, as predicted, found to be related to exhibitionism, but (contrary to prediction) not recognition-seeking. As for its predicted

relationship to overt narcissism, the *m1* subscale did demonstrate the same overall pattern of correlations with the selected PRF-E “overt” scales as did the NPI. However, apart from a positive association with affiliative needs, the magnitude of those correlations was lower than those found for the NPI, and was in some cases non-significant. For example, the *m1* subscale was found to be significantly related to affiliation, aggression, dominance, and playfulness, but not defensiveness and arrogance. It therefore appears that *m1* is related to overt narcissism to the extent that it was found to be associated with the conspicuous, rather than modest expression of mirroring needs, along with interpersonal dominance and aggression, all of which are consistent with empirically-derived portraits of overt narcissism (see Raskin, 1980; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992; Emmons, 1984; Wink, 1991). Associations with affiliative needs and playfulness also indicate that *m1* is related to relatively amicable, and certainly subclinical narcissism.⁴⁶ Consistent with findings reported earlier, an analysis of group differences for the correlation of *m1* with the selected PRF-E scales found that for the clinical sample, attention-related narcissistic needs tended to be met in a more mature manner, through affiliation, humility, and non-defensiveness.

⁴⁶ These findings invited interpretation as to why the overall magnitude of correlations with the PRF-E scales were lower for *m1* than the NPI. The most likely reason is that because *m1* assesses a relatively narrow content domain (exhibitionism), it simply shows less conceptual overlap with the PRF-E scales than does the NPI, which measures a wider range of overt narcissism characteristics. One might speculate, for example, that the NPI Superiority and Authority content scales would be related to PRF-E Dominance, etc. It would therefore be incorrect, for example, to assert that *m1* is, by virtue of its lesser association with the selected PRF-E scales, related to a “milder” form of overt narcissism than the NPI.

m2 Subscale with PRF-E Scales

The *m2* (vulnerability) subscale was, as predicted, associated with defensiveness. As per Kohut and Wolf's (1978) position that narcissistic injury is characterized by defensiveness, this finding was interpreted as evidence that the *m2* subscale measures the kind of reactivity associated with narcissistic injury or vulnerability.

It was also hypothesized that the narcissistic reactivity measured by *m2* would be related to covert narcissism. Clinical accounts of covert narcissism describe an unexpressed hunger for recognition and attention, accompanied by hypersensitivity, shyness, anxiety, self-criticism, and low self-esteem (Kohut, 1971; Kernberg, 1995; Cooper, 1998; Ronningstam, 1999). Similarly, empirical findings have found measures of covert narcissism to be related to defensiveness (hypersensitivity), and social anxiety (Wink, 1991), negatively related to interpersonal dominance and affiliative needs, and unrelated to exhibitionism (Wink, 1991, Sturman, 2000). The present study demonstrated that, as predicted, *m2* was not significantly related to needs for affiliation, aggression, dominance, or exhibitionism. Along with defensiveness, these correlates are consistent with both clinical and empirical accounts of covert narcissism. However, contrary to expectations, *m2* was found to be positively associated with recognition- and approval-seeking (PRF-E Social Recognition), an interpersonal stance that was assumed to be inconsistent with the covert narcissist's presumed social anxiety and introversion.

Two potential hypotheses could explain the relationship between *m2* and PRF-E Social Recognition, the first being the possibility of a confound in the measurement of narcissistic reactivity. For example, some respondents received high *m2* scores because their

self-reported response to having their mirroring needs thwarted was to act on the perceived injustice (the “I would let the other person know” response), whereas others described an equally intense, but more contained, seething reaction. Although both response types suggest narcissistic reactivity, the latter suggests covert narcissism, whereas the former is decidedly overt. The next iteration of the scoring manual will therefore be designed to distinguish between the two variants.

Another likely reason for the correlation of *m2* with Social Recognition, is that covert narcissism *is* in fact associated with recognition- and approval-seeking. Assuming that covert narcissism appears on a continuum ranging from the relatively mild (e.g., shyness and anxiety impeding the satisfaction of some mirroring needs) to the extreme (e.g., a profoundly anxious, introverted stance, accompanied by unexpressed grandiose needs), it is possible that the majority of subclinical covert narcissists are not so introverted that they cannot employ relatively *surreptitious* strategies for gaining credit and recognition (such as approval-seeking behaviors).

The general conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that the M-Composite scale does appear to be associated with characteristics consistent with Kohut and Wolf's (1978) description of the mirror-hungry type (attention-seeking, recognition/approval-seeking, and defensiveness). The mirror-hungry subcomponents were, as predicted, associated with two narcissistic trends, one exhibitionistic, and the other vulnerable/reactive. However, contrary to expectations, recognition/approval-seeking was associated with the vulnerability, rather than the exhibitionism component, thereby supporting the idea of *m1* as

a relatively pure measure of overt-exhibitionistic narcissism, but potentially complicating the meaning of the *m2* subscale as a covert measure.

Ideal-Hungry Scales

The theoretical rationale used here to outline the beginnings of a nomological network for the ideal-hungry type represented a departure from that of the previous study. In Study I, the ideal-hungry personality was hypothesized to be dependent, deferential, and defensive. However, as only the predicted association with defensiveness was supported, it was decided that the underlying assumptions regarding the ideal-hungry type were (with the exception of defensiveness) likely incorrect. In the present study, it was predicted that the ideal-hungry type would be associated with the defensiveness characteristic of a narcissistic disturbance (PRF-E Defence), and show specific signs of a deficit in the ideals sector of the self, including: a) an inability to adhere to goals (negative Endurance) and b) disorganization (negative Order). All correlations were found to be in the predicted direction, but none were significant.

Before interpreting these results, it bears mentioning that the present attempt to validate the I-Composite scale appears to have been compromised in two fundamental ways. First, the I-Composite scale cannot be considered a valid measure of the ideal-hungry construct because its “seeks others to admire” content is poorly represented by the *i1* subscale. Pending improvements to *i1*, it makes little sense to interpret any I-Composite (or *i1* subscale) correlational findings. Second, it appears that PRF-E Order was a poor choice as an indicator of organization (or lack thereof). Although the scale definition of Order uses

adjectives such as disciplined, methodical, and organized, a low score does not indicate disorganization so much as a less “tidy” *temperament*. Clearly, if the hypothesized relationship between I-Composite and disorganization were to be re-tested, a valid measure of disorganization would be needed.

A significant association *was* however, found for *i2* (disappointment) with Defence. Given that the disappointment reaction described by the *i2* root construct is meant to represent an expression of narcissistic vulnerability (like *m2* and *t2*), the association between *i2* and Defence suggests that this subscale may possess some validity as an indicator of ideals-related narcissistic fragility.

Twinship-Hungry Scales

Hypothesized twinship-hungry correlates were chosen (for theoretical and empirically-derived reasons) to represent characteristics of a personality style organized around a somewhat inflexible need for similarity-based relationships. As predicted, T-Composite was found to be related to reassurance-seeking, interpersonal dependency, and (from an exploratory analysis) a risk-avoidant outlook. However, the expected associations with a) dislike of new experiences, and b) the defensiveness purported to be characteristic of the narcissistic types were not borne out.

These findings could be taken to indicate that the T-Composite scale is associated with a generally cautious, dependant and reassurance-seeking view of relationships. The absence of the expected correlation with defensiveness need not negate the possibility that this scale measures a form of narcissistic disturbance – *if* risk-avoidance can be considered

somewhat analogous to defensiveness. It seems possible that a generally cautious temperament might extend to the interpersonal realm, causing one to seek familiar, similarity-based relationships that provide safe haven from the (feared) feelings of existential isolation engendered by a deficit in the twinship sector of the self.

At the subscale level, convergence was found for *t1* (seeks similarity) with dependency and reassurance-seeking, and for *t2* (disappointment) with risk avoidance. These findings suggest that *t1* may be associated with something akin to a need for merger-type relationships, whereas the *t2* reflexive disappointment reaction is associated with general cautiousness, potentially lending support to the hypothesis that *t2* measures a defensive stance, as manifested by interpersonal fearfulness. In summary, not all predictions were supported; however, the observed pattern of correlates was deemed to be consistent with basic assumptions for the twinship-hungry type.

Correlation with the NPI and Content Scales

M-Composite, m1 and m2

As predicted, convergence was demonstrated for M-Composite with the NPI and the Exhibitionism content scale, both relationships being almost entirely accounted for by the *m1* subscale. The *m1* subscale therefore appears to be strongly related to exhibitionism and the general overt narcissism construct. As expected, the *m2* (vulnerability) subscale was not significantly related to the NPI or its content scales, this finding being both consistent with previous demonstrations of a non-relationship between the NPI and measures of

hypersensitivity (Wink, 1991; Sturman, 2000; Soyer, *et al*, 2001), as well as lending indirect support to the hypothesized relationship between *m2* and *covert* narcissism.

In an exploratory analysis, the *m1* subscale was also found to be associated with both adaptive (Authority, Superiority) and maladaptive (Exhibitionism, Exploitativeness, Entitlement) aspects of overt narcissism. The adaptive scales suggest a combination of self-confident, autocratic, and status-conscious characteristics, tempered by a capacity to be nurturant and affiliative (Raskin & Terry, 1988; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), whereas the maladaptive scales suggest exhibitionistic, non-affiliative, dominant-aggressive “warrior-type” narcissism, accompanied by egocentricity, unscrupulousness, and a lack of impulse control (Raskin & Terry, 1988; Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). It appears then, that a high *m1* score might be associated with either the healthy or maladaptive expression of mirroring needs.

An analysis of group differences found that for the clinical sample, both mirror-hunger (as measured by M-Composite) and exhibitionism (as measured by *m1*) were more strongly associated with adaptive, but interpersonally aloof components of NPI narcissism, as represented by the Superiority and Self-Sufficiency content scales. It is possible that these findings reflect the fact that several of the clinical participants occupied managerial-type positions.

I-Composite, T-Composite, and subscales

As predicted, no relationship was found between the ideal- and twinship-hungry scales and the NPI, the purpose of this analysis being to demonstrate discriminant validity for those scales.

Additional Analyses**Measuring Covert Narcissism**

The present study explored the relationship between the mirror-hungry subscales and covert narcissism in two separate analyses. In the first analysis, *m2* was found to be associated with documented covert narcissism correlates (see: Wink, 1991; Rathvon & Holstrom, 1996; Hendin & Cheek, 1997; Sturman, 2000), and was unrelated to overt narcissism. However, it was also associated with a characteristic that might not be consistent with the covert narcissist's purported introversion (recognition-seeking). These findings suggested a need for further study to determine the relationship of *m2* with established measures of the covert narcissism construct.

In the second analysis, it was hypothesized that those participants who scored simultaneously low on *m1* (exhibitionism) and high on *m2* (vulnerability) would represent a true covert narcissism group. The creation of four transformed product term variables provided an index of a participant's resemblance to each of the four possible scoring prototypes, thereby making it possible to examine the relationship between the Low

m1/High m2 variable (LH) and the set of covert narcissism correlates used in the previous analysis.

As predicted, LH was negatively associated with PRF-E Affiliation, Dominance, Exhibition, and the full-scale NPI (but not, as predicted, aggression or recognition-seeking). Although the correlation of LH with recognition-seeking was essentially zero (rather than the predicted negative relationship), it could be argued that even a *non-relationship* might be indicative of LH being a covert measure. However, the absence of the predicted positive correlation with Defence suggested that LH was in fact not measuring covert narcissism. It was subsequently determined that two problems with the data set may have contributed to this result, the first being that the combination of a negatively skewed LH variable and a positively skewed Defence variable had limited the magnitude of the relationship. Furthermore, because so few participants demonstrated upper range LH scores, there were insufficient numbers to be truly representative of the LH type⁴⁷ resulting in a weak test of the hypothesis. Pending further research using a sample that includes a greater number of participants with upper-range LH scores, this particular result will be considered inconclusive.

A dearth of participants with upper range LH scores also made it difficult to develop strong inferences about the LH interaction term in the multiple regression analysis. As a result, it was not possible to determine whether the negative relationship of LH with PRF-E

⁴⁷ As was the case for all four types. Using cutoff criteria of $\geq 6/9$ for high scores, and $\leq 3/9$ for low scores, 8 participants were found to be HH, 9 participants were HL, 11 participants were LL, and only 2 participants were LH.

Dominance, Exhibition, and the NPI was the result of an interaction (LH), or a main effect for the constituent $m1_{new}$. However, in the multiple regression equation for Affiliation, the weight for LH was both significant and *positive*, casting doubt on the hypothesized relationship between LH and introverted, covert narcissism.

Demonstrating an Association Between Narcissistic Vulnerability and Overt Narcissism

This analysis sought evidence for the hypothesis that grandiose narcissists are in fact vulnerable narcissists. Clinical observers have long asserted that the overt narcissist's acute sensitivity to both positive and negative feedback indicates a fragile sense of self (see for example: Horney, 1939, Reich, 1960, Kohut, 1971, Miller, 1979, Kernberg, 1995). In its description of narcissistic personality disorder, the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (4th ed. [DSM-IV]; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), notes that "criticism may haunt these individuals and may leave them feeling humiliated, degraded, hollow, and empty. They may react with disdain, rage, or defiant counterattack" (p. 659). However, eliciting direct evidence of such vulnerability has proved difficult, as grandiose narcissism appears to be associated with an inflated, overly positive self-view (Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994; Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998), and has been found to be unrelated to hypersensitivity (Wink, 1991; Sturman, 2000; Soyer, *et al*, 2001). As a result, empirical evidence for the coexistence of grandiosity and vulnerability (the so-called narcissistic paradox) has been limited to studies that measure the overt narcissist's reaction to negative feedback (see: Kernis & Sun, 1994; Bushman & Baumeister, 1996; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998).

Because it was not possible to demonstrate a *direct* association between the *m2* subscale and overt narcissism (as measured by the NPI), the variable of interest was the special case of the *m1* high/*m2* high scoring profile, believed to represent a kind of aggravated, unstable mirror-hungry type, wherein the characteristics of attention-seeking and vulnerability are highly activated. It was therefore predicted that the *m1* high/*m2* high (HH) product term variable would be positively associated with the NPI, which is to say that an interaction was predicted, rather than the simple sum of the main effects for being high on *m1* and *m2*. As hypothesized, HH was positively associated with the NPI, but in the multiple regression equation for NPI, it was not possible to determine whether the positive relationship of HH with NPI was the result of an interaction (HH), or a main effect for the constituent $m1_{\text{new}}$. In summary, support was found for the hypothesized relationship (HH with NPI), but as with the previous analysis, certain limitations in the data precluded a more definitive result.

Commentary: Product Term Correlation Patterns

A comparison of PRF-E correlation patterns for two of the four product term variables illustrates how the *m1* (exhibitionism) and *m2* (vulnerability) subscales might be used to further identify various narcissistic subtypes (see Table 33). For example, both HH and HL⁴⁸ were associated with attention-seeking, interpersonal dominance, and overt

⁴⁸ LH was not discussed here because of uncertainty as to its relationship to the PRF-E scales. Likewise, LL was not mentioned because it does not appear to represent a narcissistic subtype so much as the relative absence of what is being measured.

narcissism (as measured by the NPI). However, the key difference between these two prototypes is that HH was associated with aggression, defensiveness, and recognition-seeking, but *not* affiliation, whereas HL was related to affiliative needs, but *not* aggression, defensiveness, or recognition-seeking. The HH prototype therefore appears to represent an intense, and somewhat disturbed manifestation of Kohut & Wolf's (1978) mirror-hungry type, similar to Sturman's (2000) maladaptive narcissist, for whom the need for dominance overrides affiliative concerns. Because of its relationship to affiliation and apparent lack of negative characteristics, the HL prototype appears to represent an *adaptive* narcissistic style, not unlike Kohut's (1977) description of the adaptive narcissist who presents as dominant, achievement-oriented, optimistic, and confident. Similarly, Millon (in Ronningstam, 1998) refers to this variant as the Normal (i.e., typical) narcissistic personality, describing such persons as natural leaders, self-confident, charming, and ambitious, who often achieve considerable success in life (p. 89). Significantly, one cannot distinguish between these two prototypes based on their correlation with the NPI (both were $r = .37, p < .01$), thereby indicating that unless one examines content scale scores, the NPI is not particularly effective at differentiating between relatively healthy and maladaptive narcissistic manifestations.

Response Analysis: Portraits of the Three Types

Evidence of construct validity for the three narcissistic personality types has been presented in light of content validity findings and correlates of the Sentence Completion test scales. However, the advantage in using a semi-projective measure was that the test responses offered a wealth of information regarding the actual *expression* of the behaviors

being assessed. This section is therefore intended to give the reader a sense as to how the three narcissistic personality types manifested in the participant's responses.

Mirror-Hungry Scales

The mirror-hungry dynamic was apparent in sentence completions that described the role of praise and attention in regulating self-esteem. Because this dynamic represents the basis for healthy mirroring selfobject relationships, relatively mild manifestations were common among midrange *m1* responses, whereas upper range responses tended to be characterized by attention-seeking. For example, in response to stem *m1a* (If I tell a joke at a social gathering, and several people turn to listen), one participant stated: "*I become energized and feel like continuing...I like to be the center of attention.*" However, as Kohut and Wolf (1978) note, the need for attention was often accompanied by considerable anxiety. In this prototypical mirror-hungry response to stem *m1c* (A person stands in the spotlight, while another stands off to one side, etc.), one participant explained: "*[I would find myself] in the spotlight. I'm always putting myself there even though it's very, very scary for me. I need attention (it seems), but I'm also very afraid of it.*"

Kohut (1984) notes that attention-seeking is but one of many behaviors that can suggest the presence of a mirroring-related self-deficit. A number of other defensive indicators were present in upper range *m1* responses. Some participants, for example, stated that an increase in self-esteem was contingent not only upon receiving attention, but also in feeling superior to others: "*[I like to be in the spotlight because] I honestly like attention and like to be to superior to others around me or at least equal.*" Aggressive competitiveness and not

infrequently, sadism, also accompanied expressions of mirror-hunger. For example, in response to stem *m1d* (When I share my successes with other people, my secret wish is that they...), some respondents, in true warrior narcissist fashion, sought to induce jealousy (*"Would feel envious of me. I am proud of my accomplishments and feel that they are individual to only me, therefore someone else should be envious or jealous of my success since they can't have it"*), while others hinted at more malicious sentiments (*"Fail. Because I am a jealous person"*). Characteristics such as these (i.e., need for superiority, competitiveness) may be considered attempts to bolster self-esteem in the face of feelings of inferiority and a generally devitalized self (Kohut, 1966; Bursten, 1973; Miller, 1975; Silverstein, 1999). It appears then, that when the need for attention is sufficiently desperate, narcissistic self-enhancement involves dependence on others, not only as a direct source of narcissistic supplies, but also, by virtue of their envy (or failure), proof of one's own worth (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001).

Narcissistic rage was especially apparent in responses to stem *m2b* (If I worked very hard preparing for a party (or family gathering), and someone else took all the credit...), including expressions of anger and revenge (*"I'd be mad. Really mad. I'd do whatever I could to get the credit given back to me and exact revenge."*), fantasized omnipotent control, dehumanizing the offender (*"I would not allow it to happen. I hate parasites"*), an aggressive-dominant response (*"Obviously I would be pissed! I would probably confront this motherf****r and make him know his role."*), and grandiosity (*"I'd be pissed off. I'd make sure people knew all the hard work I put into this. It isn't fair to work hard and go unrecognized. Look at Mozart, the master of the arts making millions two hundred years after he died in poverty. Where's the fairness in that? I won't go for it."*). Apart from whatever indignation a person might understandably feel in such a situation, these upper range

responses all demonstrate a certain *amplitude*, suggestive of Kohut's (1966) statement that "the examination of relatively silent states of narcissism in equilibrium is clearly less fruitful than the scrutiny of narcissism in states of disturbance" (p. 62).⁴⁹

Ideal-Hungry Scales

The majority of responses to *i1* (seeks others to admire) sentence stems expressed healthy idealizing selfobject relations, wherein the admired one personifies deeply felt goals, values and ideals. Upper range responses, however, tended to convey what Kohut and Wolf (1978) observed in the idealizing transference: the need to look up to (and possibly merge with) a source of calmness, idealized strength, and omnipotence (p. 177). For example, responses to stem *i1c* (When I think of someone I admire, I feel...) included the soothing function ("*comforted and warm. A person I admire brings me constant happiness and I admire her for the countless times she inspires me*"), the calming and invigorating presence ("*energized because I think about how everything always will work out*"), and the prototypically ideal-hungry response ("*goosebumps and a sense of awe because I respect them so much for how far they have got in life. It is very hard to gain my admiration and thus those that do are really something amazing*").

Also encountered were examples of "pseudo-idealization," similar to what might be expressed by Reich's (1949) Elitist narcissistic personality. In such responses, there was no

⁴⁹ While not listed here, covert shame-withdrawal type reactions were also noted, but more so in reaction to stem *m2d* (I am walking down the street, looking my best. An attractive person passes by without even glancing at me, I...), including shame ("*feel great discouragement and embarrassment*"), depression ("*think I'm talentless or sulk that no one is paying attention to me*"), and withdrawal ("*withdraw and feel that they do not deserve to be acknowledged*").

evidence of real admiration (only an acquired grandiosity-by-association), and a clear impression of disdain for the rank and file. Stem *i1d* (Some people are fascinated by the complexity of regular people...whereas others go through life seeking to discover people who are exceptional. I...), provided several examples of this particular narcissistic style: “[I] seek people who are exceptional. As for regular people, I often only see their flaws,” and “I like exceptional people. I usually find I don’t care much for the average person. There is usually nothing special about them.” Not surprisingly, this particular stem loaded positively on the Sentence Completion test *grandiosity* factor.

The difficulty in scoring *i2* (ideals disappointment) responses was in discriminating between relatively normal disappointment reactions, and those that indicated a somewhat greater investment in the idealized other’s perfection. The key to making this distinction lay in Silverstein’s (1999) statement that “disappointment at the hands of an idealized selfobject seen either as faltering or defective characteristically thrusts a patient into a vulnerable state of narcissistic injury” (p. 157). Therefore, in order to be scored as an upper range response, an *i2* sentence completion had to provide some evidence of narcissistic injury, as demonstrated by unusual rigidity with respect to disappointment (i.e., “I tend to write them off completely...I don’t have the ability to look past the disappointment”) or a global disruption of self-feeling (i.e., “my view of the world changes and everything that once looked so stable seems very weak and fragile to me”). On occasion, a disappointment reaction conveyed the complete ideal-hungry dynamic: “usually in situations like this people tend to fall below my standards as I get to know them. I guess I let my imagination run so wild that they become super-people”.

Twinship-Hungry Scales

As would be expected, the majority of responses to *t1* (seeks similarity) subscale items stated a preference for (but not absolute insistence on) similarity in relationships, usually explained as a matter of compatibility. Consistent with Silverstein's (1999) findings regarding twinship content in projective test protocols, upper range twinship responses were rare, and tended to be associated with themes involving effortlessly fluid, or even wordless communication. For example, in response to stem *t1a* (Having a partner who is very much like myself ...), one participant stated: "*will be the happiest...because she will know exactly what am thinking about and I don't have to explain to her over and over again.*" A similar theme appeared in a response to stem *t1c* (Think of your best friend. Is it the similarities or differences, etc.): "*we can talk to each other...sentences upon sentences effortlessly...we discover ourselves in each other.*" Because the *t1* subscale was associated with reassurance-seeking and dependency, it was tempting to interpret such responses as involving the gratification of infantile needs. Certainly, for these participants, the experience of similarity was associated with happiness, and involved a form of communication suggesting intermingled boundaries, and perhaps some degree of merger. However, in order to demonstrate that these responses were in any way regressive, further evidence of merger-hunger would be required, as well as some indication that these particular participants sought (either in fantasy or reality) to have their selfobject needs met in a single, exclusionary relationship (Kohut, in Elson, 1987).

Most participants were not especially bothered by the degree of dissimilarity in relationships posed by *t2* (twinship disappointment) sentence stems. Upper range responses, however, tended to be peppered with terms suggesting aversion and alarm, strongly

suggesting the presence of a twinship-related narcissistic fragility. Note for example, the highlighted words in the following responses to stem *t2a* (If I arrive at the realization that someone who I consider to be a close friend is very different from me in some respect...):

*“I begin to become **paranoid** and question their friendship with me.”*

*“I will **alienate** them, if I can’t seem to get along with them or share their views, until eventually the relationship is broken off or slowly diminished.”*

*“I become somewhat **scared** or uneasy as my judgment has been incorrect.”*

These participants did more than express simple discomfort at the prospect of non-similarity between friends. For those who truly *required* similarity in their relationships, the perception of differences resulted (at the very least) in a loss of trust, whereas for others it constituted an insurmountable problem, sometimes characterized by a xenophobic rigidity. Responses such as these therefore suggested that the relationship between the *t2* subscale and risk-avoidance may have (as was suggested earlier) in part reflected an *interpersonally* risk-avoidant stance.

Concluding Commentary

It has been suggested that traditional social structures that value interdependence and group cohesion have given way to a modern emphasis on autonomy and individual achievement (Horney, 1939; Lasch, 1979; Millon, 1998). Such changes appear to have led to a shift from culturally-prescribed healthy sources of narcissistic gratification (e.g., assertiveness, pride in effort and creativity) to those that emphasize the maintenance of self-esteem through external sources (e.g., attention-seeking, acquiring possessions) (Ronningstam, 1999). While current theoretical discussion acknowledges that narcissism is a

healthy aspect of personality, clinical accounts from the latter half of the twentieth century report an increase in the number of patients presenting with narcissistic (as opposed to neurotic) pathology (Cooper, 1974, p. 114), especially the apparently endemic, subclinical manifestations (Kohut, 1977, 1984; Johnson, 1987; Masterson, 1993; Miller, 1994).

Clearly, there is a need for assessment instruments that can measure subclinical narcissism. Although there is no shortage of tests designed to assess the pathological variant (the focus of mainstream narcissism research), as yet, only one measure of subclinical grandiose narcissism has been developed: Raskin and Hall's (1979) Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Even less success has been reported in the construction of assessment instruments designed to measure subclinical disturbances in the three narcissistic domains described by Kohut's (1971, 1977, 1984) psychology of the self: mirroring, idealization and twinship. One reason for this imbalance is that while the signs of exhibitionistic-grandiose narcissism (whether pathological or subclinical) may be readily detected by objective tests, the distortions in object relatedness that reflect non-grandiose narcissistic disturbances tend to be expressed through relationships rather than symptomatology (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). The present study attempted to sidestep this particular assessment problem by a) focusing on the expression of narcissistic needs and behaviors in the context of relationships, and b) using a semi-projective, rather than objective format. As Loevinger (1993) notes: "objective tests will always have an advantage in terms of (potential) reliability...[however], the sentence completion test, being a free-response test, requires the respondent to display his or her own frame of reference. That gives a glimpse of personality structure that objective tests cannot match" (p. 12).

In a previous study, Estrin, (1994) developed a sentence completion test and scoring system designed to measure Kohut and Wolf's (1978) three subclinical narcissistic personality types. The present study undertook to reexamine that test's conceptual basis, leading to a substantial revision of the operational definitions, the measure itself, and the accompanying scoring manual. In sum, the scoring system demonstrated satisfactory inter-rater reliability for all but one (*i1*) of the subscales, and varying degrees of construct validity were obtained for the mirror-, ideal-, and twinship-hungry scales. For example, the *i1* subscale demonstrated little evidence of construct validity (largely due to poor item design), whereas the *i2* (ideals disappointment) subscale was to some extent validated as a measure of ideals-related narcissistic disturbance. The twinship-hungry scales yielded more promising findings: *t1* and *t2* were well represented in the factor model, showed convergence with a Self-Rating measure, and were related to set of correlates reflecting theoretically-congruent themes: dependency and reassurance-seeking for *t1* (seeks similarity), and risk-avoidance for *t2* (twinship disappointment). In the case of the mirror-hungry scales, content validity results were consistent with the theoretical model, convergence was obtained with a Self-Rating measure, and correlates of the combined subscales conformed to Kohut & Wolf's (1978) description of the mirror-hungry type as being both attention- and recognition-seeking, and defensive. Aggregated findings therefore suggest that the combination of the *m1* and *m2* subscales represents a satisfactory measurement approximation of Kohut and Wolf's (1978) mirror-hungry type.

Two additional assessment questions were directed to relatively undeveloped areas of narcissism research: whether the *m1* and *m2* subscales could be used to assess both overt *and*

covert narcissism, and the matter of the overt narcissist's purported vulnerability. With respect to the former question, the *m1* subscale, as a measure of exhibitionism was shown to be related to overt narcissism, whereas the *m2* subscale, as a measure of narcissistic reactivity, was associated with both overt and covert characteristics. Unfortunately, although it seemed possible that truly covert participants might be represented by a composite score low on *m1* and high on *m2* (a non-exhibitionistic, yet narcissistically-vulnerable profile), a lack of respondents with that scoring profile precluded a definitive result.

Evidence for a relationship between overt narcissism and narcissistic vulnerability came from three sources. First, a correlational analysis of the high *m1*/high *m2* scoring prototype with NPI overt narcissism suggested partial support for such an association. Second, the NPI was positively correlated with defensiveness, thereby providing indirect evidence of the overt narcissist's insecurity – similar to previous studies that demonstrated overt narcissist's heightened reactions to negative feedback (see Kernis & Sun, 1994; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998). Third, the positive correlation (and factorial overlap) between *m1* and *m2* further suggested a relationship between overt and vulnerable characteristics. Cumulatively, then, the characteristics of attention-seeking and reactive vulnerability appear to be demonstrating a trend of association.

Future Research

The sentence completion test and scoring manual described in this study represent the first attempt to validate Kohut and Wolf's (1978) narcissistic personality types, and the first empirical investigation of the twinship construct. Following the reconstruction of the

scoring manual, research into the validity of the three types could follow several investigative routes, with issues of construct validity remaining the primary focus. For the ideal-hungry scales, there was some question as to whether a self-report test represented the appropriate assessment modality. The ideal-hungry type is an inherently difficult construct to measure largely because the idealized selfobject function tends to be expressed in a subtle manner; as an emotional need, the search for (and experience of) an idealized other is not so much overtly displayed (as is often the case with mirror-hunger) so much as silently experienced (Silverstein, 1999). Furthermore, it was hypothesized that attempts to directly assess idealization may be hampered by social norms which discourage the open expression of such needs. For these reasons, future efforts to assess ideal-hunger might be better accomplished using purely projective techniques or a structured interview format.

As with the ideal-hungry construct, the difficulty in validating the twinship-hungry type was that there were no established measures against which its validity could be assessed. While correlates of the *t1* (seeks similarity) and *t2* (twinship disappointment) subscales represent a solid *basis* for future research, the question remains as to whether the relationships depicted in upper-range *t1* responses represented not so much the need for a twinship “soul-mate” relationship as examples of merger-hunger (which might indicate pathology). This particular question might be addressed by administering the test to a much larger sample and having upper range responses reviewed by clinical judges.

Although the present study appears to have resulted in a valid measure of mirror-hungry narcissism, the possibility remains that the M-Composite scale (and possibly the NPI), are measuring more than one type of narcissism. An examination of SCT responses,

for example, detected at least three mirroring-related variants; Kohut and Wolf's (1978) attention-seeking yet vulnerable mirror-hungry type was in evidence, as were more warrior-type and covert manifestations. Factor analytic findings supported both vulnerable and grandiose forms of mirroring-type narcissism. It was also noted that certain *m1* and *m2* scoring configurations suggested adaptive (high/low) and maladaptive (high/high) narcissism. It therefore seems possible that distinct narcissistic types or even a spectrum of types are present subclinically and that the development of a more complex scoring system would be required to detect and distinguish between variants.

Theoretically-informed judgment suggests that the signs of narcissistic disturbance displayed by upper range mirror-hungry responses were of a subclinical, rather than pathological nature. However, what are needed are scoring norms that would allow raters to reliably distinguish between the subclinical and pathological response ranges. Although one of the goals of this study was to include a clinical subsample for the purpose of obtaining pathological responses, it was the student group that provided greater evidence of grandiose-type narcissistic disturbance (which itself supports the validity of the SCT as a subclinical measure). Further research might establish scoring norms by administering the M-Composite scale to pre-identified normal and pathological groups.

Lastly, the relationship between overt narcissism and vulnerability remains an important research question. In order to demonstrate that the interaction of high *m1* with high *m2* is related to overt narcissism, it will be necessary to repeat the HH with NPI correlational and multiple regression analyses, using a sample that includes a sufficient number of upper range responses for all four scoring prototypes. As it stands, however, the

current version of the M-Composite scale appears to be able to detect overlapping overt/grandiose and vulnerable characteristics, and as such appears to present a viable exhibitionistic-vulnerable alternative to the NPI as a measure of subclinical narcissism.

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Appendix A:

Retained Sentence Stems

m1 root construct: displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses.

m1 stems

- | | |
|-----|---|
| m1a | If I told a joke at a social gathering, and several people turned to listen ... |
| m1b | If I were asked to take part in a play ... |
| m1c | A person stands in the spotlight, while another stands off to one side.
<i>If I were in this scene, I would be ...</i> |
| m1d | When I share my successes with other people, my secret wish is that they ...
<i>[After completing this sentence, please explain your response]</i> |
-

m2 root construct: low self-esteem (or other indication of narcissistic fragility, such as rage or cold rejection) in the absence of confirming and admiring responses.

m2 stems

- | | |
|-----|--|
| m2a | If I had to work in a demanding job in which I received little or no feedback from my boss or co-workers as to whether I was doing it well ... |
| m2b | If I worked very hard preparing for a party (or family gathering), and someone else took all the credit... |
| m2c | When my talents and abilities aren't acknowledged, what I do is... |
| m2d | I am walking down the street, looking my best. An attractive person passes by without even glancing at me. I... |
-

i1 root construct: seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities
(i.e., prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or views, etc.)

i1 stems

[For the next incomplete sentence, please exclude romantic situations]

- i1a The kind of person who holds a real fascination for me ...
 - i1b In my life, having someone I can look up to...*[because]*
 - i1c When I think of someone I admire, I feel...*[because]*
 - i1d Some people are fascinated by regular people (their positive attributes and flaws), whereas others seek to discover people who are exceptional. I...
-

i2 root construct: easily disappointed by idealized other.

i2 stems

- i2a Try to bring to mind someone you held in very high esteem, but who you did not know all that well. Over time, as you got to know him/her better ...
- i2b When someone I look up to displays a character flaw - that is, show that they are not as faultless as I initially imagined...
- i2c When a mentor or role model disappoints me I...

[For the next incomplete sentence, please exclude romantic situations]

- i2d When someone I admire lets me down...
-

t1 root construct: seeks relationships/ friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values.

t1 stems

- t1a Having a partner who is very much like myself ...
 - t1b Some of the people I know are very similar to me, whereas others are very different from me. I feel the most comfortable with ...
 - t1c Think of your best friend. Is it the similarities or differences in your personalities that makes you friends? For me, what really makes the friendship "click" ...
 - t1e Having a partner who is very different from myself ...
-

t2 root construct: becomes disappointed, angry, or reverses previous feelings for partner when he/she discovers that the partner is not as identical to self as previously thought.

t2 stems

- | | |
|-----|--|
| t2a | If I arrive at the realization that someone who I consider to be a close friend is very different from me in some respect ... |
| t2b | If I discover that a friend and I are very dissimilar ... |
| t2) | In my close friendships, a difference in outlook or lifestyle ... |
| t2e | Consider these two scenes: In the first one, two friends stand side by side. It is obvious that they are quite different from one another. In the second scene, two other friends stand together, but unlike the first two, they are alike in many ways.
<i>If I were in the first scene, I would feel ...</i>
<i>If I were in the second scene I would feel ...</i> |
-

Appendix B:

Sentence Completion Test

Name: _____ Age: _____ Sex: _____

Marital/Relationship Status _____ Education: _____

The purpose of this sentence completion form is to explore your social style, and the role other people play in your life. So it is important that when you complete each sentence, your response reflects your own feelings and life experience, rather than what you think you might do in a given situation. For example:

“If I were at the beach, and someone asked me to watch their belongings while they went swimming, I would ...”

Because we all like to be thought of as helpful, a common way to finish this sentence would be to say that you would watch the other person’s belongings. But ask yourself: What would I do? have I ever been in this situation, or something similar? If so, use that personal experience. You might even want to add what you thought or felt, such as: *“I would watch their stuff, but might feel impatient and wish they’d hurry up and finish swimming.”* Or you might say something like: *I’m glad they asked, because I felt like they trusted me.* It is also important that your responses not be too brief. For example:

“At parties where I do not know anyone I ...”

If you complete this sentence with *“head straight for the munchies,”* it says very little about you as a social being. So why not describe what you did and how you felt in such a situation? For example, you might say: *“At parties where I do not know anyone I ... usually feel uncomfortable, but try to make conversation with whoever looks friendly, and if that doesn’t work, I head straight for the munchies.”*

Whether you choose to finish a sentence or write a paragraph is up to you. Not every sentence will be applicable to situations in your life, and if that is the case, just respond in a way that feels true to you. Please be assured that once you have finished, the first page and all identifying information will be separated from the rest of the test, so that your responses will be identified by number only.

1. If I tell a joke at a social gathering, and several people turn to listen ...

[For the next incomplete sentence, please exclude romantic situations]

2. The kind of person to whom I am drawn like a magnet ...(because)
3. If I had to work in a demanding job in which I received little or no feedback from my boss or co-workers as to whether I was doing it well ...
4. Try to bring to mind someone you held in very high esteem, but who you did not know all that well. Over time, as you got to know him/her better ...
5. Having a partner who is very much like myself ...
6. In my life, having someone I can look up to...(because)
7. If I arrive at the realization that someone who I consider to be a close friend is very different from me in some respect ...

8. If I were asked to take part in a play ...
9. Everyone's feelings are affected by what others neglect to say to us as much as what they *do* say. In my experience, my feelings are sensitive to the *absence* of comments such as ...
10. When I think of someone I admire, I feel...(because)
11. Having a partner who is very different from myself ...
- [For the next incomplete sentence, please exclude romantic situations]
12. When someone I admire lets me down...
13. When I share my successes with other people, I secretly wish that they ...
(after completing the sentence, please explain your response)
14. My sense of self-worth can be affected by ...
(After completing the sentence, please explain your response)

[For the next incomplete sentence, please exclude romantic situations]

15. The kind of person who holds a real fascination for me ...
(Please describe why you are fascinated with this person)
16. If I discover that a friend and I are dissimilar ...
17. There have been times in my adult life when I have admired someone, or even come to the conclusion that a certain person represents my ideals. *The end result of this relationship was...*
18. If I am wearing new clothes, and bump into someone I haven't seen for a while ...
19. When a mentor or role model disappoints me I...
20. Some of the people I know are very similar to me, whereas others are very different from me. I feel the most comfortable with ...
21. For me, the idea of playing a starring role ...

22. If I worked very hard preparing for a party (or family gathering), and someone else took all the credit...
23. In my life, when I encounter a person with qualities I especially admire, my tendency is to...
24. In my close friendships, a difference in outlook or lifestyle ...
25. I need people to tell me that I ...
(after completing the sentence, please explain your response)
26. When someone I look up to displays a character flaw - that is, show that they are not as faultless as I initially imagined...
27. Think of your best friend. Is it the similarities or differences in your personalities that makes you friends? *For me, what really makes the friendship "click" ...*
28. When my talents and abilities aren't acknowledged, what I do is...


29. It sometimes seems as though I am always searching for a person who...
(after completing the sentence, please describe the person)
30. A person stands in the spotlight, while another stands off to one side. *If I were in this scene, I would be ...*
(After completing the sentence, please explain your response)
31. Sometimes, when we have a lot in common with someone, we feel a sense of kinship. Such a friendship (one based on similarity between people) can create a special bond. *If I discovered in the course of knowing that person, that we were not as much 'twins' as I thought we were...*
32. Some people are fascinated by the complexity of regular people (their positive attributes and flaws), whereas others go through life seeking to discover people who are exceptional. I...
33. I am walking down the street, looking my best. An attractive person passes by without even glancing at me. I...
34. Sometimes people feel energized when they are with friends. Other times they feel energized by people they admire. I...

35. In some friendships, similarity is what makes it work, whereas for others, opposites attract. In order that a friendship be a satisfying one, it is important that the other person be ...
36. When I think of someone I regard as a mentor or role model, I feel... (because)
37. Speaking from my own experience, when I got to know someone I admired, my reaction was ...
38. Consider these two scenes: In the first one, two friends stand side by side. It is obvious that they are quite different from one another. In the second scene, two other friends stand together, but unlike the first two, they are alike in many ways.
If I were in the first scene, I would feel ...
If I were in the second scene I would feel ...
 (After completing these two sentences, please explain your responses)
39. Some people like to be noticed, whereas for others, it's just not important. *As for myself...*
40. Some people are very discriminating when it comes to the people they admire - they have high standards, even for those they view as above all others. If these standards are not met, they would find it impossible to continue to look up to a person. Some people however, could care less, and are inclined to overlook other people's faults, even those of the people they admire. *In my case ...*
 (After completing the sentence, please explain your response)


Appendix C:

INSTRUCTIONS: Read each description and indicate whether it reminds you of yourself.


Barbara loves being admired for who she is. She feels most alive when she is noticed and appreciated by others. For Barbara, receiving positive feedback means feeling good. If she doesn't get that response from others, she feels let down, angry, or just bad about herself. Barbara sometimes wonders why the good feeling she gets when someone compliments her doesn't last longer.



Natalie believes it is important that a person have a mentor, and feels energized when she is with someone she admires. Throughout her life, Natalie has known people who, at the time, embodied the qualities that were important to her. Sometimes she knew these people personally, and other times she just admired them from afar. Even though each one was extremely important to her, Natalie found that as she got to know them better, they inevitably disappointed her, and so she had to move on.



Diane doesn't believe that "opposites attract." "She feels most comfortable when she and a friend have so much in common that people say they are practically identical. All of Diane's friendships have been based on shared interests, opinions, feelings, values, or even similar appearance. The only problem is, she always finds that the person she thought was her "twin" turns out to be anything but.



Appendix D:

Therapist Rating Scale (Mirror-Hungry)

The Mirror-Hungry Personality

General Description





Persons described as mirror hungry seek attention, compliments, and positive feedback (either openly or covertly/subtly), and when this need is met, they experience an increase in self-esteem and energy. However, when deprived of attention/compliments, they tend to feel dysphoric (i.e., low energy, low self-esteem, depression), or in some cases, angry or indignant.

Key Characteristics





1. Displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses.
i.e., does your client seek attention, compliments or praise in the therapeutic context, or in other relationships (work, familial, marital)?
2. Disturbed by a lack of attention or positive feedback.
i.e., how does your client react when denied attention, compliments, or positive feedback? Are they relatively unaffected, or do they appear unhappy or angry?

To what extent does your client demonstrate the first characteristic (*displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses*) in each of the following three domains:





A. In the therapeutic relationship:

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

B. In relationships in his/her life (familial, marital, work, etc.):





0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

C. Reflected in the presenting problem:





0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

To what extent does your client demonstrate the second characteristic (*disturbed by a lack of attention or positive feedback*) in each of the following three domains:





A. In the therapeutic relationship:

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

B. In relationships in his/her life (familial, marital, work, etc.):

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

C. Reflected in the presenting problem:

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

Appendix E:

Therapist Rating Scale (Ideal-Hungry)

The Ideal-Hungry Personality

General Description

Persons described as ideal-hungry are drawn to those they can admire - because of that person's status, power, beauty, talent, moral/spiritual values, or any number of other possible variables. Whether the object of their worship is someone they know personally, or admired from afar, their association with that person makes them happy and fulfilled (or perhaps soothed and calmed). However, because they always discover that their idol is imperfect, disappointment is inevitable.





Key Characteristics

- A. Seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities, such as prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or views.
i.e., Does your client appear to idealize you? Does your client experience an increase in self-esteem, or feel calm or soothed when he/she associates with, or even thinks about a person he/she admires?





- B. Easily disappointed by idealized other. Judgmental stance leads to end of relationship.
i.e., Has your client described relationships in which someone they admired disappointed them? If so, did they simply see that person as "more human," or was that disappointment disturbing to them (possibly causing them to reject that person)?

To what extent does your client demonstrate the first characteristic (*seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities*) in each of the following three domains:





A. In the therapeutic relationship:

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

B. In relationships in his/her life (familial, marital, work, etc.):





0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

C. Reflected in the presenting problem:





0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

To what extent does your client demonstrate the second characteristic (*easily disappointed by idealized other*) in each of the following three domains:





A. In the therapeutic relationship:

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

B. In relationships in his/her life (familial, marital, work, etc.):

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

C. Reflected in the presenting problem:

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

Appendix F:

Therapist Rating Scale (Twinship-Hungry)

The Twinship-Hungry Personality

General Description

Persons described as twinship-hungry seek relationships with those who they consider similar to them in some way (i.e., appearance, self-image, personal beliefs, status, values, etc.). Whether the degree of similarity is obvious or subtle, it provides the twinship-hungry person with a feeling of happiness and security. However, such a person inevitably discovers differences between him/herself and their “twin,” disappointment sets in, and the search resumes.





Key Characteristics

- A. Seeks relationships/ friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values.
i.e., does your client seem pleased when he/she notices similarities between him/herself and you? Does he/she appear to be at their best in relationships/friendship with someone who is very much like him/herself?





- B. Becomes disillusioned or angry with partner when he/she discovers that he/she is not as identical to him/her self as previously thought.
i.e., is your client bothered by a lack of similarity in his/her relationships/friendships?

To what extent does your client demonstrate the first characteristic (seeks relationships/ friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values) in each of the following three domains:





A. In the therapeutic relationship:

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

B. In relationships in his/her life (familial, marital, work, etc.):





0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

C. Reflected in the presenting problem:





0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

To what extent does your client demonstrate the second characteristic (becomes disillusioned or angry with partner when he/she discovers that he/she is not as identical to him/her self as previously thought) in each of the following three domains:





A. In the therapeutic relationship:

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

B. In relationships in his/her life (familial, marital, work, etc.):

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

C. Reflected in the presenting problem:

0	1	2	3
			
NO INDICATION	SLIGHT INDICATION	CLEAR INDICATION	STRONG INDICATION

Appendix G:
Scoring Manual

SENTENCE COMPLETION TEST

SCORING MANUAL

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

DRAFT MANUAL: USE ONLY IN CONSULTATION WITH THE AUTHOR

Component M-1: Displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses.

Stem m1a: If I told a joke at a social gathering, and several people turned to listen ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration

Rationale: A score of **zero** is given when there is no indication of attention seeking. Examples include: a respondent who deflects attention, expresses displeasure for the situation, feels pressure or self-consciousness (in the absence of any pleasant payoff), or someone who even though they feel uncomfortable completes the joke (but indicates no pleasure at doing it).

i.e., actively deflects attention:

- I would jokingly accuse them of eavesdropping in an angry voice.

i.e., expresses clear dislike for the situation:

- Very, very seldom would I even tell a joke at a social gathering. 1) I'm not very good speaking to groups. 2) When I tell a joke it sounds flat, so I don't think it would happen.

i.e., indicates self-consciousness, sense of pressure without enjoyment:

- I tend to feel as though there is pressure on me to perform well; to make them laugh.
- I get self conscious for I do not possess that "dramatic" ability like some do.
- I will feel disappointed because I think they don't care about me. I will be unhappy and upset for several hours. (*key: probable need for attention, but insufficient information to give it a higher score*)
- I may stop telling the joke. Usually I don't tell jokes or anecdotes except if I am extremely comfortable. At social gatherings I tend to listen and respond to questions, taking the lead only if I am sure of myself (*key: a) discomfort is sufficient that they may stop, and b) even if the circumstances were different, they indicate "comfort" rather than enjoyment*).

i.e., feels uncomfortable, but proceeds without enjoyment:

- I get a little nervous, but tell the joke anyway.

One: **Some indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration.**

Rationale: A score of **one** is given when the respondent indicates low-level enthusiasm or describes equal proportions of anxiety and feedback-payoff. Examples include: mild enthusiasm (usually with a bland quality), someone who likes the attention but is equally overcome with anxiety, states that they might feel less nervous under different circumstances, or states that they are willing to tell the joke if the audience response is favorable.

i.e., mild/bland enthusiasm:

- I will continue with the joke and hope that they find it humorous or entertaining.
- I feel this is fine, since it is not often that I have a joke to tell.
- I get a feeling similar to pride, in a (rarely) reckless mood (which may be related to hostility).

i.e., stated need for attention counterbalanced by anxiety:

- I am flattered that I have drawn attention, yet frightened by what their reaction will be.

i.e., indicates he/she might enjoy telling the joke under different circumstances:

- I get freaked out if I don't know the people but continue to tell it and unless it's a really funny joke I'd probably end up telling it every unenthusiastically as compared to if I told it to people I know.

i.e., feels uncomfortable, but is willing to work for the positive payoff:

- I am more apt to feel pressure because I will wish the joke to go over well and invite a happy response.

- Sometimes I get nervous, but if I am confident the joke will make everyone laugh, I usually can handle it.
- I get nervous because more people are listening to me but if people laugh at the joke then I feel better.
- I usually blush but I also enjoy the attention.

Two: **Clear indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration.**

Rationale: A score of **two** is given when the respondent clearly indicates that they enjoy the attention, if they become enthusiastic and encouraged by audience reaction, engage the audience (trying to increase audience enjoyment), or characterizes self as a performer. Responses where some anxiety is noted, but the greater emphasis is placed on enjoyment also receive a score of two.

i.e., enjoys the attention, makes him/her feel good:

- I enjoy the attention.
- I feel as though I am important and ride off of their energy.
- I embellish it a little more, raise my voice and make sure everyone really gets into it - I like making people laugh.
- I may initially feel slightly uncomfortable, but given the function of such activities (ice breakers, attention getters), I am pleased, especially if the joke is well-received.

i.e., encouraged by audience reaction:

- I talk louder and ham it up even more because now I have an audience!
- I usually tend to become more animated and ham it up a bit more.
- This encourages me and I will usually talk more, to the point of dominating the conversation.

i.e., enjoyment expressed through action, characterizes self as performer:

- I try to make it as much of a story as possible, so all can enjoy.
- I know there's something wrong! I've always had a bit of a singular sense of humor, which most people don't have. It doesn't bother me when people listen though because I'm a bit of a social performer.
- (Is this a dirty joke?) If it's clean, the joke gets louder, longer and more embellished. I seem to wave my arms around more too.

i.e., clear engagement with the audience:

- I make eye contact with them to show I know and accept them listening.
- I will often repeat the joke for their benefit or just continue from where I am.

Component M-1: Displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses.

Stem m1b: If I were asked to take part in a play...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration

Rationale: Did the respondent say yes or no? A negative response yields a score of zero. An affirmative response yields a score of one.

i.e., for whatever reason, the respondent declines:

- I would probably decline, because I would not want to take the chance of “messaging up” and becoming embarrassed.
- I'd decline and ask if I could help behind the scenes instead. I've had to do a couple of in-class skits and it is the most humiliating experience - all teachers should remember this that when you have to do it (say for work or whatever), you'll do it, but don't force someone without some major reward that will make them want to do it.

- would be a part of the stage crew making sure props, lighting and cues for music were set up properly.

One: **Some indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration**

Rationale: An affirmative response, whether enthusiastic or hesitant, receives a score of one. Please note that there is a qualitative difference between simple enthusiasm (“that would be exciting”), which is scored as a **one**, and *keen* enthusiasm (“I would love to, especially if it were one of the lead roles”), which is scored as a **two**.

i.e., a marginal yes:

- my first reaction would be to, decline or work offstage. If needed, I could be persuaded into a small/medium role.
- I would consider it depending on who was involved and the nature/quality of the production.

i.e., a definite yes:

- I would do it. This surprises me as well. It would be an adventure, that’s for sure. It would be exciting!
- I would agree yet feel a lot of stress over being in front of everyone.

i.e., a conditional yes:

- I would as long as the script was a good one, the director was someone I respected or the part was one that was challenging. I would not take part in the play if the message was repulsive to me or if there was undue nudity required of me.
- I would definitely agree, but I wouldn’t want the lead. I want to be noticeable without being the center of attention.
- I would most likely refuse- unless I felt that it was important and I could amply prepare for my own portion.

Two: Clear indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration

Rationale: The following types of responses receive a score of two: a) innately exhibitionistic, b.) specifies a plan of action (i.e., the character they wish to play), c) consciously enjoys being the center of attention, d) displays a keen enthusiasm for the lead role, and e) agrees to take the lead role if certain condition are met.

i.e., an innately exhibitionistic response:

- I would gladly accept because I've had extensive background in theatre. This tool to express oneself is greatly utilized by me.
- I would want the [sic] or a leading role. I love to act onstage. I adore performing.

i.e., is so enthusiastic, he/she actually specifies a character:

- I'd like to take the part of Puck in Midsummer Night's Dream. I know he's supposed to be a boy, but what the hell! I've always loved his mixture of fairy and rogue, magic and sleaze. I guess that ties in with my answer to 19 really doesn't it?
- I would choose to be a character who saves another from the wrongs of humanity.

i.e., agrees because he/she enjoys being the center of attention:

- I would, I enjoy having attention, knowing exactly what is expected of me – e.g. where to stand, what to say, and also working with a group.
- I would take part, I like being the center of attention. I would only get nervous if I thought about it too much and made myself nervous.

i.e., displays keen enthusiasm for the lead role:

- I would love to, especially if it were one of the lead roles.
- I would love to, only if I had a major role.
- I would wish for the lead role and put on a tough competition to get it.
- I would say yes, no matter what part I was given, I think it would be exciting.

i.e., admits that he/she would like the lead role (but...):

- I would want the lead part. But if I was not best suited for it, I would gladly accept the part for which I was best suited.
- I would secretly wish to play the lead part, but would probably actively seek a less prominent role, unless I were absolutely confident that I could pull it off.
- I would throw myself into it because I would not be judged, my character would. So I think my insecurities would be eliminated. However, I suppose that if my acting abilities were put down I would totally take it to heart.

i.e., wishes to take a different, yet important role:

- I would like, not the leading role, but one of importance such as the leading role's friend/mother.

Component M-1: Displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses.

Stem m1c: A person stands in the spotlight, while another stands off to one side.
If I were in this scene, I would be ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration

Rationale: Responses that identify with the person “off to one side” receive a score of **zero**.

i.e., identifies with the person off to one side:

- the one off to one side because I'm a shy person and I don't enjoy being the center of attention.

i.e., will take the spotlight if circumstances force him/her (no enthusiasm):

- the one off to one side. I enjoy other people enjoying victories, however I will never be afraid of stepping into the spotlight. I am not a competitive person so I would not push my way into the spotlight, if I'm thrown. . . no problem.

One: **Some indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration**

Rationale: Simple identification with the spotlight figure is an affirmative response and warrants a score of **one**.

i.e., the basic affirmative response:

- standing in the spotlight.

i.e., admits he/she would very much like to be in the spotlight, but is too embarrassed to do so:

- off to one side wishing I was in the spotlight. I like praise and yet it is often embarrassing and awkward to be in the spotlight. As a result I often feel that I deserve to be in the spotlight and am not, and thus I feel disdain for whoever is working the spotlight.

i.e., feels at ease in both situations:

- in either situation. There have been times when attention is focused on me, and times when I've been beside the attention.

i.e., lukewarm affirmative responses (some evidence that he/she would enjoy center stage):

- In the spotlight. I feel I have nothing to hide from.
- off to the side preparing to move into the spotlight. I tend not to want to be the center of attention because I feel inadequate in comparison to others. However, I recognize that I have things to share and although I would not necessarily be overly aggressive, I would like to step onto the spotlight to share my views.

- either one depending on the situation and who actually deserves the credit. I enjoy the attention but also feel satisfied as I help someone else achieve the respect or admiration too.
- in the middle on the edge. Sometimes I'm the leader and I like the attention. Other times I'd rather be in the woodwork. But mostly I just like being known that I'm there.
- in the spotlight sometimes and other times off to one side. It depends on the situation. If I deserve to be in the spotlight, I will be there and enjoy it. If the other person has earned it or deserves it then they will be there and I will be on the side applauding them feeling just as content.

i.e., concedes that under certain circumstances, he/she would take the spotlight:

- depends. If with my family and friends I would stand in the spotlight. If with people I don't know, I stands off to one side.
- Off to one side. But this is actually very relative. With some friends I watch as they gather attention around themselves, while with others, I feel like I'm manipulating the group, enjoying the spotlight. Sometimes it feels safer to be off to one side, there is no responsibility involved, although it is great fun to be the center of attention.

Two: **Clear indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration**

Rationale: In order to get a score of **two**, the response must be affirmative *and* include some sort of explanatory component that clearly states that the respondent has a knowingly exhibitionistic style.

- In the spotlight! Attention is me - all of it, and the more controversial the better!
- in the spotlight. Though I don't consider myself a ham or attention seeker, when given center stage I do not shy away. Specifically, I was cast fairly large roles in drama productions in high school.
- in the spotlight because I tend to try to mask my insecurities with rash, extroverted behavior.
- Operating the spotlight - No! - In the spotlight because I crave the attention of others.

- either one although I would like to be the one in the spotlight, because I want to be seen.
- standing in the spotlight because I have high expectations of myself and I am rewarded by being given recognition.
- Standing in the spotlight. This surprises me because I think of myself, well I am a shy person, and DETEST things like speaking in front of people. But I do love and need to be noticed in different ways. I go out of my way to excel at certain things and to stand out in a crowd - but I guess I do in a more quiet, subtle way.
- the person in the spotlight. I tend to be an outgoing, “aggressive” person.
- depends on the situation but usually in the spotlight. I guess I like to have “control” of the situation as opposed to letting others have it. I am a leader, however, I sometimes lead from the back (off to one side?)
- in the spotlight because I always try to be in control or leadership roles.
- the one in the spotlight - I love to be the center of attention and usually I get depressed when I start to think that those around me have stopped noticing me.
- the one in the spotlight, I hope. I like to be known and appreciated. I realize that sometimes very important work can be done “behind the scenes,” but I prefer to be on stage in a lead role. I like the attention. However, the negative aspects of attention can sometimes be too much for me.
- The one in the spotlight, all eyes on me and my performance would be exceptional. I have always like to have all attention on me, I believe that when I am looking good I have a strong presence in a room because of the way I carry myself and feel about myself; confident, beautiful and powerful. I have always loved acting on stage for this reason.
- in the spotlight. I grew up with attention and feel it is necessary sometimes. I could also see myself off to the side if I did not know anyone and felt insecure.

Component M-1: Displays self to attract confirming and admiring responses.

Stem m1d: When I share my successes with other people, my secret wish is that they ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: **No indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration.**

Rationale: Any response that does not directly describe a confirming or admiring response gets a score of zero. Examples include: 1) no need for admiration, 2) states that he/she wishes others to be “happy for me” (being happy for someone is not the same as offering praise), or 3) provides insufficient information.

i.e., no real indication of need for confirmation or admiration:

- can understand the significance to myself and that they can respect that significance.
- I do not have any secret wishes about this scenario. When I share my successes with other people it is for the benefit of us all.

i.e., stated wish that others feel “happy for me” (not praise, but shared feeling):

- would be as happy for me as I am for myself. I enjoy making others happy.

One: **Some indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration**

Rationale: A score of **one** is given to responses that refer to the ‘audience’s reaction’ as admiring but do so in a simple or understated way (i.e., “I hope they will be impressed”). Please note that a simple statement to the effect of “I hope they will be happy for me” must be qualified in some way to justify a score of one. Responses indicating a desire that the audience be jealous are given a score of **two**.

i.e., paid a compliment:

- Acknowledge that the success was largely due to my work on the project.

- Tell people about my success.
- Praise my successes and be happy for me.
- Respect me for my success and accomplishments.
- Are proud of me. That they understand what it took to succeed and that they knew I could do it.

i.e., a desire to be seen as having attained higher status:

- are happy for me and see me as a successful person. I want them to be happy for me, not jealous of me because I know jealousy can ruin a friendship. (*happy + successful = 1*)

i.e., wishes to be congratulated, have someone be proud of him/her:

- will congratulate me for my efforts. This compliment helps me strive to have more goals reached in the future.
- are happy for me and proud of me too. I can feel their love.
- will say congratulation to me and they will feel happy and proud of me. It's a natural response; it can't be explained.

Two: Clear indication of display, attention-seeking, or need for confirmation/admiration

Rationale: A score of **two** is given to responses that explicitly describe the audience's reaction as admiring, with the use of multiple descriptors or mention of some sort of dependence on their response. Responses in this range tend to be either innately exhibitionistic, have an arrogant tone, or actually describe the admiration = self esteem dynamic.

i.e., actually states that he/she likes and seeks the admiration:

- Praise me for my success. I like the flattery and the confirmation of their admiration.
- Express their admiration. To admire my accomplishments is to respect me which is what I seek from most people.

i.e., a slightly “over-the-top” response:

- Would be astonished and praise me to no end at my accomplishments.

i.e., multiple descriptors:

- Look up to me, respect me, and admire me. I want people to think well of me, but on my terms. I won't change myself to appease them though.
- should admire my success, and be happy for me, and recognize that I am successful. (*key = redundancy*)

i.e., the “if they are jealous, I must look good” response:

- Are jealous of me. Because when people are jealous of other people it usually means something good has happened. (crude, but it's a two)
- Are jealous. That they wish that they could be me. Maybe because I'm insecure.
- will envy me, because it makes me feel good.
- wish they were me. <---- excuse conceit. (Now that's totally secret. I actually can't believe I fessed up to that)
- feel very jealous. I live to have what others only dream of.

i.e., makes the connection between admiration = self esteem:

- think, “Wow, she can do this or get this.” I like to be put on a pedestal sometimes to boost my confidence.
- admire and respect me and wish to learn from me. Because these actions/behaviors help boost my self esteem and ego. In times when I encounter difficulty, I can look back and use those instances to help me recover (emotionally) - a form of coping mechanism, you can say.

i.e., someone who clearly relishes praise:

- Praise me, in an unqualified way, allowing me to say “Oh no no, it's nothing really.” or to ask me about it and display interest so that I get to talk about it.

Component M-2: Low self-esteem (or other indication of narcissistic fragility, such as rage or cold rejection) in the absence of admiring responses.

Stem m2a: If I had to work in a demanding job in which I received little or no feedback from my boss or co-workers as to whether I was doing it well ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.

Rationale: A score of **zero** is given when the respondent either feels comfortable in such an environment, or simply indicates that he/she can tolerate it without emotional discomfort. In some zero responses, the respondent will state that he/she is able to cope with the situation by developing some sort of strategy (by observing other's cues or comparing his/her performance to what is expected overall). However, this strategy must be an internal, mental one (with no mention of discomfort), rather than an active one, such as ignoring the "no-feedback" rule and asking the boss for an evaluation (in which case it would be scored as a "two").

i.e., respondent asserts that he/she can operate without feedback:

- I would perform as usual. External influences as trivial as these should not dictate one's actions or performance.
- I would assume that I was doing a good job because I am a hard worker.
- I would work very hard to make sure I was doing it well so there was at least no room to criticize how hard I worked and then assume they would tell me if there was a problem. *(The key here is that the respondent does not provide enough information to score it higher than a zero, even though he/she behaves in a manner designed to fend off all negative feedback.)*
- as long as there was an equal lack of negative feedback, I would consider myself a competent worker at that job. *(employs internal strategy to cope, no discomfort noted)*

- I would attempt to extrapolate on my performance as compared with those before me to determine how I was doing. (*employs internal strategy to cope, no discomfort noted*)

One: **Some indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.**

Rationale: A score of **one** is given when the respondent is clearly bothered by the lack of feedback, but can somehow tolerate it. Frustration paired with passivity is a common dynamic found in this range. Any action taken is limited to passive-aggressive means, such as declining job effort. Any statement that the situation is intolerable is scored as a two.

i.e., feels uncomfortable but does not describe action taken (if any):

- I would be restless and experience job dissatisfaction.
- I would do the best I could but would wonder whether I was doing okay.
- I would start to become a little discouraged because I enjoy positive feedback and it helps me feel good about myself. However, if I felt that the job was worthwhile and that I was good at it and I also enjoyed, I'd continue at it.

i.e., respondent upset, work may be affected, but he/she does not indicate that the situation is so intolerable that he/she would quit:

- I would be very nervous about my performance and constantly be watching myself for the slightest mistake.
- I might question the quality of my work. If I am being rewarded accordingly for the work, I would feel confident about doing the work.
- It would bother me because I would not know if I was performing to their expectations, i.e. Am I productive enough?
- would be very frustrating. Praise is good for esteem, but if you are going wrong, even if it hurts your feelings, it is good to be corrected. (*very bothered, but does not express intolerance*)
- I would feel somewhat uncomfortable. I prefer to know if I'm doing a job well so that I can continue to do so and I like to know of my mistakes so that I can correct them. I hate being "in the dark."

Two: Clearly disturbed by the lack of feedback.

Rationale: A score of **two** is given when the respondent indicates that he/she cannot function in an environment without externally-supplied feedback. Examples include: a) respondents who clearly state that feedback is essential to the job, or that b) they characterize themselves as someone who needs feedback, or c) that he/she would simply quit, or d) would ignore the 'no feedback' rule and ask for it anyway. Please note that in the latter instance, any action taken must be an external strategy, rather than an internal, mental one.

i.e., clearly states that feedback is essential to the job:

- I would insist on it. I thrive on feedback (hence I guess why I'm here!) and need that pat on the back once a while as motivation.
- I would become frustrated. It is important (to me) to know if my work is good, or if it needs improving. Feedback lets you know where you stand - good for self-esteem. If no feedback – what's the point in doing the job?

i.e., states that he/she **needs** feedback:

- I would start nagging them to tell me. Get overly paranoid about my performance. It would make me extremely stressed-out. I need feedback to function.
- I would probably begin to feel unhappy about my job - I need constant praise and reassurance.
- I would feel okay if I knew I was doing well, but if a customer shot me down my self-confidence would go down unless another employee backed me up. If my self-confidence stayed low it would last all day but it would be gone by the next. (*an indirect but powerful statement that feedback is essential*)

i.e., states that he/she would quit:

- I would quit. Feedback and response to work done is of the utmost importance for me.

i.e., expresses need for feedback by finding alternate means of getting it:

- I will ask them to give me some feedback, or try to get very close to one/two co-workers, find out how they feel about the work I have done.

Component M-2: Low self-esteem (or other indication of narcissistic fragility, such as rage or cold rejection) in the absence of admiring responses.

Stem m2b: If I worked very hard preparing for a party (or family gathering), and someone else took all the credit...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.

Rationale: The question here really, is: how important is this to you? A score of **zero** is given when the respondent shows no concern that others will take the credit. Scores in this range will be rare.

- It would be okay because I know who did the work and it is more important that the gathering is enjoyable than getting praise for my work.

One: Some indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.

Rationale: A score of **one** is given for responses in the “normal” range: a) those who are clearly bothered by the lack of feedback, but can somehow tolerate it (frustration paired with passivity), or b) instances of simple assertiveness (i.e., standing up for oneself by confronting the offender). However, if the respondent also makes a *public* statement so as to correct misperceptions, this is scored as a **two**.

- It would bother me very much, but I would probably keep my feelings to myself.
- I would feel resentful and complain to my friends later but wouldn’t say anything to the people involved.

i.e., standing up for oneself:

- I would talk to them about it and try to figure out why they behaved in this way. Dependence on the response from that person I would then re-evaluate my relationship with them.
- I would be mad and ask why they have done that.
- I would explain that the person who took the credit was being untruthful and say how important the party was to me and why I put so much effort into it. Thus, I would confront the person who took the credit.

Two: Clear indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.

Rationale: Any statement that this situation is intolerable is scored as a **two**. Examples may include: rage, or telling everyone who *really* deserves the credit. Responses in this range are exceedingly rare (less than 5/100)

- I would make sure everyone knew who really deserved the credit.
- I would try and make it clear in a subtle way that it had actually been me who prepared the party (while still there, everyone listening).
- It would make me furious. I would let them know at the party (so everyone could hear), that I didn't appreciate them taking the credit.
- This happened to me. All I could think of was how to get back at them.

Component M-2: Low self-esteem (or other indication of narcissistic fragility, such as rage or cold rejection) in the absence of admiring responses.

Stem m2c: When my talents and abilities aren't acknowledged, what I do is...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.

Rationale: A score of **zero** is given when the respondent indicates that he/she can tolerate the situation without emotional discomfort, or offers a response unrelated to obtaining positive feedback. For example, some respondents will suggest an internal, mental strategy, such as the “wait-it-out” approach described below. Nevertheless, any mention of discomfort would warrant a score of **one**.

i.e., “self-reliant” response:

- Keep on doing what I was pursuing and be myself. I don't need other people's acknowledgement.

i.e., “wait-it-out” strategy:

- To keep quiet about it. I know one day someone will acknowledge me. (*is therefore able to tolerate the lack of feedback*)

One: Some indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.

Rationale: A score of **one** is given for responses that mention discomfort, and/or some attempt to obtain positive feedback.

i.e., simple discomfort:

- Inside feel somewhat sad yet a bit angry at the same time. If my talents and abilities are acknowledged though I feel embarrassed. It seems either way I am not content.

- Feel dejected and self esteem decreases. It kind of discourages me for a while, until I realize I don't need constant reinforcement to have talent.

i.e., a direct attempt to obtain feedback:

- Tell people that I can do these things and show them and also try to get them involved.
- Try and let others know my abilities/talents and why they are important to me.

i.e., upset, but expresses self by other means:

- Complain to my family and friends about how frustrating it is, but I rarely mention anything to the people who didn't acknowledge my talents. Then I eat ice cream to feel better.
- Sit and sulk and then complain to my friends (the ones who will listen anyway).

i.e., the "try harder" response:

- Push myself to perform better next time in hopes that my efforts may later be acknowledged.
- Try to figure out why. Maybe I'm getting stale. Time to revisit and revise. I guess the biggest thing is to evaluate what happened, why it happened, and how /what changes could be made to turn it into a successful situation.

Two: **Clear indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.**

Rationale: A score of **two** is given for responses that clearly describe a precipitous drop in self esteem, rage, desperate overtures for attention, need for revenge, etc.. If any remedial action is taken, it will have an intense quality.

i.e., precipitous drop in self esteem:

- Feel like I'm worth nothing. I try no to be upset but sometimes I feel like I am not important.

i.e., anger followed by an “I’ll show you” response:

- I get a little pissed inside because nobody is giving me any credit. Sometimes I would do a really great project that would over-exaggerate my talents so that I do get acknowledged.
- Get angry, try to jump in front of situations to gain attention. If all fails then I probably just hate everyone who should have acknowledged me.

Component M-2: Low self-esteem (or other indication of narcissistic fragility, such as rage or cold rejection) in the absence of admiring responses.

Stem m2d: I am walking down the street, looking my best. An attractive person passes by without even glancing at me. I...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.

Rationale: A score of **zero** is given when the respondent appears unperturbed.

i.e., considers the possibilities, but unaffected:

- Don’t really think much of it. Maybe I don’t look as good as I thought I did, or maybe they were preoccupied. Who knows?
- Ignore that person. I think he/she is probably taken.
- Don’t even think about it. If he wants to make an effort to talk to me then he can. I’m not out to meet a guy on the street.
- Wouldn’t even notice. When I am feeling my best I don’t really care if other people notice or not as long as I feel good.

One: **Some indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.**

Rationale: A score of **one** is given when, on some level, the respondent is either:
a) bothered that the other person did not pay some attention, or b)
vigilant to the possibility of getting some attention.

i.e., some indication that the respondent *wanted* them to look:

- Look back to make sure they didn't look (they might not have wanted to look obvious). If this was not the case, I would brush it off. You can't win them all.

i.e., bothered, maybe hurt:

- Would automatically feel a bit hurt but very soon after realize that perhaps I am not their type. Their loss, or that their mind was somewhere else, maybe thinking of their girlfriend.
- Feel sheepish for ever thinking I look "my best." It would be a blow to my confidence. *(Please note that the reason this response is not considered a "two," is that it is a relatively minor blow to the respondent's self-esteem).*

Two: **Clear indication that he/she is disturbed by the lack of feedback.**

Rationale: A score of **two** is given when the respondent is in some *fundamental* way disturbed by the lack of attention (intense frustration, drop in self worth, anger, retaliatory impulse, etc.).

- Question how I feel about myself and whether I am as attractive as I think and my self-esteem declines.

Component I-1: Seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities, such as prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or views.

Item 1a: The kind of person who holds a real fascination for me ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication of search for an admirable other

Rationale: A score of **zero** is given for responses that do not *clearly* describe a person who is admired (in the sense that he/she is “looked up to”)

i.e., responses that do not describe a person who is admired:

- are ignorant people. People whose views seem so “redneck” or play stereotyped roles such as being a macho womanizer.
- is someone who feel comfortable working with me. I am fascinated by that person because my works are organized and neat.
- are people from other cultures, who hold different views and have different interests.
- is one who admires my good will toward people, generosity and pleasantries.

One: Some indication of search for an admirable other

Rationale: Responses that describe someone who is admired receive a score of **one**. Typical responses in this range describe: a) someone (or a set of characteristics) who embodies the goals to which the respondent aspires, or b) a “shopping list” of desirable qualities.

i.e., straightforward description of someone who is admired:

- is one who isn’t afraid to do what they want to do.

- does X in spite of being told he can't do X. I admire people who can buck the system and achieve goals in spite of adversity.
- is intelligent and can ski well. I value intelligence and winter sports.
- is someone who is able to withstand any turmoil set before them on their "life-long journey" through their life. Someone who is basically cool because I envy them.
- is someone who is eccentric. Eccentric people seem to have been able to break the social norm without any remorse or feeling of rejection. This strength is fascinating.
- is someone who's done something different. Routine, monotony and conformity are boring and confining. I like it when people break out of the mould and do their own thing. People who risk rejection and persecution to do something they believe in fascinate me.

i.e., responses that evoke the mentor dynamic:

- a mentor of some sort. A person who fulfills me intellectually and stimulates me to think things or in ways I may never have.
- is the kind who has had a broad range of life experiences, and is not unwilling to share them. I am fascinated because I would want to learn from them and somehow 'absorb' these insights.
- are people who are strong willed and very capable of doing a variety of things. I feel I learn from them and their passion for whatever is usually rubbed off on me, making me a stronger person.

Two: Clear indication of search for an admirable other

Rationale: Responses that describe someone who is *perfect, complete, some sort of hero, or possessing exceptional status and/or power* receive a score of **two**. Many of the "persons" described here will possess unrealistic combinations of qualities/abilities.

i.e., attracted to power or status:

- is someone who's extroverted and has a powerful status symbol. I'm very attracted to people with those characteristics 'cause I believe those characteristics are fundamental to surviving in today's changing world.
- Is a leader who can hold and move a massive audience because of the manner in which they speak and present themselves. This to me lends inspiration and a sense of success. The ability to identify with an audience.

i.e., the "too perfect" description:

- has direction in life, active, loving, caring, forgiveness, can take in a lot of bad situations but can still react normal. Always in control, go toward his goals, even face difficulties, because this is the kind of person I want to be. *(In other words, this is not a description of a person so much as a set of internalized goals)*
- those who seem satisfied with life, as though they are at home in all environments and sure of their own responses and rights in a given situation. I am fascinated by people who seem to want nothing and yet rarely act to get themselves anything. *(seeks perfect poise?)*

i.e., the respondent states that he/she is fixated on this person:

- is more competent or knowledgeable than I am in my areas of interest, or superb at anything at all. . .by being a good example of what I would like to be like, they would become a subject of study, admiration, and "fascination". . . *(an extreme version of the mentor dynamic)*

Component I-1: Seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities, such as prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or views.

Stem 11b: In my life, having someone I can look up to...

Scoring Levels

Zero:	No indication that respondent seeks others to admire
Rationale:	A score of zero is given when the respondent states that having someone to look up to is not important. Indifferent responses or weighing of pros and cons (with balance in favor of cons) are also scored zero.
One:	Some indication that respondent seeks others to admire
Rationale:	A score of one is given for responses stating that having someone to look up to is important. Typical responses evoke the goal-setting or inspirational function, or a weighing of pros and cons (with balance in favor of pros). Most responses fall in this range.
Two:	Clear indication that respondent seeks others to admire
Rationale:	A score of two is given for affirmative responses that express a need that is qualitatively different from the average goal/inspiration function. For example, responses that evoke the soothing/calming/protective function, or someone who states that they need a leader or hero to follow. Another possible response would evoke the "I lack energy and the leader provides it" need. This, however, is not the same as simple inspiration, which is scored as a one.
Component I-1:	Seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities, such as prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or views.
Stem 11c:	When I think of someone I admire, I feel...(because)

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication of search for an admirable other

Rationale: As an indirect measure of the root construct, scoring focuses on the degree of positive affect associated with the thought of the admired other. Responses that do not evoke positive affect are scored as **zero**.

i.e., responses that reflect conflict between admiration and the respondent's need to admire:

- Envious of what they have.
- Inadequate because I have yet to have accomplished anything of real significance in my life. So I will strive to be like them.
- Envious because I wish I could have the talent that they have. Then I feel jealous and wish they were dead (joke!).
- Depending on the day, and how I'm feeling about myself I would either feel inspired and proud or envious and inadequate. *(If this response was just "inspired and proud," it might be scored as a one, however, because it gives equal weight given to both positive and negative aspects, it is scored as a zero)*

One: Some indication of search for an admirable other

Rationale: A score of **one** is given for responses that express a predominantly positive feeling. These are very much in the normal range and tend to reflect the bulk of responses.

i.e., simple positive association with the thought of that person:

- Good because I think of why I admire that person.
- Good about myself because I am friends with him/her and I'm sure I can learn his/her good qualities.

i.e., feels inspired (*for future reference, this class of responses should be considered "1 1/2"*):

- Inspired to act more like that person because they reflect an ideal I aspire towards.
- Inspired because I also think of the traits and achievements I associate with that person.

i.e., competing positive and negative feelings, but indicates that negative feelings are transient:

- Good because they have qualities that are attractive to me, things I hope to pick up and learn, and apply to my own life. Sometimes I feel jealous that I'm not like this person because I realize that I have a long way to go.

Two: **Clear indication of search for an admirable other**

Rationale: A score of **two** is given for responses that go beyond simple positive feeling, expressing more of what could be considered that classic ideal-function: soothing, comforting, protecting, or invigorating.

i.e., comforted or invigorated:

- Comfortably safe because this person I hold in such high regard also has the same regard for me, or for what I could be.
- Refreshed and charged with emotion because I would like to be at least half as good as they are. In my opinion, a role model is someone you look up to, and someone you try to catch up with.

i.e., someone for whom the idealized one plays a powerful role in their life:

- Like I should try harder to become a better person. I feel pleased if I know this person likes me as well, but I will feel inferior and bad about myself if I think that person doesn't like me very much. (*in this case, the negative feelings say far more about this person's importance than do the positive ones*)

- Component I-1:** Seeks others to admire for their idealizable qualities, such as prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or views.
- Stem 11d:** Some people are fascinated by regular people (their positive attributes and flaws), whereas seek to discover people who are exceptional. I...

Scoring Levels

- Zero:** No indication of search for an admirable other
- Rationale:** Responses that indicate a preference for “regular people” receive a score of **zero**.
- One:** Some indication of search for an admirable other
- Rationale:** Responses that indicate a preference for “exceptional people” receive a score of **one**.
- Two:** Clear indication of search for an admirable other
- Rationale:** Responses that indicate a preference for “exceptional people,” and clearly indicate that such people are very fascinating to the respondent, receive a score of **two**.

Component I-2: Easily disappointed by idealized other.

Stem i2a: Try to bring to mind someone you held in very high esteem, but who you did not know all that well. Over time, as you got to know him/her better ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication of disappointment/rejection

Rationale: Any indication that the respondent experiences no disappointment in the object of their admiration warrants a score of **zero**. Some respondents may see the object of their admiration as more human, but if they maintain a positive view of that person, then the response is scored as a **zero**. Any indication of disappointment or intolerance of faults is automatically scored as a **one** or higher.

i.e., admiration/affection simply continues:

- my respect grew when I came to realize that the qualities I admired were not an act or one time occurrence.
- I'd want to deepen the relationship further.
- This depends on the quality of the admiration. Generally when I discover weaknesses in the person I admire I like them better because then I feel they are more human (assuming I don't discover some hypocritical deception on their part which is quite different). (*anticipates that some faults might invoke rejection - but these would cause the average person to do so*)

i.e., acceptance - the "no-one's perfect response:

- and found out that that person is a human with faults just like all humans - no one's perfect.

i.e., even though admiration lessens, the respondent still likes the person (no disappointment reported):

- *I liked him* but brought him down from the pedestal I had put him on and saw he was with faults like anyone else.

- I began to realize that he was actually a fallible human being. I took him off the pedestal I had placed him on *but I enjoyed his company even more.*
- *I still thought well of him/her* but also came to see they were as human as everyone else.
- I began to recognize that they are not necessarily “better” than me, merely different (i.e., more intelligent, well traveled, etc.), therefore some of the esteem tends to fade *but I still respect them highly.*

i.e., the relationship changes, respondent does not say they actually like the person, but no disappointment evident either:

- I found that they were not as hard to talk to as when I first met them.
- she seemed like everybody else. I was no longer as shy and had more confidence in talking openly with her.
- I found that she stood up to my expectations on most things but found I didn’t have to be intimidated by her.
- I found that he was more human than I could have imagined. There were a number of characteristics about him that definitely brought him down to a personal level.

i.e., the insufficient information or ambiguous response:

- I found that my initial perceptions made it difficult for me to see this person objectively.
- my opinion of him would change depending on how he truly was.
- can find out that person has her own differences, and she might be very good on a lot of things. But she could have a lot of problems on one small area. *(the respondent’s opinion could very well be negative. However, because no disappointment is noted (explicit or implicit), it must be scored as a zero)*
- my opinion changed because they were more human than godly. *(no disappointment expressed, therefore insufficient information to score it as a one).*

One: Some indication of disappointment, but not rejection

Rationale: A score of one is given for simple disappointment, or disappointment combined with continued friendship. Examples include: a) disappointment combined with continued friendship, b) loss of admiration with implicit disappointment, c) the realization that the admired one has faults (with implicit disappointment), and d) the realization that one admired an illusion. Any clear indication of disappointment without tolerance of faults, however, indicates a score of **two**.

i.e., simple disappointment:

- I have usually been disappointed with the real person.
- My estimations were not fulfilled. I have never met anyone who fulfilled or surpassed my expectations.
- I found that this person was lacking many characteristics I thought the person had. It turned into great disappointment.
- faults that he had became more apparent to me. Those faults seemed that much worse in contrast to my previous opinion of him.
- I was very disappointed because that person betrayed my trust.

i.e., disappointment combined with continued friendship:

- I became disappointed as I learned she was not the person I had thought her to be but I still remained friends with her.
- I was glad and honored to consider her a friend. However, when it came to the crunch, she disappointed me enormously.
- I often become very disillusioned, although I often still like the person (perfect vs. human). *(still likes them but disillusionment makes it a one)*

i.e., loss of admiration, with implicit disappointment (gentle removal from pedestal):

- I realized they weren't that different from me and not as special as I thought they were, and I realized that they weren't all so hot. I only knew/saw the one side of them.

- my view of them dropped from high esteem to lower esteem since people may not all be as they seem at first.
- the gap (level of pedestal placement) decreased and I realized that she was not excessively exceptional.

i.e., the realization that the admired one has faults (implicit disappointment):

- I found that generally my first instinct was right and that they were deserving of my admiration. However eventually I found areas or issues in which their opinion surprised or disappointed me.
- I started to see them in a more realistic light and although I might have still admired certain aspects of their being, I also started to see their faults.
- she began to seem more “human” to me, and as I recognized some of her flaws, I became much more critical of her than of others.
- I learned that she was impatient with me and that her affection for me reflected a “flavor of the month” kind of friendship.

i.e., disappointment based on the realization that the other person was a bit of an illusion:

- I found myself very insecure of how he felt about me. The more I learned about him, the more I realized I had created an image of him to fill in the pieces I didn’t know.

Two: Clear indication of disappointment/rejection

Rationale: The general tone of a two response is one of profound, rather than simple disappointment. There must be no evidence that the respondent still likes or admires the person. Responses often reflect “black and white” thinking, with explicit or implicit rejection. Examples include: a) condemnation, b) an abrupt shift from good to bad (even if it sounds reasonable), c) a complete change of opinion, or d) disappointment and avoidance of that person.

i.e., condemnation - moved decisively from the “good” category to the “bad” category:

- I found out he was a total jerk.
- I altered my opinions about her because I can't fully respect someone who uses foul language as it is not Christian-like.
- the esteem became much lower until it almost vanished.
- I realized that she was putting up a pseudo-image of herself for me to admire, but deep inside she was complete scum.
- one person that comes to mind is a person I worked for at one time building houses. I had a high opinion of him because he was self made, independent, and immigrant who did not have much at first. But later, I discovered he was petty, cheap, used people, basically told people one thing then did another - ripped people off. Respect dropped.
- I ended up not liking him very much at all. Our personalities clash - his does with lots of people's. I'm not good at hiding how I feel so now we just try to ignore each other. At first I thought he was cool and nice and sensitive but as I got to know him and talk to him I saw another side, a side I didn't like.

i.e., a complete change of opinion:

- I came to realize that he was a real person, with faults and was actually kind of an asshole.
- In high school I met a girl who had a great sense of humor and we really clicked. However as time went on and I got to know her better I found her to be very self-absorbed and highly judgmental.
- He turned into a jerk, I no longer hold him in high esteem. I tended to hero worship and as I caught up in maturity (he's 5 years older) I found out that he was very snobbish and not as important as he thinks he is.

i.e., disappointment and avoidance:

- I was disappointed that they didn't hold up to my expectations. They were in fact fallible and made mistakes and I found myself having less time for them as a result.

Component I-2: Easily disappointed by idealized other.

Stem i2b: When someone I look up to displays a character flaw - that is, show that they are not as faultless as I initially imagined...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication of disappointment/rejection

Rationale: If the respondent displays a resilient, accepting attitude, with no judgment of the other person, or indicates that he/she feels a little let down, but that ultimately, the result is equalization, the score is **zero**. The scoring rationale is therefore unique in that it accommodates disappointment in the zero range insofar as the end result is *acceptance*. In general, the rationale is: zero = not disappointed, one = disappointed with possible *De*-admiration - but does not reject, two = disappointed and a *complete* reversal of admiration or rejection.

i.e., is able to shrug it off:

- depending on the flaw, try to identify with that person's flaw, why he/she has that flaw, try (usually) to accept that person's imperfections.

i.e., may feel let down initially, but concludes with the "they're only human" realization:

- I will be disappointed for a moment or short period of time. Then I realize that nobody is perfect and I feel more comfortable.
- I lose little respect for them, after all they are only human.
- I am a little disappointed but I know that they are simply human.

i.e., vacillates between disappointment and acceptance, but does not settle on either:

i.e., blames self:

One: Some indication of disappointment/rejection

Rationale: If the respondent feels disappointed and/or angry, but their admiration is only *partly* affected (admiration is not completely lost, no condemnation or rejection), then the score is **one**.

i.e., feels disappointed and/or angry:

i.e., steps back until idol redeems him/herself (implicit that the respondent would like to salvage the relationship):

i.e., respondent reevaluates their idol (but rejection not mentioned):

- I tend to change my opinion of them.
- I will believe the truth and re-evaluate the person again.
- I get annoyed or feel uncomfortable about it unless I can find a good justification for that flaw, that near-perfect image gets a dip off (i.e. loses 5-10 points) from me.
- I accept the flaw as a human trait but tend not to look up to them as much.

i.e., deeply affected, but does not actually specify disappointment:

Two: Clear indication of disappointment/rejection

Rationale: If the respondent is easily disappointed by the presence of a character flaw *and* responds with rejection, then the response gets a score of **two**.

i.e., the reject-and-replace strategy:

i.e., sense of disappointment is so profound that the respondent's relationships are affected globally:

- I get upset, and view it as another disappointment this world has to offer.

i.e., starts out accepting, and then drops-kicks the former idol:

Component I-2: Easily disappointed by idealized other.

Stem i2c: When a mentor or role model disappoints me I...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication of disappointment/rejection

Rationale: This stem is a straightforward “what would your reaction be” question, which requires an unabashedly ideal-hungry rejection-reaction to justify a score of two. The scoring rationale is as follows: If the respondent displays a resilient, accepting attitude, with no judgment of the other person, or indicates that he/she feels a little let down, but that ultimately, the result is equalization, the score is **zero**. The scoring rationale is therefore unique in that it accommodates disappointment in the zero range insofar as the end result is *acceptance*.

i.e., is able to shrug it off:

i.e., may feel let down initially, but concludes with the “they’re only human” realization:

- Try to think that we are just human beings so nobody is perfect.
- Both let down because I would have counted on them. However, I also feel and realized that they are human and make mistakes, which makes me less upset if I make a mistake.

i.e., vacillates between disappointment and acceptance, but does not settle on either:

- Really should be a role model. It makes me second guess my choice as to whether they are role model material or just had a bad day because everyone is human and makes mistakes.
- Reflect (think about it a lot in days following and sometimes become discouraged). I also may come to see others more realistically (on same level) rather than elevating them because of certain strengths of positions. (*effect is global but very mild*)

i.e., blames self:

- Feel like I have done something wrong and may ask them why they would do the things they do.

One: **Some indication of disappointment/rejection**

Rationale: If the respondent feels disappointed and/or angry, but the response does not involve complete rejection or condemnation, then the score is **one**.

i.e., feels disappointed and/or angry:

- Feel really disenchanted as I tend to place people above myself who I admire.
- Try not to think about the episode or event which caused my disappointment.
- Get upset because I've spent so much of my life looking up to someone who does not live up to my expectations.
- Will be upset because that is a person I look up to.

i.e., steps back until idol redeems him/herself (implicit that the respondent would like to salvage the relationship):

- Usually would just notch that up to a human mistake and allow them another chance to make up for it.

i.e., respondent reevaluates their idol (but rejection not mentioned):

- Would feel very disappointed and question and be skeptical about what he/she taught/told me before.
- Feel very disappointed that I looked to them to be a role model. It indicates that perhaps my judgment as to their character was in error.
- Feel let down. There may be a sense of distrust that goes along with these feelings and a decrease in enthusiasm of wanting to be around them or in how much you know value their opinion.

i.e., deeply affected, but does not actually specify disappointment:

- I feel shaken. I may not trust them anymore.

Two: **Clear indication of disappointment/rejection**

Rationale: If the respondent is easily disappointed by the presence of a character flaw *and* responds with rejection, then the response gets a score of **two**.

i.e., the reject-and-replace strategy:

i.e., sense of disappointment is so profound that the respondent's relationships are affected globally:

- Feel let down, hurt, lose respect and admiration for that person, and am less likely to look up to them and/or to other role models.
- Feel upset and disappointed. In a sense, I was counting on this person whom I look up to, and with them disappointing me, my view of things gets popped a bit as well.

i.e., starts out accepting, and then drops-kicks the former idol:

Component I-2: Easily disappointed by idealized other.

Stem i2d: When someone I admire lets me down...

Scoring Levels

Zero: **No indication of disappointment/rejection**

Rationale: This stem is a straightforward “what would your reaction be” question, which requires an unabashedly ideal-hungry rejection-reaction to justify a score of two. The scoring rationale is as follows: If the respondent displays a resilient, accepting attitude, with no judgment of the other person, or indicates that he/she feels a little let down, but that ultimately, the result is equalization, the score is **zero**. The scoring rationale is therefore unique in

that it accommodates disappointment in the zero range insofar as the end result is *acceptance*.

i.e., is able to shrug it off:

- I don't take it personally.
- Usually would just notch that up to a human mistake and allow them another chance to make up for it.

i.e., feels let down initially, but concludes with the "they're only human" realization:

- Both let down because I would have counted on them. However, I also feel and realized that they are human and make mistakes, which makes me less upset if I make a mistake.

i.e., vacillates between disappointment and acceptance, but does not settle on either:

- It makes me second guess my choice as to whether they are role model material or just had a bad day because everyone is human and makes mistakes.

i.e., blames self:

- Feel like I have done something wrong and may ask them why they would do the things they do.

One: **Some indication of disappointment/rejection**

Rationale: If the respondent feels disappointed and/or angry, but the response does not involve complete rejection or condemnation, then the score is **one**.

i.e., feels disappointed and/or angry:

- I feel somewhat betrayed and really annoyed at them.
- Feel really disenchanted as I tend to place people above myself who I admire.
- Try not to think about the episode or event which caused my disappointment.

i.e., steps back until idol redeems him/herself (implicit that the respondent would like to salvage the relationship):

- I am disappointed and tell the person or sometimes I ignore the person and give them the silent treatment until they figure out they let me down and apologize to me.
- I will hold it against them until they come through again.

i.e., respondent reevaluates their idol (but rejection not mentioned):

- I feel shaken. I may not trust them anymore.
- Would feel very disappointed and question and be skeptical about what he/she taught/told me before.
- Then I probably wouldn't admire that person as much as I did before. I might have mistaken the person as being something he/she is not.
- Feel let down. There may be a sense of distrust that goes along with these feelings and a decrease in enthusiasm of wanting to be around them or in how much you know value their opinion.
- Bring them down from their pedestal and look at them as a human being who can make mistakes. The intentions of their actions if negative would be the biggest letdown.

i.e., deeply affected, but does not actually specify disappointment:

- I want to tell them how I feel, but sometimes find it difficult to express my feelings. It takes me a while to express how I feel and I usually tend to downplay my feelings.

Two: Clear indication of disappointment/rejection

Rationale: If the respondent is easily disappointed by the presence of a character flaw *and* responds with rejection, then the response gets a score of **two**.

i.e., the reject-and-replace strategy:

- I'll simply find another idol.

i.e., sense of disappointment is so profound that the respondent's relationships are affected globally:

- Feel let down, hurt, lose respect and admiration for that person, and am less likely to look up to them and/or to other role models. *(the effect is global)*

- Feel upset and disappointed. In a sense, I was counting on this person whom I look up to, and with them disappointing me, my view of things gets popped a bit as well. (*global*)
- Feel very disappointed that I looked to them to be a role model. It indicates that perhaps my judgment as to their character was in error.
- I feel like it's not worth it to get close to people because they always disappoint you.

i.e., starts out accepting, and then drops-kicks the former idol:

- I feel uncomfortable and dissatisfied with the relationship. It lets me know that we're all human and fallible (them for letting me down, and me for looking up to such a loser).

Component T-1: Seeks relationships/friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values.

Stem t1a: Having a partner who is very much like myself ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships

Rationale: A score of **zero** is given for negative or indifferent responses. Lukewarm endorsements of twinship (along the lines of "sounds like a good idea") also get zero. A characteristic pattern in the zero range is an equal weighting of pros and cons, without a vote in favor either way. If the vote falls in favor of "yes," then the score is **one**.

i.e., negative responses:

- would not work because I value my partner's qualities too much (the ones I don't have), especially when I get emotional, or in situations that I am unsure of.
- would probably be uninteresting and become old very quickly.

i.e., somewhat indifferent:

- helps, but I find it is not necessarily essential.
- can be comfortable - but if they are too much like me, it can be boring.

i.e., lukewarm endorsement (also does not appear to follow respondent's pattern of past relationships):

- is important as long as he or she is not completely the same. It's hard to do things I like and try to accommodate someone else's interests too so we both have fun.
- would be quite the opposite of relationships I've had in the past yet welcomed.

i.e., weighs pros and cons with fairly equal weighting:

- can enrich my life to a large extent in the sense that we can do many things together. However, familiarity breeds contempt so I can also handle novelty and change at times too.
- would probably be very confirming of my own beliefs , yet at the same time uncomfortable because we would be too similar, no diversity of ideas.

One: Some indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships

Rationale: A score of **one** is given when the answer is a simple "yes." In some cases, the response is affirmative (not lukewarm), but simply does not provide enough information for the rater to conclude that the respondent has actually had twinship-based relationships. Other examples include: a) the respondent weighs the pros and cons with the balance in favor of pro, b), an abstract, unemotional endorsement of twinship, or c) the respondent places the idea of twinship in a hypothetical future. Please note that the existence of certain factors indicate that a hypothetical response should be scored as a two (see next page).

i.e., a simple, mild yes:

- is quite important for long term success of a relationship.
- helps me to be more understanding when either or us feels hurt about something.
- is comfortable.

- would be great because we'd have common interests.
- is comforting and necessary for a relationship to work. (*too calm for a two*)
- allows me to relate to them better and gives me someone who might empathize with my ideas.

i.e., weighs pros and cons, balance in favor of pro:

- is somewhat important. I like someone who has a passion for something as I do and who is goal-directed as I am. Also who has morals straight as I do. Otherwise, similarity in superficial stuff doesn't matter to me.

i.e., responses that say this *would* be a good thing (hypothetical):

- would be wonderful - I am still looking!
- would be ideal. I believe you interact better with someone who has similar interests and values.
- is fun because we will enjoy many of the same things and can always share time together enjoying these activities.

Two: Clear indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships

Rationale: A score of **two** is given when it is clear that twinship is the respondent's existing or habitual relationship pattern. A response with hypothetical wording may be scored as a two if: a) the respondent's phrasing is emotionally loaded (words like love or hate), b) the response expresses intense longing, or c) suggests emotional fusion.

i.e., statement that this characterizes the respondent's current or recent relationship:

- I can cooperate better, since the thoughts we have are very close. I feel very comfortable since I can tell my partner anything I want to. (*describes current relationship*)
- is important because he understands me and can actually relate to my feelings because he's been through most of the same things and he can give me helpful advice or even just listen when I need him. (*describes current relationship*)

- is very important to me. She understand me and my reactions to certain situations.
(describes current relationship)
- is important. I have that right now and I always like to think that our likenesses reflect that we are destined to be together forever. I feel it strengthens the bond between two people. (describes current relationship)

i.e., hypothetical but phrasing suggests intense longing:

- is a great asset. I would love a partner who is alike to myself. It make things go easier, I know what to expect and I feel comfortable with them.
- is important to me, because I hate it when I have nothing in common with someone - I feel as if they are not worth my time.
- would be ideal, a perfect match, someone who would be easy to love.

i.e., phrasing suggests fusion:

- would be a blessing, such that I would have someone “watching my back” at all times. She would always be there.
- is a lot of fun. We really don’t verbalize very much any more. Most communication takes place through gestures or facial expressions. Besides that we usually know what the other is thinking anyway, so verbalizing any response would be pointless.
- would be very nice. Would brighten the day and night, also make everything nice. Would be two bodies as one, no deadly isolation. Intimacy and togetherness once again.

Component T-1: Seeks relationships/friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values.

Stem t1b: Some of the people I know are very similar to me, whereas others are very different from me. I feel the most comfortable with...

Scoring Levels

Zero: **No indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships**

Rationale: Most people require some degree of similarity in their relationships; it is simply a basic need. It follows then, that most responses will favor similarity. A minority will prefer relationships with those seen as "different," while a greater number will mention both "similar" and "different" but put emphasis on neither, or make a vague comment such as "not exactly like me." Responses of this type receive a score of **zero**.

i.e., feels most comfortable with those who are different:

- those who are different

i.e., a mixed response, with no weight on either:

- either, depending on whether I feel accepted by those people.
- the ones who are somewhat similar to me but not too much so.
- Those who are similar are comforting however they can also be repressive.
- someone/people who are very similar to me unless their differences can contribute positively to our friendship or relationship. (*values differences*).

One: **Some indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships**

Rationale: A simple "yes" receives a score of **one**. Minimal elaboration including statements such as "similarity promotes communication, understanding, etc." is permitted. Most responses will occur in this range in one form or another.

i.e., simple statement that similarity is preferred (minor elaboration permitted):

- those that are similar to me.
- people who are very similar (usually because they understand me a little better).

- people similar to me - then there is no small talk as we try to ignore our differences.
- Those who are similar to me as I feel I know them a lot better.
- The more similar. I like to know I can communicate easily with friends. I don't know how much a "different" person would understand.
- People who are like me, with the same dreams and desires.
- Those who are similar to me. They are the people I am most able to share with and grow from, because we can relate.

Two: **Clear indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships**

Rationale: A score of **two** is a rare occurrence for this sentence stem. Responses in this range will consist of a stated preference for similarity accompanied by some sort of elaboration. However, there is a marked qualitative difference both in tone and content between a "**one**" and "**two**" elaboration. Examples of "**two**" elaborations include: a) stated need for identical characteristics, b) exclusive similarity (i.e., intolerance of difference), c) a statement that twinship needs are a dominant feature of the respondent's friendship(s), or d) a "one" response stated in such an emphatic way that it must be considered a "two." Responses in this range often have a mildly xenophobic quality, or describe a relationship where similarity brings ease, simplicity, or security (in the sense that fusion/merger banishes anxiety).

- Those who are very similar to me - I know what to expect from them and I don't have to try so hard to understand them.
- Those who are very similar. It is easy to fit the role to relate to them because it is so close to yourself.
- The people who are similar to me. I enjoy having things in common, having conversations comes easily. I do not like having to make conversation with people who I am different from. I find it an effort, uncomfortable and I don't really care about their interests.

- The similar people. It is always comforting to rely on our common ground. It provides security.

Component T-1: Seeks relationships/friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values.

Stem t1c: Think of your best friend. Is it the similarities or differences in your personalities that makes you friends? For me, what really makes the friendship “click” ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships

Rationale: Any focus on differences, a balanced combination of similarity and differences, or friendships based on complementary personalities receives a score of **zero**.

i.e., differences:

- differences in personality but must have some basic values (honesty, kindness, etc.)
- the differences, as we are able to share our opinions on subjects and talk freely with each other.

i.e., combination of similarity and differences (with no particular emphasis on either):

- both similarities and differences. Share the similarities and learn the good things about the other from the difference.
- is the similarities (e.g. in humor) but the differences often make the friendship more interesting.
- is that we are similar in so many ways but yet so different. Apart from that the main thing is that we respect each other and are willing to share not only happiness, but also pain.

- it is the differences which make us click within the framework of similarity, i.e., we were raised differently, but we share some similar ideas.

i.e., friendship based on differences or complementary personalities:

- we have the same hopes and dreams - general outlook on life. But we are very different too. She is very outgoing, likes to be the center of attention, while I like to be in the background. We don't compete for attention because I don't want it!
- is the interplay of those similarities and differences in what we do or what we talk about. I know that if he encourages me to try something new I will probably like it after I get used to it.

i.e., responses unrelated to similarity or difference:

- is how we communicate deeply and openly express our feelings and opinions. Also, that we can make each other laugh.
- cerebral conversation. Intelligent, supported opinions that are progressive. I have the most stimulating conversations with my best friend.

One: **Some indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships**

Rationale: A score of one is given in for the following response types: a) a simple "similarities" statement, b) similarity conveyed through shared characteristics, or c) a combination of similarity and difference - with an emphasis on similarity.

i.e., basic "similarities" statement:

- are similar basic fundamental interests or values.
- the similarities in our characters that keep us close.

i.e., similarity indicated via shared characteristics:

- is that we're both great listeners and are both very caring people.
- people who are similar in nature, values, goals, interests, activities, socioeconomic status to some extent.

- are our similarities: our backgrounds, 'logical' thinking, senses of humor, common values.

i.e., mentions both similarity and difference, but emphasis given to similarity:

- are the similarities. The differences make the relationship more dynamic and exciting but the similarities are what make us bond and understand one another.
- similarities, sometimes a little difference can be interesting. But I like a person that is compatible.

Two: Clear indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships

Rationale: A score of **two** would require some sort of comprehensive or intense statement of the desire for a conforming/twinship relationship. For example, the key elements in the following response are: a) the idea of achieving a sense of "comfort" (i.e., a static, anxiety-free state), and b) the "acute understanding" of the other's identical characteristics.

- are the similarities. We can always find comfort in each other because we have an acute understanding of each other's likes and dislikes because they are the same as our own.

Component T-1: Seeks relationships/friendships/affiliation with others who conform to his/her own appearance, opinions or values.

Stem t1d: Having a partner who is very different from myself ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships

Rationale: This stem is a simple inversion of T1A. There are really only two potential responses: "is good" or "is bad." The scoring rationale is as follows: Any positive comment gets a score of **zero**. A negative

response with a note of tolerance gets a score of **one**. Any statement that such a state of affairs would be virtually intolerable warrants a score of **two**.

i.e., a positive response (with minor qualifications):

- is good because then I can be exposed to different ideas, ways of thinking, living, etc.
- can be exciting -- learning and experiencing new things. But, if they are too different and we have nothing in common, it won't last!
- is fun and exciting because I enjoy learning different perspectives on things. However, it can be frustrating when the person has no concern over time or responsibility.
- would be interesting because he could expose me to new things etc. But someone too different may pose a problem. (*scored as zero because response doesn't define "too different"*)

i.e., a balance of positive and negative with no stress on either:

- can pose a problem in the long term, but can also be mutually beneficial.
- would be more exciting but require more effort on my part.
- has some attraction because we can question each other's beliefs and we can learn a lot about ourselves by seeing an opposite. Being too different can become alienating if there is no commonality at all.
- is often a trying, difficult situation sometimes, but overall it can be very nice , finding common ground and enjoying each other's diversities.
- can create problems but can also be a learning experience. (*the "philosophical response"*)

i.e., evidence that the respondent is currently in a relationship with differences:

- is a trial at times, but is very much part of the real world of relationships. It is a constant realization to me how very different my husband is from me. At times he and I interpret very different things from the same situation. At times it can be very frustrating and lonely or wonderfully cool depending on the context. I think there's always some differences between men and women, bridges which can't be built, but I don't know if these are socialized or natural gulfs.

- has it's ups and downs. I am in this position now-we both have very different lives & interests & sometimes this makes it difficult to get excited about the other's life, day etc. All in all though as long as there is support, understanding & compromise - I prefer it!

One: **Some indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships**

Rationale: A score of **one** is given for responses that: a) state that differences could pose a problem, b) provide both sides of the argument with weight on the negative, or c) state why differences could be a problem.

i.e., simple statement that differences can pose a problem (with no qualifications to the contrary):

- doesn't give us a lot of common ground with which to communicate.
- is not something I would like to have.
- would probably not work out. Having to deal with someone different from myself during my leisure time would be a drain on my patience.
- is very difficult. It is hard to organize mutual affairs when they are approached from different viewpoints.

i.e., mixed response, with the balance in favor of the negative:

- would be interesting for a short period of time for the experience. Also depends on the differences - certain ones would not be acceptable (i.e. no relationship). However, for a long committed relationship (eg. marriage) it would not work.
- would be frustrating. There would be no common (or little) ground that we could share and talk about or do together. As long as there are some similarities and a basic similar philosophy, then differences are great.

i.e., lists specific requirements:

- is trying, depending on how they are different. If they are not independent or ignorant of knowledge in general we would be incompatible.
- is fun for having heated discussions but isn't much fun sexually.

Two: Clear indication that respondent seeks similarity in relationships

Rationale: Responses in the **two** range generally depict the respondent as someone who requires similarity in their relationships (with self-descriptors to that effect).

i.e., puts special emphasis on the need for similarity, and describes self as someone who needs similarity in relationships:

- can create potential conflict especially if our basic interests/values/attitudes differ. I can only handle superficial differences - not core ones.
- would be a nightmare. I like to do things alone as in my way. Compatibility is very important for me. I don't like to change very much.
- I do not think I would like a partner who is very different from myself, I would find it difficult to be close with a person who did not share interests/ traits with myself and most importantly a liking to talk about things.
- would be really difficult as I feel more at ease with someone when we have something significant in common - otherwise I feel as if I can't really trust them.

i.e., differences = intolerable, or differences = inevitable conflict:

- usually doesn't work because we usually can't relate to each other and we both get angry at each other.
- will lead to problems in the future. They say opposites attract but in the long run, I believe that if he does not share similar interest and values then the incompatibility will become slowly intolerable.
- can't cooperate with that person find very difficult to work or talk to can't talk about personal things.
- could be the start of trouble. I find conflict occurs mainly between myself and those who are different.
- will probably cause me to dislike him/her eventually.

i.e., clear distaste for differences:

- makes me uncomfortable because we don't have common interest. It's so boring to talk with this kind of person. I have to think what we should talk about. I hate to be the one start to talk when my partner is not interested in talking with me.
- I don't think would work. It is very important in my friendships/relationships that we share many of the same interests and beliefs. Some differences are good, but to be "very different" I couldn't handle. I'm not attracted to people who are very different from myself.

Component T-2: Becomes disillusioned or angry with partner when he/she discovers that he/she is not as identical to self as previously thought.

Stem t2a: If I arrive at the realization that someone who I consider to be a close friend is very different from me in some respect ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: **No indication that respondent would reject other because of differences**

Rationale: Any indication that the respondent feel at ease with people who are dissimilar or a simple statement he/she seeks to accommodate the friend's differences is scored as a **zero**. If the respondent discusses both similarity and difference, but places no emotional weight on either, that will be scored as a zero also. Responses that describe a reaction without specifying the outcome (and yield insufficient information) must be scored as zero.

i.e., feels at ease with differences:

- I would accept the friendship wholeheartedly despite our differences. After all, we had already established a bond together. Why give it up over differences?
- it doesn't bother me. What made us close in the first place is still there.

i.e., is able to accommodate differences:

- I would accept that difference and I would try to understand and maybe learn a few of her different views. At times the differences could lead to interesting debates and conversation.
- I would try hard to stay close with them, it would depend on what made them different, like if they were a Nazi or a member of the Reform Party.

i.e., insufficient/vague information:

- it can make things interesting or make us go separate ways depending on the issue.
- I would consider if that fact was relevant to our friendship enough to affect a change.
- I never had that happen. The closer I get to someone, the more connections I make, so that we become more alike. (*implicitly values similarity, but no indication of rejection*)

One: **Some indication that respondent would reject other because of differences**

Rationale: A score of **one** is given when the respondent expresses some form of disappointment or alienation (which does not state that the relationship is over), or disappointment combined with tolerance (or the stated possibility of tolerance). Examples include: a) simple disappointment, b) a statement that the lack of similarity will affect the relationship, c) indication that the friendship wanes, but some tolerance of difference allows it to continue, or d) a clear statement that dissimilarity might end the friendship.

i.e., simple disappointment:

- I would be disappointed.

i.e., simple statement that lack of similarity affects the friendship:

- I feel a little alienated from them.

i.e., does not like dissimilarity, but some effort is made to keep it going (not complete intolerance):

- I may drift away from them and not be so close to them, but still be friends.
- we probably would drift apart while fighting to stay together. I would try very hard to keep things as they were before - the same
- I'll probably inch out of the existing close relationship and just be friends with him/her.
- I continue being friends with the person even if we aren't as close as we used to be.

i.e., states that lack of similarity might end the friendship (tolerance is still a possibility):

- if it is different in a way that we can work around (different clothes, music), it doesn't matter. I think of it as a way to try something new. But if it is different in terms of our general beliefs or outlook on life, I don't find it as easy to relate to them.
- I would ask how this difference will negatively affect our relationship. If the factors are too strong to maintain a reasonable relationship, I would consider leaving it.

Note: the difference between these responses and the zero level "insufficient information" responses is that these are far more specific. For example, the second response actually states that the respondent might leave.

Two: **Clear indication that respondent would reject other because of differences**

Rationale: A score of **two** is given when the response indicates absolute intolerance of differences, inevitable alienation, and/or clear indication that this is characteristic of all this respondent's relationships.

i.e., unqualified alienation - the relationship is over:

- then we'll slowly drift apart and eventually go our own ways.
- I slowly retreat from that person.
- I choose to distance myself from them.
- then, I don't do anything drastic; I simply shy away from that person, due to this realization, by spending less time with them.

i.e., halfhearted attempt at being civil, but again, the relationship is over:

- I try to keep the friendship up, so as not be a snob, but there's not much motivation, and we gradually lose touch. (*note that the motivation is not because of tolerance of difference, but a matter of social etiquette*)
- I begin to slowly pull back from them, putting distance between us. I would always be nice and go out with them once in a while, but I wouldn't call them all the time or desire to see them a lot! (*as above*)

i.e., forced to reevaluate the situation (almost a sense of astonishment that this could even occur):

- I'm surprised and wonder on what our friendship is based. Usually our friendship will not continue, if the differences are too great.
- It makes me wonder what we have in common to keep us together.
- it scares me, and I would tend to back away until I could get to re-know her better.

Component T-2: Becomes disillusioned or angry with partner when he/she discovers that he/she is not as identical to self as previously thought.

Stem t2b: If I discover that a friend and I are very dissimilar ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication that respondent is bothered by differences

Rationale: Any indication that the respondent feel at ease with people who are dissimilar or a simple statement he/she seeks to accommodate the friend's differences is scored as a **zero**. If the respondent discusses both similarity and difference, but places no emotional weight on either, that will be scored as a zero also. Responses that describe a reaction without specifying the outcome (and yield insufficient information) must be scored as zero.

i.e., an accepting response:

- that's okay as long as we still care for one another.
- it wouldn't matter as long as it is something that we can get around. If they have a totally different outlook/lifestyle, I may not be able to relate to them as well but I would be able to learn from their differences.

One: **Some indication that respondent is bothered by differences**

Rationale: A score of **one** is given when the respondent expresses some form of disappointment or alienation (which does not state that the relationship is over), or disappointment combined with tolerance (or the stated possibility of tolerance). Examples may include: a) simple disappointment, b) a statement that the lack of similarity will affect the relationship, c) indication that the friendship wanes, but some tolerance of difference allows it to continue, or d) a clear statement that dissimilarity might end the friendship.

i.e., friendship is affected but continues:

- I am likely to go on being friends with that person but to perhaps withdraw slightly, i.e. not be perfectly natural with them, not share quite everything I am thinking.
- It bothers me and puts me off a bit. I hate it when friendships change - it scares me. Then I like to find ways we are the same.

i.e., unambiguous disappointment, but no statement made as to friendship ending:

- If that is my friend, the person would have to share the same basic values that I hold, e.g. kindness, honesty, etc.. If that person is dissimilar in this way, I would be disappointed that I didn't know that person better than I thought I did.

Two: **Clear indication that respondent is bothered by differences**

Rationale: A score of **two** is given when the response indicates absolute intolerance of differences, inevitable alienation, and/or clear indication that this is characteristic of all this respondent's relationships.

i.e., respondent states that he/she would end the friendship:

- I would minimize social contact with him/her and if we do have to interact, my level of self-disclosure would remain low. (*note element of distrust*)
- I distance myself from him/her.
- I would lose interest in that person and probably slowly wind down the friendship by not phoning them.
- I tend to become distant from them and look for friendship elsewhere.
- It would lead to conflict and the breakdown of the friendship.
- I would cool the friendship. What's the point?

Component T-2: Becomes disillusioned or angry with partner when he/she discovers that he/she is not as identical to self as previously thought.

Stem t2c: In my close friendships, a difference in outlook or lifestyle ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: **No indication that respondent would reject other because of differences**

Rationale: Because most people require some degree of similarity in relationships, very few respondents will actually state that they prefer no similarity. Therefore, any indication that the respondent feel at ease with people who are dissimilar or provides a simple statement he/she seeks to accommodate the friend's differences is scored as a **zero**. Three other zero response types are: a) if the respondent discusses both similarity and difference, but places no emotional weight on either, b) if the respondent describes a reaction without specifying the outcome (insufficient information), or c) the respondent makes it clear that they currently maintain a difference-based friendship.

i.e., not particularly bothered by the situation (may specify characteristics that would be intolerable to the average person:

- is welcome as it allows me to explore other views and interests.
- is okay as long as the people are good people by my standards.
- Makes a little difference. I can't stand people who are dirty and get up at 3 every afternoon.
- Does create pressure in the relationship. As long as it is not illegal I can overlook it.

i.e., describes mild friction, but appears to be in a current (functioning) difference-based friendship:

- Is tolerable but doesn't help the friendship. For example, I have a friend who is moderately Catholic, and I am an atheist. As a consequence, we have very different outlooks. However, the friendship still remains.

i.e., insufficient information:

- Can be problematic, depending on the degree of difference.

One: **Some indication that respondent would reject other because of differences**

Rationale: If the respondent finds this state of affairs difficult - without any evidence that it is intolerable, the response is given a score of **one**. Most responses will occur in this range.

i.e., if differences do exist they must be relatively minor for the relationship to function:

- can be positive or negative, depending on the outlook of lifestyle. A greater change or difference is more stressful.
- Tends to strain the relationship. I realize that the differences between my friends and I, while noticeable, are not that radical. Fundamental disagreements about certain things would make friendship difficult.
- In outlook is important. I like people with the same values, morals, standards. Lifestyle isn't important. They can do as they please.

i.e., differences viewed negatively:

- Is sometimes healthy, but most of the time potential for trouble.
- Is sometimes okay and sometimes not. Career-wise I feel okay about different choices, but if my morals differ from someone I am close to I tend to feel apprehensive toward them. I often secretly belittle their beliefs or morals if they differ from mine.
- Is not always easily acceptable.
- Often dampens my enthusiasm for the friendship.

Two: **Clear indication that respondent would reject other because of differences**

Rationale: Any response that clearly states that the respondent would find the situation intolerable or unworkable, is to be scored as a **two**. It is possible that a "one" response could be stated in such an emphatic way that it could be considered a "two." Very few responses will occur in this range.

i.e., describes his/her relationships as exclusively similarity-based:

- Is rare.
- does not really exist.
- hasn't happened. Most of my close friends have the same outlook or lifestyle that I do. In some of my other friendships where we are close (but not as close as I am with my best friends), I find that I am not able to totally relate to them because they have different experiences than I do.
- is intolerable if excessive. (does not define "excessive" yet use of "intolerable" makes it a two)
- Usually would cause conflict, which is why I have the same outlook and goals in life as my close friends. I find it difficult to get along with people who do not have the same goals.
- Bothers me if I don't understand it. I would rather associate with people who are the same as me.

Component T-2: Becomes disillusioned or angry with partner when he/she discovers that he/she is not as identical to self as previously thought.

Stem t2d: Consider these two scenes: In the first one, two friends stand side by side. It is obvious that they are quite different from one another. In the second scene, two other friends stand together, but unlike the first two, they are alike in many ways.
If I were in the first scene, I would feel ...
If I were in the second scene I would feel ...

Scoring Levels

Zero: No indication that respondent would reject other because of differences

Rationale: If the respondent feels comfortable or indifferent in the first (different) scene and uncomfortable or indifferent in the second (similar) scene, then the response gets a score of **zero**.

i.e., prefers the first scene or does not state a strong preference:

- Scene 1: fine - I have a friendship like this with one of my best friends. Scene 2: fine, for the same reason. I don't think that you need to be totally the same or different from a person to be their friend. As long as there is something that attracts you to one another - you feel good when you are with them and you are able to work out your differences, and be different enough from one another so you aren't bored, I think it can be a good friendship.
- Scene 1: strange yet proud of me. Scene 2: like I want to be different. I always want to conform to how others are, but at the same time, I try to be somewhat different to be me with. So being the exact same would motivate me to become different somehow. And to be different, I would try to be the same somehow.
- Scene 1: I have my own style myself. Scene 2: uncomfortable. I feel like my "shadow" on my side. If I were in the first scene, I feel very easy and I can act as my own style.

One: **Some indication that respondent would reject other because of differences**

Rationale: If the response states a preference for the second scene it receives a score of **one**.

i.e., prefers the second scene, values similarity:

- Scene 1: uncomfortable. I would feel uncomfortable because I think I wouldn't have anything in common with someone very different from me. Scene 2: comfortable. I'd feel comfortable because I'd notice that this person is somewhat like myself.
- Scene 1: funny. Scene 2: comfortable. I would wonder what things I had in common with the friend in the first scene. I seem to relate the way a person looks or dressed to his/her personality and interests. I would not raise an eyebrow in wondering why I am friends with the person in the second scene.

Two: **Clear indication that respondent would reject other because of differences**

Rationale: If the respondent states that the second scene is probably the only viable option, the response gets a score of **two**.

- Scene 1: strange because they are with differences. Scene 2: normal because they are like my friend and me. Most of the people around me have friend with a lot similarities. Two people have so many differences, it is hard for them to keep their friendship.
- Scene 1: bored and frustrated. Scene 2: excited and optimistic.
- Scene 1: a little estranged. Scene 2: more comfortable and at ease. In the first scene, my perception is that differences may produce a conflict which I would like to avoid unless that conflict draws us closer. In the second scene: Hey! It's my ideal picture of what a friendship based on similarities should be like and is.
- Scene 1: uncomfortable. Scene 2: companionship/united. The two stand together (alike) would make me feel as if I were not alone in my battle against the rest of the world.
- Scene 1: awkward and uncomfortable. Scene 2: comfortable. I do not feel comfortable with people who are different than me. I find it hard to make conversation, and find myself looking down on them and criticizing them. People who are like me, I feel comfortable and "at home" with.

Appendix H:

Consent Forms

INFORMED CONSENT BY SUBJECTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT OR EXPERIMENT

The University and those conducting this project subscribe to the ethical conduct of research and to the protection at all times of the interests, comfort, and safety of subjects. This form and the information it contains are given to you for your own protection and full understanding of the procedures. Your signature on this form will signify that you have received a document which describes the procedures, possible risks, and benefits of this research project, that you have received an adequate opportunity to consider the information in the document, and that you voluntarily agree to participate in the project.

Having been asked by Terry Estrin of the Psychology Dept. of Simon Fraser University to participate in a research project experiment, I have read the procedures described below.

I understand the procedures to be used in this experiment and the personal risks to me in taking part.

I understand that I may withdraw my participation in this experiment at any time and for any reason.

I also understand that I may register any complaint I might have about the experiment with William Krane, Chair of the Psychology Dept. of Simon Fraser University (291-3358).

I understand that I will be fully debriefed as to the purpose of this study following my participation, and that the experimenter will do his best to answer any questions that I may have.

I have been informed that the research material will be held confidential by the Principal Investigator. All raw data will be stored in a locked office in the department of psychology, kept separate from identifying information, and destroyed upon completion of the research. Data will later be available as group results only. I may obtain copies of the results of this study, upon its completion, by contacting Terry Estrin, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University.

I agree to participate by completing four personality inventories: one 45-item sentence completion form, a 352-item questionnaire, a 40-item questionnaire, and three brief 7-point rating scales.

During the time period: Jan. 1, 2000 to Sept. 1, 2000

at: the Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University

NAME (please type or print legibly): _____

ADDRESS: _____

SIGNATURE: _____ **WITNESS:** _____

DATE: _____

**INFORMED CONSENT BY CPC CLIENTS TO PARTICIPATE
IN A RESEARCH PROJECT OR EXPERIMENT**

The University and those conducting this project subscribe to the ethical conduct of research and to the protection at all times of the interests, comfort, and safety of subjects. This form and the information it contains are given to you for your own protection and full understanding of the procedures. Your signature on this form will signify that you have received a document which describes the procedures, possible risks, and benefits of this research project, that you have received an adequate opportunity to consider the information in the document, and that you voluntarily agree to participate in the project.

Having been asked by Terry Estrin of the Psychology Dept. of Simon Fraser University to participate in a research project experiment, I have read the procedures described below.

I agree to participate by completing four personality inventories: one 45-item sentence completion form, a 352-item questionnaire, a 40-item questionnaire, and three brief 7-point rating scales. I am aware that my therapist will also take part in this study by completing a description form.

During the time period: Jan. 1, 2000 to May. 1, 2002

I understand that my therapist may decline my participation if he/she believes it is not in my best interest. The researcher will contact my therapist to ask this question and to confirm the length of treatment. Other information regarding my treatment will not be disclosed to the researcher.

I understand that upon completion of the test package, I will be asked if I wish feedback on the results, and that this is my decision alone. My decision regarding feedback will in no way affect my status as a client. I understand that it is my decision whether my therapist views the test results, and that this decision will in no way affect my status as a client.

I understand the procedures to be used in this experiment and the personal risks to me in taking part. None of these measures contains material that might be considered stressful to a participant. However, if I were to become distressed while completing the measures, the researcher will be available to answer any questions, and contact my therapist with my consent. I understand that I may withdraw my participation in this experiment at any time, and that my participation or lack thereof will not in any way affect my status as a client.

I have been informed that the research material will be held confidential by the Principal Investigator. All raw data will be stored in a locked office in the department of psychology, kept separate from identifying information, and destroyed upon completion of the research. Data will later be available as group results only. I may obtain copies of the results of this study, upon its completion, by contacting Terry Estrin, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University.

I also understand that I may register any complaint I might have about the experiment with William Krane, Chair of the Psychology Dept. of Simon Fraser University (291-3358).

I understand that I will be fully debriefed as to the purpose of this study following my participation, and that the experimenter will do his best to answer any questions that I may have.

NAME (please type or print legibly): _____

ADDRESS: _____

SIGNATURE: _____ **WITNESS:** _____

DATE: _____

**INFORMED CONSENT BY CPC STUDENT THERAPISTS TO PARTICIPATE
IN A RESEARCH PROJECT OR EXPERIMENT**

The University and those conducting this project subscribe to the ethical conduct of research and to the protection at all times of the interests, comfort, and safety of subjects. This form and the information it contains are given to you for your own protection and full understanding of the procedures. Your signature on this form will signify that you have received a document which describes the procedures, possible risks, and benefits of this research project, that you have received an adequate opportunity to consider the information in the document, and that you voluntarily agree to participate in the project.

Having been asked by Terry Estrin of the Psychology Dept. of Simon Fraser University to participate in a research project experiment, I have read the procedures described below.

I agree to participate by completing a rating scale that predicts my client's responses to a sentence completion test. I am aware that my client will complete four personality inventories: one 45-item sentence completion form, a 352-item questionnaire, a 40-item questionnaire, and three brief 7-point rating scales. I have been informed that my client is aware of my participation in this study.

During the time period: Jan. 1, 2000 to May. 1, 2002

I understand that upon completion of the test package, I will be asked if I wish test results feedback. I am however, aware that the final decision regarding test feedback remains with my client, who will decide whether he/she alone will learn the results, or whether those results will be communicated to both of us by the researcher. I understand that my client's decision will in no way affect his/her status regarding therapy and that my decision will in no way affect my status regarding training and evaluation. I understand that both I and/or my client may withdraw from this experiment at any time and for any reason, and that our decisions will not impact our status as client or student.

I understand the procedures to be used in this experiment and the personal risks to me in taking part. I understand that the researcher will ask my opinion as to whether it is in my client's interest to participate. If it is my judgment that it is not in my client's best interest to participate in this study, I may decline participation for my client.

I have been informed that the research material will be held confidential by the Principal Investigator. All raw data will be stored in a locked office in the department of psychology, kept separate from identifying information, and destroyed upon completion of the research. Data will later be available as group results only. I may obtain copies of the results of this study, upon its completion, by contacting Terry Estrin, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University.

I also understand that I may register any complaint I might have about the experiment with William Krane, Chair of the Psychology Dept. of Simon Fraser University (291-3358).

I understand that I will be fully debriefed as to the purpose of this study following my participation, and that the experimenter will do his best to answer any questions that I may have.

NAME (please type or print legibly): _____

ADDRESS: _____

SIGNATURE: _____ **WITNESS:** _____

DATE: _____

Appendix I:

Descriptive Statistics: PRF-E and NPI

Personality Research Form – E

Scale	Full Sample N = 160							Student Sample N = 140							Clinical Sample N = 20						
	Range	Min	Max	M	S	S ²		Range	Min	Max	M	S	S ²		Range	Min	Max	M	S	S ²	
Ab	48	25	73	44.56	9.34	87.19		48	25	73	44.05	9.36	87.67		33	31	64	48.10	8.55	73.15	
Ac	45	18	63	46.71	9.65	93.09		45	18	63	46.94	9.75	94.97		34	25	59	45.15	9.02	81.29	
Af	43	28	71	52.61	8.72	76.03		38	33	71	53.64	8.17	66.82		35	28	63	45.40	9.21	84.88	
Ag	45	31	76	55.64	9.20	84.62		45	31	76	55.89	9.53	90.89		22	42	64	53.90	6.29	39.57	
Au	61	29	90	46.76	10.34	106.86		61	29	90	46.21	10.47	109.60		31	37	68	50.60	8.64	74.67	
Ch	52	18	70	46.95	10.08	101.70		46	24	70	47.14	9.89	97.77		39	18	57	45.65	11.56	133.71	
Cs	42	27	69	50.37	8.84	78.08		42	27	69	50.49	8.51	72.34		37	31	68	49.50	11.10	123.32	
De	40	36	76	56.83	8.81	77.64		39	37	76	57.41	8.65	74.78		31	36	67	52.75	9.10	82.72	
Do	40	29	69	51.44	9.62	92.49		40	29	69	51.99	9.57	91.58		30	35	65	47.65	9.31	86.66	
En	42	22	64	45.04	9.50	90.33		42	22	64	45.14	9.48	89.91		39	22	61	44.35	9.88	97.61	
Ex	36	34	70	53.06	9.97	99.49		36	34	70	53.72	9.95	99.02		31	35	66	48.40	9.06	82.04	
Ha	40	31	71	52.16	9.42	88.65		40	31	71	51.90	9.52	90.69		29	39	68	54.00	8.62	74.32	
Im	37	36	73	53.23	8.77	76.96		37	36	73	53.29	8.76	76.69		34	37	71	52.85	9.10	82.77	
Nu	41	26	67	50.04	8.34	69.58		41	26	67	50.30	8.34	69.49		29	36	65	48.20	8.36	69.85	
Or	35	32	67	47.06	9.24	85.37		35	32	67	47.06	9.08	82.49		35	32	67	47.05	10.53	110.89	
Pl	46	27	73	52.95	9.62	92.45		43	30	73	53.81	9.29	86.27		36	27	63	46.90	9.93	98.52	
Se	48	18	66	46.92	9.62	92.52		48	18	66	46.41	9.82	96.46		26	36	62	50.50	7.29	53.11	
Sr	40	33	73	55.44	8.79	77.30		40	33	73	56.09	8.81	77.60		27	36	63	50.90	7.38	54.41	
Su	49	29	78	55.19	9.51	90.51		49	29	78	55.94	9.71	94.34		23	37	60	49.95	5.84	34.16	
Un	46	22	68	44.79	9.50	90.31		46	22	68	43.99	9.39	88.17		28	37	65	50.35	8.57	73.50	
In	70	43	113	52.32	13.10	171.51		70	43	113	52.97	13.75	189.14		13	45	58	47.75	5.15	26.51	
Dy	52	18	70	45.77	10.43	108.74		52	18	70	46.21	10.76	115.78		24	30	54	42.65	7.16	51.29	

Note. Ab = Abasement, Ac = Achievement, Af = Affiliation, Ag = Aggression, Au = Autonomy, Ch = Change, Cs = Cognitive Structure, De = Defence, Do = Dominance, En = Endurance, Ex = Exhibition, Ha = Harmavoidance, Im = Impulsivity, Nu = Nurture, Or = Order, Pl = Play, Se = Sentience, Sr = Social Recognition, Su = Succorance, Un = Understanding, In = Infrequency, Dy = Desireability.

Descriptive Statistics: Narcissistic Personality Inventory


Scale	Full Sample N = 160						Student Sample N = 140						Clinical Sample N = 19					
	Range	Min	Max	M	S	S ²	Range	Min	Max	M	S	S ²	Range	Min	Max	M	S	S ²
NPI	39	0	39	16.68	7.67	58.89	39	0	39	15.44	9.11	83.03	21	0	21	9.95	5.49	30.16
Auth	8	0	8	4.26	2.46	6.04	8	0	8	3.98	2.66	7.08	6	0	6	2.20	2.31	5.33
Exhib	7	0	7	2.57	2.01	4.05	7	0	7	2.43	2.11	4.47	3	0	3	1.15	1.04	1.08
Superior	5	0	5	2.40	1.52	2.30	5	0	5	2.16	1.66	2.75	4	0	4	1.95	1.28	1.63
Entitle	6	0	6	2.21	1.70	2.91	6	0	6	2.06	1.78	3.18	4	0	4	1.15	1.23	1.50
Exploit	5	0	5	1.78	1.35	1.84	5	0	5	1.66	1.41	1.99	4	0	4	0.95	1.10	1.21
Self Suff	6	0	6	2.27	1.40	1.96	6	0	6	2.05	1.53	2.35	4	0	4	1.75	1.21	1.46
Vanity	3	0	3	1.21	1.11	1.23	3	0	3	1.11	1.12	1.27	3	0	3	0.80	1.01	1.01

Note. NPI = full scale NPI, Auth = Authority, Exhib = Exhibitionism, Superior = Superiority, Entitle = Entitlement, Exploit = Exploitativeness, Self Suff = Self-Sufficiency.

Appendix J:

Inside-Out Plots: Two and Four Factors

Inside-Out Plot: Two Factors



Inside-Out Plot: Four Factors

